AN ESSAY UPON THE PROBABLE METHODS Of making a People Gainers IN THE Ballance of Trade.

Treating of these Heads, viz.

Of the People of *England*.
Of the Land of *England*, and its Product.
Of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.
That a Country cannot increase in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

By the Author of

The Essay on Ways and Means.

The Second Edition.

Inter quæ L. Piso ambitum fori, corrupta judicia, sævitiam oratorum, accusationes minitantium increpans, abire se, & cedere urbe, victurum in aliquo abdito & longinquo rure testabitur. Simul Curiam relinquebat. Tacit. lib. 2. Annal.

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Books writ by the ſame Author, and Printed for *James Knapton* at the *Crown* in St. *Paul*'s Church-Yard, *viz.*

DIſcourſes on the Publick Revenues, and on the Trade of *England*: In Two Parts.

A Diſcourſe upon Grants and Reſumptions. Showing how our Anceſtors have proceeded with ſuch Miniſters as have procured to themſelves Grants of the Crown-Revenue; and that the Forfeited Eſtates ought to be applied towards the Payment of the Publick Debts.

AN

AN ESSAY UPON THE PROBABLE METHODS Of making a People Gainers IN THE Ballance of Trade.

SECT. I.

THE Writer of these Papers stands in a manner engag'd to say something upon this Subject, having in his Discourses, publish'd last Year, promis'd to handle several Points concerning the Ballance of Trade; to which Design he was principally induc'd by the Calculations then Communicated to him by *Gregory King* Esq; *Lancaster* Herald.

The *Eſſay upon Ways and Means*, and the Diſcourſes lately ſet forth *On the Revenues*, and *On the Trade of* England, did meet with ſo good a Reception from the beſt ſort of Men, that he finds himſelf encourag'd once more to offer to the Publick his Obſervations of the like Nature; from which, if any thing can be gather'd that may promote, or that will hereafter tend to the Welfare and Proſperity of his Country, he ſhall think his Labours well rewarded.

'Tis true, his Computations were attacked, ſometime after they were publiſh'd, by two Pamphlets; but ſo impotently, that he thinks he cannot do himſelf greater Right, than to deſire that all People who give themſelves the trouble to read his Writings, would likewiſe be pleas'd to peruſe Mr. *P. R*——*y*'s Obſervations and Mr. *T. E*——*d*'s Remarks upon the ſaid Books. And he doubts not, but that any Impartial Reader, by comparing the Schemes together, and by duly weighing the Arguments of both ſides, will think theſe Anſwerers have rather ſtrengthen'd and confirm'd, than ſhaken his Foundations.

'Tis an eaſie matter to pick out of any Book, here and there, ſomething to Cavil at; which is the common Method, taken by the little Scriblers of the Town, of Anſwering, as they call it, a Writer; but all Judicious Men know that an able Author proceeds quite another way; and if his Adverſary has advanc'd a wrong Propoſition, or a falſe Hypotheſis, he ſets up ſomething in the room of what he would pull down, he offers another Propoſition or Hypotheſis, which ſhall viſibly be truer, wiſer and better founded: All other arguing (eſpecially where any new Matter has been advanc'd) being but wretched Sophiſtry, that carries with it no Conviction. What has been here ſaid, is all the Reply

ply the Writer of these Papers designs to make to the two forementionʼd Pamphlets and their Authors, who (whatever they may be good for else) have shewn by their Works, that Figures and Calculations, about the King's Revenue, are very little their Province.

He thought it might be of use (in the heat of a War that had then the appearance of lasting a great while) to propose *Ways and Means* by which Taxes might be laid more equally, and by consequence more lightly upon the People: And when the Peace was concluded, he believ'd he might do his Country Service to treat of the *Publick Revenues* and of the *Trade of* England, the quiet Times which the King's Valour and Wisdom had newly procur'd, seeming most seasonable to propose some kind of Remedy for those Disorders in the Administration, which a War of such length had undoubtedly occasion'd. In the Tracts therefore which he publish'd last Year, he handled *Credit*, *The King's Revenues*, *The Publick Debts and Engagements*; and in the second Volume several Points relating to Trade, thereby to give some View, what Improvements this Nation was capable of, under a careful and steady Management.

And having deeply imprinted in his Mind, the Notion that all our Thoughts, Endeavours and Designments should tend to the Good and Welfare of our Country; and being convinc'd, that even where Abilities are wanting, the very Intentions are commendable and virtuous, he is resolv'd to continue his Studies upon the same Subject, and to look yet farther into the Condition and Posture of this Kingdom.

He is now indeed call'd up to a Station, wherein he has the opportunity of delivering his Thoughts concerning the Business of *England* another way than by his Pen; but 'tis many Years since he had the Honour to sit in Parliament; and he doubts very

ry much, whether he ſhall be able to arrive at any degree of expreſſing himſelf readily and well; without which, the beſt and moſt uſeful Matter loſes all its Energy and Effect, before a great Aſſembly. Writing and Speaking are Talents very different; a tolerable Stile may be attain'd to by great Application and Diligence; but Elocution is a Gift (and if employ'd to honeſt Uſes) one of the greateſt Bounties Nature can beſtow upon a Man: He who has not the Seeds of it within him, ſhall never come at it by Art or Labour; and (which perhaps is not vulgarly obſerv'd) Writing much extinguiſhes the Faculty of Talking well off hand, in ſome Perſons who wouldo therwiſe have a competent ſhare thereof; for if the Writer be of any Form, he accuſtoms himſelf to a Correctneſs and a Choice of Words: And this Nicety and Care beget a diffidency in him which is altogether inconſiſtent with the Happineſs of Speaking well in Publick. Such therefore, as fear they cannot deliver their Thoughts well and clearly another way, muſt commit them to Writing, in order to make whatever Qualities they have, of Service to their Country.

The Matters we have hitherto handled, have been in a manner intirely new, and ſuch wherein very little Help could be had from Books; and (it being the Intereſt of ſome Perſons of no ſmall Power in the Management of Affairs, that many Truths, important for *England* to be known, ſhould rather be conceal'd, if poſſible, in the Center of the Earth, than laid open) the Aids and Lights which might be gather'd from the publick Accompts and Offices, have been induſtriouſly with-held from all who are not ſervile Applauders of their wild and deſtructive Conduct; however, he will proceed on with his Work, notwithſtanding the potent Malice of ſuch Men, utterly indifferent how much his Inquiries offend them, provided they

they yield any Benefit to the King and Kingdom.

His Aim always has been and ever ſhall be, to ſhew how the Wealth and Strength of *England* is to be ſecur'd and improv'd; to ſet the Matters thereunto conducing in a true Light; to inſtill into the Minds of young Gentlemen a deſire of looking into the Revenues and Trade of the Nation; that having therein an inſight themſelves, they may not be, in ſome future Reign, inſnar'd by the wicked Arts of falſe and rapacious Miniſters, who will be ever craving for large Supplies, but careleſs how they waſt the publick Treaſure; who will be always coveting new Fonds, which they will lay by as ſo much Lumber of the State, when they have borrow'd all they can upon 'em, not minding how any new Branch is manag'd; who will be for ſhearing the Sheep as many times as they can, every Year, without any care of the Flock, or how the Fleece ſhall grow again; and who will be for pulling down the Common-wealth, ſo they may build up their own Fortunes.

It ſhall not be here argu'd, whether the Skill of Phiſick be now brought to Perfection, or whether it is yet capable of further Improvements; but this may be ſafely pronounc'd, That the Knowledge of the Sinews, Muſcles, Arteries and Veins, with the late diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood and all the Parts of Anatomy, conduce very much te render this dark Science more plain and certain.

In the ſame manner, ſuch as would underſtand the Body-Politick, its true Conſtitution, its State of Health, its Growth or Decay, its Strength or Weakneſs, and how to apply Remedies to the various Diſtempers to which it is incident, muſt ſtudy and look narrowly into all the diſtinct parts of the Common-wealth, its Trade, the Current Mony, (which is its flowing Blood) the Arts, Labour and Manufactures, and the number of its People;

with many other things which altogether are the Members of which the great Body is compos'd.

From these Topicks, to reason upon Matters of Government, has been the Method we have hitherto taken, and which we shall persue in the following Tract; and the way we go of arguing and concluding upon things by Figures, being in a manner new, and made use of but by two or three before us, and that too but very superficially, 'tis hop'd Grains of Allowance will be made, and that we shall be look'd upon as Beginners of an Art not yet Polish'd, and which Time may bring to more Perfection.

In all Arts and Sciences, the first Inventions have been rude and unskilful: Very antiently, the *Ægyptians* knew something of Geometry, and the *Assyrians* of Astronomy: but as well these, as all other parts of Knowledge, were but a shapeless Body, till brought into some Form by the artful Hands of *Pherecides*, *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Pythagoras*; and yet Philosophy had neither Strength nor Beauty, till it was further improv'd in the three successive Schools of *Socrates*, *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

What has been here said of sublimer Things, holds as well in Speculations of an inferiour Nature, and in Arts meerly Mechanical, whose first Principles and Rudiments must be imperfect. But if this our manner of Inquiring into Matters that relate to Polity and Government, be found any ways Instructive and Beneficial to the Publick, we hope hereafter to be follow'd by abler Hands, who shall finish what we are but beginning.

We have formerly said, * *That to find out the true Ballance of Trade, in order to adapt thereunto our Laws and Form of Living, would bring as much Wealth to this Country, as is requisite to render a Nation safe and happy. That an exact Ballance between Us and every*

* *Discourses on the Publick Revenues and Trade*, part 2d, p. 331.

every distinct Place, perhaps cannot by any humane Skill be attain'd to; and that it is not certain whether a Scrutiny so very Nice, would be of any Use. But that without doubt, a general State of this Matter, form'd upon strict Enquiry, with Deliberation and Skill; and such an one as would carry with it a Demonstration of being somewhat near the Truth, must be a great Help to the Rulers and Ministers of a Country, and a good Guide in many important Councils.

That we have been heretofore large Gainers by Trade, is manifest from the expensive War we were able to carry on for so many Years; and tho' to find out in what Particulars we got or lost, may be very difficult; yet to give some general View of the matter may not be impossible: And we shall endeavour to shew from whence such may take their Rise, who would have some Prospect of a thing so vast and that seems at such a distance.

And albeit to know the *Quantum* of our yearly Gains, may not perhaps so much import the State; yet to be watchful that we do not lose, waste and impair from time to time, must certainly be the concern of every one who loves his Country; and as it behoves private Men frequently to Ballance their Accompts, and to see how their Condition stands; so without doubt, it is a Duty incumbent upon those who are in Power, very often to contemplate the Posture of the Nation, in order to this, that growing Mischiefs may have a sudden Cure.

As the Wealth of all kinds stor'd up in this Kingdom was of late our chief Support, so what we are hereafter to get, must defend us against the Accidents at home and abroad, to which all Governments are liable; and upon this Account the Motions of Trade ought to be observ'd with a strict and careful Eye.

And we owe it to our Country to communicate

what we think may conduce to make it flouriſh; and the Men in Power ſhould encourage ſuch Attempts, at leaſt they ſhould not oppreſs nor contrive their Ruin, who employ their whole time, and impair their own Health, in ſtudying to promote the Common Good.

But they who Act upon a Principle are not eaſily diſhearten'd. In this *Eſſay* we ſhall ſet forth ſome probable Methods of making a Nation Gainers in the Ballance of Trade: And we ſhall cloſe the Diſcourſe with endeavouring to ſhew, That this Ballance is not to be put of our Side, (by which we mean that a Country cannot increaſe in Wealth and Power) but by private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a ſteady Courſe of Honeſty, Care and Wiſdom, in ſuch as are truſted with the Adminiſtration.

The Wounds of the late War have drein'd us of ſo much Blood, and our Foreign Commerce has met with ſuch a Ruffle and Interruption in all Parts of the World, and our Neighbours grow ſo faſt upon us, ſome in Wealth and others in Shipping and the Skill of Trade, that Poverty muſt grow upon us apace, our Naval Strength muſt decreaſe, and we muſt utterly loſe the Dominion of the Sea, unleſs the Legiſlative Authority exert it ſelf with Vigor, and interpoſe betimes to prevent our impending Ruin.

We have ſaid formerly, * *That Gold and Silver are indeed the Meaſure of Trade, but that the Spring and Original of it, in all Nations, is the Natural or Artificial Product of the Country; that is to ſay, what their Land, or what their Labour and Induſtry produces.*

* *Diſcourſes on the Publick Revenues and on Trade*, Part 2d, p. 15.

There is no Man that can reaſonably diſpute this Poſition; and if granted, it follows from thence, That to know rightly how the Ballance of Trade ſtands with any Nation, a due Inſpection muſt be made into their Natural or Artificial Product.

But

But this Natural or Artificial Product being moſt of it the Reſult of the Peoples Labour and Induſtry, we ſhall be ſtill in the dark as to all Inquiries of this kind, without maturely conſidering the Numbers of the People.

In theſe ſort of Speculations not only the Quantity but Quality of the Inhabitants muſt be duly ponder'd; they muſt be divided into their ſeveral Ranks and Claſſes: It muſt be diſtinguiſh'd who by their Arts, Labour or Induſtry are increaſing, and who by their Expence, Poverty, or Sloth, are decreaſing the Kingdom's Wealth. Of theſe Sub-diviſions are likewiſe to be made, of what Numbers are employ'd in the Church, in War, in the Fleets Mercantile and Warlike, in the Law, in Offices, in Merchandize, in Shop-keeping and Trades, in Handicrafts; and who both of the higher and lower Degree are Perſons living upon their Eſtates; who are Freeholders, Farmers, Labouring People, Servants, Cottagers, Alms-People, and Vagrants.

The People being thus diſtributed into their proper Ranks, we are likewiſe to inquire into the Quality of the Land they are to cultivate and improve, in order to that Natural or Artificial Product which is the Medium whereby a Superlucration of Wealth is to be gotten. We ſhould examin what Proportion of it is Arable, Paſture and Meadow, Woods and Coppices, Foreſts, Parks and Common, Heaths, Moors, Mountains, and barren Land, Houſes and Homeſteads, *&c.* Rivers, Lakes, Meers, Roads, Ways, and waſt Land.

The Land is to yield the Product, which Product is to yield the Wealth, ſo that we ſhould inquire how this Product ſtands in every particular, but more eſpecially in the Principal conſtituent Parts of *England*'s Strength, namely Wooll, Corn, and our Mines; for 'tis by the well ordering and

wiſe

wiſe diſpoſition of theſe Branches of our Wealth, that we are to be Gainers in the Balance of Trade.

We ſhall therefore handle diſtinctly theſe Heads, *viz.* the People, the Land and its Product, and ſhall endeavour to lay down ſeveral Matters, from whence (peradventure with good Grounds of Probability) ſome Concluſions may be made in relation to our preſent Subject; and becauſe Taxes influence very much in the Ballance of Trade, as will be ſhewn hereafter, we ſhall likewiſe ſay ſomething concerning our Payments to the Publick.

SECT. II.

Of the People of England.

THE Writer of theſe Papers has ſeen the before-mentioned Mr. *King*'s Natural and Political Obſervations and Concluſions upon the State and Condition of *England* in Manuſcript. The Calculations therein contain'd are very accurate, and more perhaps to be rely'd upon than any thing that has been ever done of the like kind. This Skilful and Laborious Gentleman has taken the right Courſe to form his ſeveral Schemes about the Numbers of the People; for beſides many different Ways of Working, he has very carefully inſpected the Poll-Books, and the Diſtinctions made by thoſe Acts, and the Produce in Mony of the reſpective Polls, going every where by reaſonable and diſcreet Mediums: Beſides which Pains, he has made Obſervations of the very Facts in particular Towns and Places,

Places, from which he has been able to judge and conclude more ſafely of others; ſo that he ſeems to have look'd further into this Myſtery than any other Perſon.

With his Permiſſion, we ſhall offer to the Publick ſuch of his Computations as may be of uſe, and enlighten the Matter before us.

He lays down, That if the firſt People of *England* was by a Colony or Colonies, conſiſting of a Number between a Hundred and a Thouſand People, (which ſeems probable) ſuch Colony or Colonies might be brought over between the Year of the World 2400 and 2600. *viz.* about eight or nine Hundred Years after the Flood, and fourteen or fifteen Hundred Years before the Birth of Chriſt; at which time the World might have about a Million of Families, and four or five Millions of People.

From which Hypotheſis, it will follow by an orderly Series of Increaſe.

That when the *Romans* invaded *England* fifty three Years before Chriſt's time, the Kingdom might have about 360,000 People, and at Chriſt's Birth about four Hundred Thouſand.

That at the *Norman* Conqueſt, *Ann. Chriſt.* 1066. the Kingdom might contain ſomewhat above 2,000,000.

That *Anno* 1260. or about 200 Years after the *Norman* Conqueſt, it might contain about 2,750,000 People, or half the preſent Number: So that the People of *England* may have doubled in about 435 Years laſt paſt.

That in probability the next doubling will be in about 600 Years to come, *viz.* by the Year 2300. at which time it may have about 11,000,000 of People, and the Kingdom containing about 39 Millions of Acres, there will be then about three Acres and a half *per* Head.

That

That the Increaſe of the Kingdom for every Hundred Years of the laſt preceeding Term of doubling, and the ſubſequent Term of doubling, may have been, and in probability may be, according to the following Scheme.

Anno Chriſti.	*Number of People.*	*Increaſe every Hundred Years.*
1300	2,860.000	
		440,000.
1400	3,300,000	
		540,000.
1500	3,840,000	
		780,000.
1600	4,620,000	
		880,000.
1700	5,500,000	
		920,000.
1800	6,420,000	
		930,000.
1900	7,350,000	
		930,000.
2000	8,280,000	
		925,000.
2100	9,205,000	
		910,000.
2200	10,115,000	
		985.000.
2300	11,000,000	

Whereby it may appear, that the Increaſe of the Kingdom being 880,000 People in the laſt Hundred Years, 920,000 in the next ſucceeding hundred Years, the Annual Increaſe at this time may be about 9000 Souls *per Annum.*

But

But whereas the Yearly Births of the Kingdom are about 1 in 28:95, or } 190,000 Souls.

And the Yearly Burials 1 in 32:35, or } 170,000 Souls.

Whereby the Yearly Increaſe would be } 20,000 Souls.

It is to be noted,

1*ſt*. That the Allowance for Plagues and great Mortalities may come to at a Medium	*p. An.* 4000	
2*dly*. Foreign or Civil Wars at a Medium.	3500	
3*dly*. The Sea conſtantly employing about 40,000 may precipitate the death of about	2500	11,000 *per An.*
4*thly*. The Plantations (over and above the Acceſſion of Foreigners) may carry away	1000	

Whereby the neat Anual Increaſe may be but. } 9000 Souls.

That of theſe 20,000 Souls which would be the Annual Increaſe of the Kingdom by Procreation, were it not for the formention'd Abatements.

The Country Increaſes Annually by Procreation } 20,000 Souls.

The Cities and Towns, excluſive of *London*, by Procreation } 2000 Souls.

But *London* and the Bills of Mortality decreaſe Annually } 2000 Souls.

So that *London* requires a Supply of 2000 Souls *per An.* to keep it from decreaſing, beſides a further Supply

Supply of about 3000 *per An.* for its Increaſe at this time. In all 5000, or above a half of the Kingdoms neat Increaſe.

Mr. *King* further obſerves, That by the Aſſeſſments on Marriages Births and Burials, and the Collectors Returns thereupon, and by the Pariſh Regiſters, it appears, That the Proportions of Marriages, Births and Burials, are according to the following Scheme.

Vide Scheme A.

Whence it may be obſerv'd, That in 10,000 Coexiſting Perſons,

There are 71 or 72 Marriages in the Country producing 343 Children.

78 Marriages in the Towns producing 351 Children.

94 Marriages in *London* producing 376 Children.

Whereby it follows,

Firſt, That tho' each Marriage in *London* produces fewer People than in the Country, yet *London* in general having a greater Proportion of Breeders, is more prolifick than the other great Towns, and the great Towns are more prolifick than the Country.

Secondly, That if the People of *London* of all Ages were as long liv'd, as thoſe in the Country, *London* would increaſe in People much faſter *pro rata* than the Country.

Thirdly, That the Reaſons why each Marriage in *London* produces fewer Children than the Country Marriages, ſeem to be

Firſt, From the more frequent Fornications and Adulteries.

Secondly,

Scheme A.

People.		*Annual Marriages.*			
530,000	*Lodon* and Bills, of Mortality —	1 in 106.	In all-- 5000.	Producing 4.	Children each.
870,000	The Cities and Market Towns—	1 in 128.	In all-- 6800.	Producing 4.5	Children each.
,100,000	The Villages and Hamlets —	1 in 141.	In all--29200.	Producing 4.8	Children each.
,500,000		1 in 134	41000.	4.64	

	Anuual Births.		*Annual Burials.*	
London and Bills of Mortality —	1 in 26½.	In all 20000.	1 in 24.1	In all 22000.
The Cities and Market Towns—	1 in 28½.	In all 30600.	1 in 30.4	In all 28600.
The Villages and Hamlets ——	1 in 29·4	In all 139400.	1 in 34.4	In all 119400.
Place this Scheme p. 14.	1 in 28.95	190000.	1 in 32.35	170000.

Scheme B.

	Males.
In *London* and Bills of Mortality ——	10 t
In the other Cities and Market Towns ——	8 t
In the Villages and Hamlets —— ——	100 t
	27 t

That as to other Distinctions they appear b

Husbands and Wives at above—	34½ *per Cen*
Widowers at above ——	1½ *per Cen*
Widows at about —— ——	4½ *per Cen*
Children at above —— —	45 *per Cen*
Servants at about —— ——	10½ *per Cen*
Sojourners and single Persons—	4 *per Cen*
	100

And that the different Proportions in each o
Towns, and the Villages, may the better

	London *and Bills of Mortality.*	*Souls.*	T
Husband and Wives	37 *per Cent.*	196,100	
Widowers ——	2 *per Cent.*	10,600	
Widows ——	7 *per Cent.*	37,100	
Children ——	33 *per Cent.*	174,900	
Servants ——	13 *per Cent.*	68,900	
Sojourners ——	8 *per Cent.*	42,400	
	100	530,000	1

Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.	Both.
10 to 13.		230,000	300,000	530,000
8 to 9.		410,000	460,000	870,000
100 to 99.		2,060,000	2,040,000	4,100,000
27 to 28.		2,700,000	2,800,000	5,500,000

ear by the ſaid Aſſeſſments to bear theſe Proportions,

	People.	Males.	Females.
r Cent.	1,900,000	950,000	950,000
r Cent.	90,000	90,000	
r Cent.	240,000		240,000
r Cent.	2,500,000	1,300,000	1,200,000
r Cent.	560,000	260,000	300,000
r Cent.	210,000	100,000	110,000
	5,500,000	2,700,000	2,800,000

ch of the ſaid Articles between London, *the Great etter appear, he has form'd the following Scheme.*

The other Cities and great Towns.	Souls.	*The Villages and Hamlets.*	Souls.
36 *per Cent.*	313,200	34 *per Cent.*	1,394,000
2 *per Cent.*	17,400	1½ *per Cent.*	61,500
6 *per Cent.*	52,200	4½ *per Cent.*	184,500
40 *per Cent.*	348,000	47 *per Cent.*	1,927,000
11 *per Cent.*	95,700	10 *per Cent.*	410,000
5 *per Cent.*	43,500	3 *per Cent.*	123,000
100	870,000	100	4,100,000

UMI

And that the different Proportions in ea
Towns, and the Villages, may the b

	London *and Bills of Mortality.*	Souls.
Husband and Wives	37 *per Cent.*	196,100
Widowers ——	2 *per Cent.*	10,600
Widows ——	7 *per Cent.*	37,100
Children ——	33 *per Cent.*	174,900
Servants ——	13 *per Cent.*	68,900
Sojourners ——	8 *per Cent.*	42,400
	100	530,000

He further obſerves, ſuppoſing the People
dom may be 190,000, *and that t*

Thoſe under 1 year old	
Thoſe under 5 years old	
Thoſe under 10 years old	
Thoſe under 16 years old	
Thoſe above 16 years old	
Thoſe above 21 years old	
Thoſe above 25 years old	
Thoſe above 60 years old	
Thoſe under 16 years old	
Thoſe above 16 years old	
Total of the People	5

Place this Scheme p. 15.

o	5,500,000	2,700,000	2,800,000

n each of the said Articles between London, *the Great the better appear, he has form'd the following Scheme.*

s.	*The other Cities and great Towns.*	*Souls.*	*The Villages and Hamlets.*	*Souls.*
100	36 *per Cent.*	313,200	34 *per Cent.*	1,394,000
600	2 *per Cent.*	17,400	1½ *per Cent.*	61,500
100	6 *per Cent.*	52,200	4½ *per Cent.*	184,500
900	40 *per Cent.*	348,000	47 *per Cent.*	1,927,000
900	11 *per Cent.*	95,700	10 *per Cent.*	410,000
400	5 *per Cent.*	43,500	3 *per Cent.*	123,000
000	100	870,000	100	4,100,000

eople to be 5,500,000, *that the yearly Births of the King- hat the several Ages of the People may be as follows,*

	In all	*Males.*	*Females.*
old	170,000	88,500	81,500
old	820,000	413,300	406,700
old	1,520,000	762,900	757,100
old	2,240,000	1,122,000	1,118,000
old	3,260,000	1,578,000	1,682,000
old	2,700,000	1,300,000	1,400,000
old	2,400,000	1,152,000	1,248,000
old	600,000	270,000	,330,000

old	2,240,000
old	3,260,000
ople	5,500,000

UMI

Secondly, From a greater Luxury and Intemperance.

Thirdly, From a greater Intenſneſs on Buſineſs.

Fourthly, From the unhealthfulneſs of the Coal Smoak.

Fifthly, From a greater Inequality of Age between the Husbands and Wives,

Sixthly, From the Husbands and Wives not living ſo long as in the Country.

He farther obſerves, Accounting the People to be 5,500,000, That the ſaid five Millions and a half (including the Tranſitory People and Vagrants) appear by the Aſſeſſments on Marriages Births and Burials, to bear the following Proportion in relation to Males and Females, and other Diſtinctions of the People, *viz.*

Vide Scheme B.

So that the Number of Communicants is in all 3,260,000 Souls.

And the Number of Fighting Men between 16 and 60 is 1,308,000.

That the Batchelors are about 28 *per Cent.* of the whole,

Whereof thoſe under 25 Years are 25 ½ *per Cent.*

And thoſe above 25 Years are 2 ½ *per Cent.*

That the Maidens are about 28 ½ *per Cent.* of the whole,

Whereof thoſe under 25 Years are 26 ½ *per Cent.*

And thoſe above 25 Years are 2 *per Cent.*

That the Males and Females in the Kingdom in General, are Aged one with another 27 Years and a half.

That in the Kingdom in General, there are near as many People living under 20 Years of Age, as there are above 20, whereof half of the Males is under

under 16, and one half of the Females is under 21 Years.

That the Ages of the People, according to their several Distinctions, are as follow, *viz.*

Vide Scheme C.

Having thus stated the Numbers of the People he gives a Scheme of the Income and Expence of the several Families of *England*, Calculated for the Year, 1688.

Vide Scheme D.

Mr. *King*'s Modesty has been so far over-rul'd, as to suffer us to Communicate these his Excellent Computations, which we can the more safely commend, having examin'd them very carefully, try'd them by some little Operations of our own upon the same Subject, and compar'd them with the Schemes of other persons, who take Pleasure in the like Studies.

What he says concerning the Number of the People to be 5,500,000 is no positive Assertion, nor shall we pretend any where to determin in that Matter; what he lays down is by way of Hypothesis, That supposing the Inhabitants of *England* to have been, 1300, Two Millions 860,000 Heads, by the orderly Series of Increase allow'd of by all Writers, they may probably be about *Anno* 1700 Five Millions 500,000 Heads; but if they were *Anno* 1300 either less or more, the Case must proportionably alter; for as to his Allowance for Plagues, and great Mortalities, Civil Wars, the Sea and the Plantations, they seem very reasonable, and not well to be Controverted.

Upon these Schemes of Mr. *King*, we shall make several Remarks, tho' the Text deserves much a better Comment.

The

Scheme C.

	at a Medium				years
The Husbands are Aged ——	43 years apiece,	which at	17¼	*per Cent.* makes	742
The Wives —— —— ——	40 years apiece,	——	17¼	—— —— ——	690
The Widowers —— ——	56 years apiece,	—— ——	1½	—— —— ——	84
The Widows —— ——	60 years apiece,	—— ——	4½	—— ——	270
The Children —— —— ——	12 years apiece,	—— ——	45	—— ——	540
The Servants —— —— ——	27 years apiece,	—— ——	10½	—— —— ——	284
The Sojourners —— —— ——	35 years apiece,	—— ——	4	—— —— ——	140
At a Medium ——	27½		100.		2750

Place this Scheme p. 19.

Scheme D. A Scheme of the Income and Expence of the ſeveral Fam

Number of Families	RANKS, DEGREES, TITLES, and QUALIFICATIONS.	Heads per Family.	Number of Perſons.	Yearly Income per Family. l. s.	Y
160	Temporal Lords	40	6,400	3,200	
26	Spiritual Lords	20	520	1,300	
800	Baronets	16	12,800	880	
600	Knights	13	7,800	650	
3,000	Eſquires	10	30,000	450	
12,000	Gentlemen	8	96,000	280	
5,000	Perſons in greater Offices and Places	8	40,000	240	
15,000	Perſons in leſſer Offices and Places	6	30,000	120	
2,000	Eminent Merchants and Traders by Sea	8	16,000	400	
8,000	Leſſer Merchants and Traders by Sea	6	48,000	198	
10,000	Perſons in the Law	7	70,000	154	
2,000	Eminent Clergy-men	6	12,000	72	
8,000	Leſſer Clergy-men	5	40,000	50	
40,000	Freeholders of the better ſort	7	280,000	91	
120,000	Freeholders of the leſſer ſort	5½	660,000	55	
150,000	Farmers	5	750,000	42--10	
15,000	Perſons in Liberal Arts and Sciences	5	75,000	60	
50,000	Shopkeepers and Tradeſmen	4½	225,000	45	
60,000	Artizans and Handicrafts	4	240,000	38	
5,000	Naval Officers	4	20,000	80	
4,000	Military Officers	4	16,000	60	
500,586		5⅓	2,675,520	68--18	34
50,000	Common Seamen	3	150,000	20	
364,000	Labouring People and Out-Servants	3½	1,275,000	15	
400,000	Cottagers and Paupers	3¼	1,300,000	6--10	
35,000	Common Soldiers	2	70,000	14	
849,000		3¼	2,795,000	10--10	
	Vagrants; as Gipſies, Thieves, Beggers, &c.		30,000		

Families of England, Calculated for the Year, 1688.

Yearly Income in general.	Yearly Income per Head.	Yearly Expence per Head.	Yearly Increase per Head.	Yearly Increase in general.
l.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l.
512,000	80-- 0	70-- 0	10-- 0	64,000
33,800	65-- 0	45-- 0	20-- 0	10,400
704,000	55-- 0	49-- 0	6-- 0	76,800
390,000	50-- 0	45-- 0	5-- 0	39,000
1,200,000	45-- 0	41-- 0	4-- 0	120,000
2,880,000	35-- 0	32-- 0	3-- 0	288,000
1,200,000	30-- 0	26-- 0	4-- 0	160,000
600,000	20-- 0	17-- 0	3-- 0	90,000
800,000	50-- 0	37-- 0	13-- 0	208,000
1,600,000	33-- 0	27-- 0	6-- 0	288,000
1,540,000	22-- 0	18-- 0	4-- 0	280,000
144,000	12-- 0	10-- 0	2-- 0	24,000
400,000	10-- 0	9-- 4	0--16	32,000
3,640,000	13-- 0	11--15	1-- 5	350,000
6,600,000	10-- 0	9--10	0--10	330,000
6,375,000	8--10	8-- 5	0-- 5	187,500
900,000	12-- 0	11-- 0	1-- 0	75,000
2,250,000	10-- 0	9-- 0	1-- 0	225,000
2,280,000	9--10	9-- 0	0--10	120,000
400,000	20-- 0	18-- 0	2-- 0	40,000
240,000	15-- 0	14-- 0	1-- 0	16,000
34,488,800	12--18	11--15-- 4	1-- 2-- 8 Decrease	3,023,700 Decrease
1,000,000	7-- 0	7--10	0--10	75,000
5,460,000	4--10	4--12	0-- 2	127,500
2,000,000	2-- 0	2-- 5	0-- 5	325,000
490,000	7-- 0	7--10	0--10	35,000
8,950,000	3-- 5	3-- 9	0--4	562,500
60,000	2-- 0	4-- 0	2 0	60,000

				l.	s.	
160	Temporal Lords	40	6,400	3,200		
26	Spiritual Lords	20	520	1,300		
800	Baronets	16	12,800	880		
600	Knights	13	7,800	650		
3,000	Eſquires	10	30,000	450		1,
12,000	Gentlemen	8	96,000	280		2,
5,000	Perſons in greater Offices and Places	8	40,000	240		1,
15,000	Perſons in leſſer Offices and Places	6	30,000	120		
2,000	Eminent Merchants and Traders by Sea	8	16,000	400		
8,000	Leſſer Merchants and Traders by Sea	6	48,000	198		1,
10,000	Perſons in the Law	7	70,000	154		1,
2,000	Eminent Clergy-men	6	12,000	72		
8,000	Leſſer Clergy-men	5	40,000	50		
40,000	Freeholders of the better ſort	7	280,000	91		3,
120,000	Freeholders of the leſſer ſort	5½	660,000	55		6,
150,000	Farmers	5	750,000	42	10	6,
15,000	Perſons in Liberal Arts and Sciences	5	75,000	60		
50,000	Shopkeepers and Tradeſmen	4½	225,000	45		2,
60,000	Artizans and Handicrafts	4	240,000	38		2,
5,000	Naval Officers	4	20,000	80		
4,000	Military Officers	4	16,000	60		
500,586		5⅓	2,675,520	68	18	34,
50,000	Common Seamen	3	150,000	20		1,
364,000	Labouring People and Out-Servants	3½	1,275,000	15		5,
400,000	Cottagers and Paupers	3¼	1,300,000	6	10	2,
35,000	Common Soldiers	2	70,000	14		
849,000		3¼	2,795,000	10	10	8,
	Vagrants; as Gipſies, Thieves, Beggers, *&c.*		30,000			
				So the general Account		
500,586	Increaſing the Wealth of the Kingdom	5⅓	2,675,520	68	18	34,
849,000	Decreaſing the Wealth of the Kingdom	3¼	2,825,000	10	10	9,
1,349,586	Neat Totals	4 1/3	5,500,520	32	5	43,

Place this Scheme p. 16.

l.	*l.*	*s.*	*d.*	*l.*	*s.*	*d.*	*l.*	*s.*	*d.*	*l.*
512,000	80	0		70	0		10	0		64,000
33,800	65	0		45	0		20	0		10,400
704,000	55	0		49	0		6	0		76,800
390,000	50	0		45	0		5	0		39,000
1,200,000	45	0		41	0		4	0		120,000
2,880,000	35	0		32	0		3	0		288,000
1,200,000	30	0		26	0		4	0		160,000
600,000	20	0		17	0		3	0		90,000
800,000	50	0		37	0		13	0		208,000
1,600,000	33	0		27	0		6	0		288,000
1,540,000	22	0		18	0		4	0		280,000
144,000	12	0		10	0		2	0		24,000
400,000	10	0		9	4		0	16		32,000
3,640,000	13	0		11	15		1	5		350,000
6,600,000	10	0		9	10		0	10		330,000
6,375,000	8	10		8	5		0	5		187,500
900,000	12	0		11	0		1	0		75,000
2,250,000	10	0		9	0		1	0		225,000
2,280,000	9	10		9	0		0	10		120,000
400,000	20	0		18	0		2	0		40,000
240,000	15	0		14	0		1	0		16,000
34,488,800	12	18		11	15	4	1	2	8	3,023,700
							Decreaſe			*Decreaſe*
1,000,000	7	0		7	10		0	10		75,000
5,460,000	4	10		4	12		0	2		127,500
2,000,000	2	0		2	5		0	5		325,000
490,000	7	0		7	10		0	10		35,000
8,950,000	3	5		3	9		0	4		562,500
60,000	2	0		4	0		2	0		60,000
ccount is										
34,488,800	12	18		11	15	4	1	2	8	3,023,700
9,010,000	3	3		3	7	6	0	4	6	622,500
43,491,800	7	18		7	9	3	0	8	9	2,401,200

The People being the first Matter of Power and Wealth, by whose Labour and Industry a Nation must be Gainers in the Ballance, their Increase or Decrease must be carefully observ'd by any Government that designs to thrive; that is, their Increase must be promoted by good Conduct and wholesome Laws, and if they have been Decreased by War, or any other Accident, the Breach is to be made up as soon as possible, for it is a Maim in the Body Politick affecting all its Parts.

Almost all Countries in the World have been more or less Populous, as Liberty and Property have been there well or ill secur'd. The first Constitution of *Rome* was no ill founded Government, a Kingly Power limited by Laws; and the People encreas'd so fast, that from a small beginning, in the Reign of their Sixth King, they were able to send out an Army of 80000 Men. And in the time of the Common-wealth, in that Invasion which the *Gauls* made upon *Italy*, not long before *Hannibal* came thither, they were grown so numerous, as that their Troops consisted of 700,000 Foot, and 70,000 Horse; 'tis true, their Allies were Comprehended in this Number, but the ordinary People fit to bear Arms, being Muster'd in *Rome* and *Campania*, amounted to 250,000 Foot and 23,000 Horse.

Nothing therefore can more contribute to the rendring *England* Populous and Strong, than to have Liberty upon a right Foot, and our legal Constitution firmly preserv'd. A Nation may be as well call'd free under a limited Kingship as in a Common-wealth; and 'tis to this good Form of our Government, that we partly owe that doubling of the People, which has probably happen'd here in 435 Years last past. And if the Ambition of some, and the Mercenary Temper of others, should bring us at any time to alter our Constitution, and to

give up our ancient Rights, we ſhall find our Members diminiſh viſibly and faſt. For Liberty encourages Procreation, and not only keeps our own Inhabitants among us, but invites Strangers to come and live under the ſhelter of our Laws.

The *Romans* indeed made uſe of an Adventitious Help to enlarge their City, which was by incorporating Foreign Cities and Nations into their Commonwealth; but this way is not without its Miſchiefs. For the Strangers in *Rome* by degrees had grown ſo numerous, and to have ſo great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Government began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants: Which *Fabius* the Cenſor obſerving, he apply'd a Remedy in time by reducing all the new Citizens into four Tribes, that being contracted into ſo narrow a ſpace, they might not have ſo malignant an influence upon the City.

Machiavel's *Diſcourſes on* Livy.

An Act of General Naturalization, would likewiſe probably Increaſe our Numbers very faſt, and repair what loſs we have ſuffer'd in our People by the late War: 'Tis a Matter that has been very warmly contended for by many good Patriots; but peradventure it carries alſo its danger with it, which perhaps would have the leſs Influence by this Expedient, namely, If an Act of Parliament were made, That no Heads of Families, hereafter to be Naturaliz'd for the firſt Generation, ſhould have Votes in any of our Elections. But as the Caſe ſtands, it ſeems againſt the Nature of right Government, that Strangers (who may be Spies, and who may have an Intereſt oppoſite to that of *England*, and who at beſt ever join in one Link of Obſequiouſneſs to the Miniſters) ſhould be ſuffer'd to intermeddle in that Important Buſineſs of ſending Members to Parliament. From their Sons indeed there is leſs to fear, who by Birth and Nature may come to have the ſame Intereſt and Inclinations as the Natives.

And

And tho' the Expedient of *Fabius Maximus*, to contract Strangers into four Tribes, might be reasonable where the Affairs of a whole Empire were transacted by Magistrates chosen in one City, yet the same Policy may not hold good in *England*; Foreigners cannot influence Elections here by being dispers'd about in the several Counties of the Kingdom, where they can never come to have any considerable strength. But some time or other, they may endanger the Government by being suffer'd to remain, such vast Numbers of 'em, here in *London*, where they inhabit all together, at least 30000 Persons in two Quarters of the Town, without inter-marrying with the *English*, or learning our Language, by which Means for several Years to come, they are in a way still to continue Foreigners, and perhaps may have a Foreign Interest and Foreign Inclinations: To permit this, cannot be advisable or safe. It may therefore be proper to limit any new Acts of Naturalization, with such Restrictions as may make the Accession of Strangers not dangerous to the Publick.

An Accession of Strangers well regulated, may add to our Strength and Numbers; but then it must be compos'd of Labouring Men, Artificers, Merchants and other Rich Men, and not of Foreign Soldiers, since such fright and drive away from a Nation more People than their Troops can well consist of: For if it has been ever seen, that Men abound most where there is most Freedom (*China* excepted, whose Climate excels all others, and where the exercise of the Tyranny is mild and easie) it must follow that People will in time desert those Countries whose best Flower is their Liberties, if those Liberties are thought Precarious or in Danger. That Foreign Soldiers are dangerous to Liberty, we may produce Examples from all Countries and all Ages; but we shall instance only one, because it is eminent above all the rest.

Polybius, *Lib.* 1. The *Carthaginians*, in their Wars, did very much uſe Mercenary and Foreign Troops; and when the Peace was made between them and the *Romans*, after a long Diſpute for the Dominion of *Sicily*, they brought their Army home to be Paid and Diſbanded, which *Geſco* their General had the Charge of Embarking, who did order all his part with great Dexterity and Wiſdom. But the State of *Carthage* wanting Mony to clear Arrears, and ſatisfie the Troops, was forc'd to keep them up longer than was deſign'd. The Army conſiſted of *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, *Baleareans* and *Greeks*. At firſt they were inſolent in their Quarters in *Carthage*, and were prevail'd upon to move to *Sicca*, where they were to remain and expect their Pay. There they grew preſently corrupted with Eaſe and Pleaſure, and fell into Mutinies and Diſorder, and to making extravagant demands of Pay and Gratuities; and in a Rage, with their Arms in their Hands, they march'd Twenty Thouſand of them towards *Carthage*, incamping within 15 Miles of the City; and choſe *Spendius* and *Matho*, two profligate Wretches for their Leaders, and impriſon'd *Geſco* who was deputed to 'em from the Common-wealth. Afterwards they caus'd almoſt all the *Africans*, their Tributaries, to revolt; They grew in a ſhort time to be 70,000 ſtrong; They fought ſeveral Battels with *Hanno* and *Hamilcar Barcas*. During theſe Tranſactions, the Mercenaries that were in Garriſon in *Sardinia* mutinied likewiſe, murdering their Commander and all the *Carthaginians*; while *Spendius* and *Matho*, to render their Accomplices more deſperate, put *Geſco* to a cruel Death, preſuming afterwards to lay Siege to *Carthage* it ſelf. They met with a Shock indeed at *Prion*, where 40,000 of them were ſlaughter'd; but ſoon after this Battle, in another, they took one of the *Carthaginian* Generals Priſoner, whom they fixt to a Croſs, crucifying

ing

ing thirty of the principal Senators round about him. *Spendius* and *Matho* were at laſt taken, the one crucified and the other tormented to Death: But the War laſted three Years and near four Months with exceſſive Cruelty; in which the State of *Carthage* loſt ſeveral Battles, and was often brought within a Hairs breadth of utter Ruin.

If ſo great a Common-wealth as *Carthage*, tho' aſſiſted at that time by *Hiero* King of *Syracuſe*, and by the *Romans*, ran the hazard of loſing their Empire, City and Liberties, by the Inſurrection of a handful of Mercenaries, whoſe firſt Strength was but 20,000 Men; it ſhould be a warning to all Free Nations, how they ſuffer Armies ſo compos'd to be among them; and it ſhould frighten a Wiſe State from deſiring ſuch an Increaſe of People, as may be had by the bringing over Foreign Souldiers.

Indeed, all Armies whatſoever, if they are overlarge, tend to the diſpeopling of a Country, of which our Neighbour Nation is a ſufficient Proof; where in one of the beſt Climates in *Europe*, Men are wanting to Till the Ground. For Children do not proceed from the intemperate Pleaſures taken looſly and at random, but from a regular way of Living, where the Father of the Family deſires to rear up and provide for the Off-ſpring he ſhall beget.

Securing the Liberties of a Nation, may be laid down as a Fundamental for increaſing the Numbers of its People; but there are other Polities thereunto conducing, which no Wiſe State has ever neglected.

No Race of Men did multiply ſo faſt as the *Jews*, which may be attributed chiefly to the Wiſdom of *Moſes* their Lawgiver, in contriving to promote the State of Marriage.

The *Romans* had the ſame Care, paying no Reſpect to a Man Childleſs by his own Fault, and giving great Immunities and Priviledges, both in the City and Provinces, to thoſe who had ſuch and ſuch a Number of Children. Encouragements of the like kind are alſo given in *France* to ſuch as inrich the Common-wealth by a large Iſſue.

But we in *England* have taken another Courſe, laying a Fine upon the Marriage-Bed, which ſeems ſmall to thoſe who only contemplate the Pomp and Wealth round about 'em, and in their View; but they who look into all the different Ranks of Men, are well ſatisfied that this Duty on Marriages and Births, is a very grievous Burthen upon the poorer Sort, whoſe Numbers compoſe the Strength and Wealth of any Nation. This Tax was introduc'd by the neceſſity of Affairs. 'Tis difficult to ſay what may be the Event of a new thing; but if we are to take Meaſures from paſt Wiſdom, which exempted Prolifick Families from Publick Duties, we ſhould not lay Impoſitions upon thoſe who find it hard enough to maintain themſelves. If this Tax be ſuch a Weight upon the Poor, as to diſcourage Marriage and hinder Propagation, which ſeems the Truth, no doubt it ought to be aboliſh'd; and at a convenient time we ought to change it for ſome other Duty, if there were only this ſingle Reaſon, That 'tis ſo directly oppoſite to the Polity of all Ages and all Countries.

In order to have Hands to carry on Labour and Manufactures, which muſt make us Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, we ought not to deterr, but rather invite Men to marry, which is to be done by Priviledges and Exemptions for ſuch a Number of Children, and by denying certain Offices of Truſt and Dignities to all unmarried Perſons; and where 'tis once made a Faſhion among thoſe of the better Sort, 'twill quickly obtain with the lower Degree.

Mr.

Mr. *King* in his Scheme (for which he has as Authentick Grounds, as perhaps the Matter is capable of) lays down, that the Annual Marriages of *England* are about 41,000, which is one Marriage out of every 134 Persons: Upon which we observe, that this is not a due Proportion, considering how few of our Adult Males (in comparison with other Countries) perish by War or any other Accident; from whence may be inferr'd, that our Polity is some way or other Defective, or the Marriages would bear a nearer Proportion with the gross Number of our People; for which Defect, if a Remedy can be found, there will be so much more Strength added to the Kingdom. See Scheme A.

From the Books of Assessment on Births, Marriages, *&c.* by the nearest View he can make, he divides the 5,500,000 People into 2,700,000 Males and 2,800,000 Females; from whence (considering the Females exceed the Males in Number, and considering that the Men marry later than Women, and that many of the Males are of Necessity absent in the Wars, at Sea and upon other Business) it follows, that a large Proportion of the Females remain unmarried, tho' at an Adult Age, which is a dead Loss to the Nation, every Birth being so much certain Treasure; upon which Accompt, such Laws must be for the Publick Good, as induce all Men to marry whose Circumstances permit it.

From his Division of the People, it may be likewise observ'd, That the near Proportion there is between the Males and Females (which is said to hold also in other Places) is an Argument (and the strongest that can be produc'd) against Poligamy, and the Increase of Mankind, which some think might be from thence expected; for if Nature had intended to one Man a Plurality of Wives, She would have order'd a great many more Female

Births than Male, her designments being always Right and Wise.

The securing the Parish for Bastard-Children, is become so small a Punishment and so easily Compounded, that it very much hinders Marriage. The Dutch compel Men of all Ranks, to marry the Woman whom they have got with Child; and perhaps it would tend to the farther Peopling of *England*, if the Common People here, under such a certain Degree, were condemn'd by some new Law to suffer the same Penalty.

A Country that makes Provision to increase in Inhabitants, whose Situation is good, and whose People have a Genius adapted to Trade, will never fail to be Gainers in the Ballance, provided the Labour and Industry of their People be well manag'd and carefully directed.

The more any Man contemplates these Matters, the more he will come to be of Opinion, that *England* is capable of being render'd one of the strongest Nations, and the Richest Spot of Ground in *Europe*.

'Tis not extent of Territory that makes a Country Powerful, but Numbers of Men well employ'd, convenient Ports, a good Navy, and a Soil producing all sort of Commodities. The Materials for all this we have, and so improveable, that if we did but second the Gifts of Nature, with our own Industry, we should soon arrive to a pitch of Greatness, that would put us at least upon an equal Foot with any of our Neighbours.

If we had the Compliment of Men, our Land can maintain and nourish; If we had as much Trade as our Stock and Knowledge in Sea Affairs is capable of embracing; If we had such a Naval Strength as a Trade so extended would easily produce; and, if we had those Stores and that Wealth, which is the certain Result of a large and well govern'd Traffick,

Traffick, what humane Strength could hurt or invade us? On the contrary, ſhould we not be in a poſture not only to reſiſt, but to give the Law to others?

Our Neighbouring Common-wealth has not in Territory above Eight Millions of Acres, and perhaps not much above two Millions two Hundred Thouſand People; and yet what a Figure have they made in *Europe* for theſe laſt hundred Years? What Wars have they maintain'd? What Forces have they reſiſted? and to what a hight of Power are they now come, and all by good Order and wiſe Government?

They are liable to frequent Invaſions; They labour under the Inconvenience and danger of bad Ports; They conſume immenſe Sums every Year to defend their Land againſt the Sea; all which Difficulties they have ſubdu'd by an unweary'd Induſtry.

We are fenc'd by Nature againſt Foreign Enemies; Our Ports are ſafe; We fear no Irruptions of the Sea; Our Land Territory at home is at leaſt 39 Millions of Acres; We have in all likelihood not leſs than Five Millions and a half of People; what a Nation might we then become, if all theſe Advantages were throughly improv'd, and if a right Application were made of all this Strength, and of theſe Numbers?

They who apprehend the immoderate growth of any Prince or State, may perhaps ſucceed by beginning firſt, and by attempting to pull down ſuch a dangerous Neighbour, but very often their good Deſigns are diſappointed. In all appearance they proceed more ſafely, who under ſuch a fear make themſelves ſtrong and powerful at home. And this was the Courſe which *Philip*, King of *Macedon*, the Father of *Perſeus*, took, when he thought to be invaded by the *Romans*.

The

The Greatneſs of *Rome* gave *Carthage* very anxious Thoughts; and it rather ſeems that they enter'd into the ſecond Punick War, more for fear the *Romans* ſhould have the Univerſal Empire, than out of any Ambition to Lord it themſelves over the whole World. Their Deſign was virtuous, and peradventure wiſe to endeavour at ſome early Interruption to a Rival that grew ſo faſt; However we ſee they miſcarry'd, tho' their Armies were led by *Hannibal*. But Fortune which had determin'd the Dominion of the Earth for *Rome*, did perhaps lead them into the fatal Council of paſſing the *Eber*, contrary to the Articles of Peace concluded with *Aſdrubal*, and of Attacking *Saguntum*, before they had ſufficiently recover'd of the Wounds they had ſuffer'd in the Wars about *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and with their own Rebels. If the high Courage of *Hannibal* had not driven the Common-wealth into a new War, while it was yet faint and weak, and if they had been ſuffer'd to purſue their Victories in *Spain*, and to get firm footing in that Rich Warlike and then Populous Country, very probably in a few Years they might have been a more equal Match for the *Roman* People. 'Tis true, if the *Romans* had endeavour'd at the Conqueſt of *Spain*, and if they had diſturb'd the *Carthaginians* in that Country, the War muſt have been unavoidable; becauſe it was evident in that Age, and will be apparent in the Times we live in, that whatever Foreign Power already grown great, can add to its dominion the Poſſeſſion of *Spain*, will ſtand fair for Univerſal Empire.

But unleſs ſome ſuch Cogent Reaſon of State, as is here inſtanc'd, intervene, in all appearance the beſt way for a Nation that apprehends the growing Power of any Neighbour, is to fortifie it ſelf within; we do not mean by Land Armies, which rather debilitate than ſtrengthen a Country, but by

by Potent Navies, by Thrift in the Publick Treaſure, Care of the Peoples Trade, and all the other honeſt and uſeful Arts of Peace.

By ſuch an Improvement of our Native Strength, agreeable to the Laws and to the Temper of a Free Nation, *England* without doubt may be brought to ſo good a Poſture and Condition of defending it ſelf, as not to apprehend any Neighbour jealous of its Strength, or envious of its Greatneſs.

And to this end we open theſe Schemes, That a Wiſe Government under which we live, not having any Deſigns to become Arbitrary, may ſee what Materials they have to work upon, and how far our Native Wealth is able to ſecond their good Intentions of preſerving us a rich and a free People.

Having ſaid ſomething of the Number of our Inhabitants, we ſhall proceed to diſcourſe of their different Degrees and Ranks, and to examin who are a Burthen and who a Profit to the Publick; for by how much every Part and Member of the Common-wealth can be made uſeful to the whole, by ſo much a Nation will be more and more a Gainer in this Ballance of Trade which we are to treat of.

Mr. *King*, from the Aſſeſſments on Births and Marriages, and from the Polls, has form'd the Scheme here inſerted, of the Ranks, Degrees, Titles and Qualifications of the People. He has done it ſo Judiciouſly, and upon ſuch Grounds, that 'tis well worth the careful Peruſal of any Curious Perſon; from thence we ſhall make ſome Obſervations in order to put our preſent Matter in a clearer Light. See Scheme D.

Firſt, This Scheme detects their Error, who in the Calculations they frame, contemplate nothing but the Wealth and Plenty they ſee in rich Cities and great Towns, and from thence make a Judgment of

of the Kingdoms remaining Part; and from this View conclude, That Taxes and Payments to the Publick do moſtly ariſe from the Gentry and better ſort, by which Meaſures they neither contrive their Impoſition aright, nor are they able to give a true Eſtimate what it ſhall produce; but when we have divided the Inhabitants of *England* into their proper Claſſes, it will appear that the Nobility and Gentry are but a ſmall Part of the whole Body of the People.

Believing that Taxes fall chiefly upon the better Sort, they care not what they lay, as thinking they will not be felt; but when they come to be levy'd, they either fall ſhort, and ſo run the Publick into an immenſe Debt, or they light ſo heavily upon the Poorer Sort, as to occaſion inſufferable Clamours; and they whoſe proper Buſineſs it was to contrive theſe Matters better, have been ſo unskilful, that the Legiſlative Power has been more than once compell'd for the Peoples eaſe to give new Fonds, inſtead of others that had been ill projected.

This may be generally ſaid, That all Duties whatſoever upon the Conſumption, of a large Produce, fall with the greateſt weight upon the Common Sort: So that ſuch as think in new Duties that they chiefly tax the Rich, will find themſelves quite miſtaken; for either their Fond muſt yield little, or it muſt ariſe from the whole Body of the People, of which the Richer Sort are but a ſmall Proportion.

And tho' War, and National Debts and Engagements, might heretofore very rationally plead for Exciſes upon our Home-Conſumption; yet now there is a Peace, it is the concern of every Man that loves his Country, to proceed warily in laying new ones, and to get off thoſe which are already laid as faſt as ever he can. High Cuſtoms

Cuſtoms and high Exciſes both together are incompatible; either of them alone are to be endur'd, but to have them co-exiſt is ſuffer'd in no well govern'd Nation. If Materials of Foreign growth were at an eaſie rate, a high Price might be the better born in things of our own Product, but to have both dear at once (and by reaſon of the Duties laid upon them) is ruinous to the inferior Rank of Men; and this ought to weigh more with us, when we conſider that even of the Common People, a Sub-diviſion is to be made, of which one part ſubſiſt from their own Havings, Arts, Labour and Induſtry; and the other Part ſubſiſt a little from their own Labour, but chiefly from the Help and Charity of the Rank that is above them. For according to Mr. *King*'s Scheme. See Scheme D.

The Nobility and Gentry, with their Families and Retainers, the Perſons in Offices, Merchants, Perſons in the Law, the Clergy, Free-holders, Farmers, Perſons in Sciences and Liberal Arts, Shopkeepers and Tradeſmen, Handicrafts Men, Naval Officers, with the Families and Dependants upon all theſe altogether, make up the Number of —— —— —— —— 2,675,520 Heads.

The Common Seamen, Common Soldiers, Labouring People and Out-Servants, Cottagers, Paupers, and their Families, with the Vagrants, make up the number of —— —— —— 2,825,000 Heads.

In all, 5,500,520 Heads.

So that here ſeems a Majority of the People, whoſe chief dependence and ſubſiſtence is from the other Part, which Majority is much greater, in reſpect of the Number of Families, becauſe 500,000 Families contribute to the ſupport of 850,000 Families. In Contemplation of which, great

great Care ſhould be taken not to lay new Duties upon the Home-Conſumption, unleſs upon the extreameſt Neceſſities of the State; for tho' ſuch Impoſitions cannot be ſaid to fall directly upon the lower Rank, whoſe Poverty hinders them from conſuming ſuch Materials (tho' there are few Exciſes, to which the meaneſt Perſon does not pay ſomething) yet indirectly, and by unavoidable Conſequences, they are rather more affected by high Duties upon our Home-Conſumption, than the Wealthier Degree of People, and ſo we ſhall find the Caſe to be, if we look carefully into all the diſtinct Ranks of Men there enumerated.

Firſt, As to the Nobility and Gentry, they muſt of neceſſity retrench their Families and Expences, if exceſſive Impoſitions are laid upon all ſorts of Materials for Conſumption; from whence follows, That the Degree below them of Merchants, Shop-keepers, Tradeſmen and Artizans, muſt want Employment.

Secondly, As to the Manufactures, high Exciſes in time of Peace, are utterly deſtructive to that principal Part of *England*'s Wealth; for if Malt, Coals, Salt, Leather, and other things bear a great Price, the Wages of Servants, Workmen and Artificers, will conſequently riſe, for the Income muſt bear ſome proportion with the Expence; and if ſuch as ſet the Poor to work, find Wages for Labour, or Manufacture advance upon them, they muſt riſe in the Price of their Commodity, or they cannot live; all which would ſignifie little, if nothing but our own Dealings among one another were thereby affected; but it has a Conſequence far more pernicious in relation to our Foreign Trade, for 'tis the Exportation of our own Product that muſt make *England* rich; to be Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, we muſt carry out of our own Product, what will purchaſe the Things

Things of Foreign Growth that are needful for our own Conſumption, with ſome Overplus either in Bullion or Goods to be ſold in other Countries; which Overplus is the Profit a Nation makes by Trade, and it is more or leſs according to the natural Frugality of the People that Export, or as from the low Price of Labour and Manufacture they can afford the Commodity cheap, and at a rate not to be under-ſold in Foreign Markets. The Dutch, whoſe Labour and Manufactures are dear by reaſon of Home Exciſes, can notwithſtanding ſell cheap abroad, becauſe this diſadvantage they Labour under is ballanc'd by the Parſimonious Temper of their People: But in *England*, where this Frugality is hardly to be introduc'd, if the Duties upon our Home-Conſumption are ſo large as to raiſe conſiderably the price of Labour and Manufacture, all our Commodities for Exportation muſt by degrees ſo advance in the prime Value, that they cannot be ſold at a rate which will give 'em Vent in Foreign Markets; and we muſt be every where under-ſold by our wiſer Neighbours. But the Conſequence of ſuch Duties in times of Peace, will fall moſt heavily upon our Woollen Manufactures, of which moſt have more Value from the Workmanſhip than the Material; and if the Price of this Workmanſhip be inhanc'd it will in a ſhort Courſe of time put a Neceſſity upon thoſe we deal with of ſetting up Manufactures of their own, ſuch as they can, or of buying Goods of the like Kind and Uſe from Nations that can afford them cheaper. And in this Point we are to conſider, that the Bulk of our Woollen Exports does not conſiſt in Draperies made of the fine Wool, peculiar to our Soil, but is compos'd of courſe broad Cloaths, ſuch as *Yorkſhire* Cloaths, Kerſies, which make a great part of our Exports; and may be, and are made of a cour-

courſer Wool, which is to be had in other Countries: So that we are not ſingly to value our ſelves upon the Material, but alſo upon the Manufacture, which we ſhould make eaſie as we can, by not laying over-heavy Burthens upon the Manufacture: And our Woollen Goods being two thirds of our Foreign Exports, it ought to be the chief Object of the Publick Care, if we expect to be Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, which is what we hunt after in theſe Inquiries.

Thirdly, As to the lower Rank of all, which we compute at 2,825,000 Heads, a Majority of the whole People, their principal Subſiſtence is upon the Degrees above them; and if thoſe are render'd uneaſie, theſe muſt ſhare in the Calamity; but even of this inferiour Sort, no ſmall Proportion contribute largely to Exciſes, as Labourers and Out-Servants, which likewiſe affect the Common Seamen, who muſt thereupon raiſe their Wages, or they will not have wherewithal to keep their Families left at Home; and the high Wages of Seamen is another Burthen upon our Foreign Traffick. As to the Cottagers, who are above a fifth Part of the whole People, ſome Duties reach even them, as thoſe upon Malt, Leather and Salt, but not much becauſe of their ſlender Conſumption; but if the Gentry, upon whoſe Woods and Gleanings they live, and who employ 'em in Day Labour; and if the Manufacturers, for whom they Card and Spin, are over-burthen'd with Duties, they cannot afford to give them ſo much for their Labour and Handy-work; nor to yield them thoſe other Reliefs which are their principal Subſiſtence, for want of which, theſe miſerable Wretches muſt periſh with Cold and Hunger.

Thus we ſee Exciſes either directly or indirectly, fall upon the whole Body of the People; but we do not take notice of theſe Matters,

ters, as receding from our former Opinion: On the contrary, we ſtill think them the moſt eaſie and equal way of Taxing a Nation; and perhaps it is demonſtrable, that if we had fallen into this Method at the beginning of the War, of raiſing the Year's Expence within the Year, by Exciſes, *England* had not been now indebted ſo many Millions; but what was adviſable, under ſuch a Neceſſity and Danger, is not to be perſued in times of Peace, eſpecially in a Country depending ſo much upon Trade and Manufactures.

Our Study now ought to be how thoſe Debts may be ſpeedily clear'd off, for which theſe new Revenues are the Fonds, that Trade may again move freely as it did heretofore, without ſuch a heavy Clog; but this Point we ſhall more amply handle, when we come to ſpeak of our Payments to the Publick.

Mr. *King* divides the whole Body of the People, into two Principal Claſſes, *viz.*

Increaſing the Wealth of the Kingdom, ——	2,675,520 Heads.	See Scheme D.
Decreaſing the Wealth of the Kingdom, ——	2,825,000 Heads.	

By which he means, That the Firſt Claſs of the People, from Land, Arts and Induſtry, maintain themſelves, and add every Year ſomething to the Nation's General Stock; and beſides this, out of their Superfluity, contribute every Year ſo much to the maintenance of Others.

That of the Second Claſs, ſome partly maintain themſelves by Labour (as the Heads of the Cottage Families) but that the reſt, as moſt of the Wives and Children of theſe, ſick and impotent People, idle Beggars and Vagrants are nouriſh'd at the

Coſt of Others; and are a Yearly Burthen to the Publick, conſuming Annually ſo much as would be otherwiſe added to the Nation's general Stock.

The Bodies of Men are without doubt the moſt valuable Treaſure of a Country; and in their Sphere, the ordinary People are as ſerviceable to the Common-wealth as the rich, if they are employ'd in honeſt Labour and uſeful Arts: And ſuch being more in Number, do more contribute to increaſe the Nation's Wealth, than the higher Rank.

But a Country may be Populous and yet Poor (as were the ancient *Gauls* and *Scythians*) ſo that Numbers, unleſs they are well employ'd, make the Body Politick big, but unweildy, ſtrong but unactive, as to any Uſes of good Government.

Their's is a wrong Opinion, who think all Mouths profit a Country that conſume its Product: And it may be more truly affirm'd, That he who does not ſome way ſerve the Common-wealth, either by being employ'd, or by employing Others, is not only a uſeleſs, but hurtful Member to it.

As it is Charity, and what we indeed owe to Humane Kind, to make Proviſion for the Aged, the Lame, the Sick, Blind and Impotent: So 'tis a Juſtice we owe to the Common-wealth, not to ſuffer ſuch as have Health, and who might maintain themſelves, to be Drones, and live upon the Labour of Others.

The Bulk of ſuch as are a Burthen to the Publick, conſiſts in the Cottagers and Paupers, Beggars in great Cities and Towns, and Vagrants.

Upon a Survey of the Hearth Books, made in *Michaelmas*, 1685. It was found that of the 1,300,000 Houſes in the whole Kingdom, thoſe of one Chimney amounted to 554,631; but ſome of theſe having Land about them, in all our Calculations,

lations, we have computed the Cottagers but at 500,000 Families. But of theſe, a large Number, may get their own Livelihood, and are no Charge to the Pariſh, for which Reaſon Mr. *King* very judiciouſly computes his *Cottagers and Paupers, decreaſing the Wealth of the Nation, but at* 400,000 *Families*; in which Accompt, he includes the poor Houſes in Cities, Towns and Villages, beſides which he reckons 30,000 Vagrants; and all theſe together, to make up 1,330,000 Heads.

This is a very great Proportion of the People to be a Burthen upon the other Part, and is a Weight upon the Land-Intereſt; of which the Landed Gentlemen muſt certainly be very ſenſible.

If this vaſt Body of Men, inſtead of being Expenſive, could be render'd Beneficial to the Common-wealth, it were a Work no doubt highly to be promoted by all who love their Country.

It ſeems evident to ſuch as have conſider'd theſe Matters, and who have obſerv'd how they are order'd in Nations under a good Polity, that the Number of ſuch who through Age or Impotence ſtand in real need of Relief, is but ſmall and might be maintain'd for very little; and that the Poor Rates are ſwell'd to the extravagant degree we now ſee 'em at, by two ſorts of People, One of which, by Reaſon of our ſlack Adminiſtration, is ſuffer'd to remain in Sloth; and the Other, through a Defect in our Conſtitution, continue in wretched Poverty for want of Employment, tho' willing enough to undertake it.

All this ſeems capable of a Remedy, the Laws may be arm'd againſt voluntary Idleneſs, ſo as to prevent it; and a way may probably be found out to ſet thoſe to Work who are deſirous to ſupport themſelves by their own Labour: And if this could be brought about, it would not only put a ſtop to the Courſe of that Vice which is the Conſe-

ſquence of an idle Life, but it would greatly tend to inrich the Common-wealth; for if the Induſtry of not half the People maintains in ſome degree the other part; and beſides, in times of Peace did add every Year near two Millions and a half to the general Stock of *England*; to what pitch of Wealth and Greatneſs might we not be brought, if one Limb were not ſuffer'd to draw away the Nouriſhment of the other; and if all the Members of the Body Politick were render'd uſeful to it?

Nature, in her Contrivances, has made every part of a living Creature either for Ornament or Uſe, the ſame ſhould be in a Politick Inſtitution rightly Govern'd.

It may be laid down for an undeniable Truth, That where all work no body will want; and to promote this, would be a greater Charity and more Meritorious, than to build Hoſpitals, which very often are but ſo many Monuments of ill-gotten Riches, attended with late Repentance.

To make as many as poſſible of theſe 1,330,000 Perſons (whereof not above 330,000 are Children too young to work) who now live chiefly upon others, get themſelves a large ſhare of their Maintenance would be the opening a new Vein of Treaſure of ſome Millions Sterling *per Annum*; it would be a preſent Eaſe to every particular Man of Subſtance, and a laſting Benefit to the whole Body of the Kingdom: For it would not only nouriſh but increaſe the Numbers of the People, of which many Thouſands periſh every Year, by thoſe Diſeaſes contracted under a ſlothful Poverty.

Our Laws relating to the Poor are very numerous, and this Matter has employ'd the Care of every Age for a long time, tho' but with little ſucceſs, partly through the ill Execution, and partly through ſome defect in the very Laws.

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The Corruptions of Mankind are grown ſo great, that, now a-days, Laws are not much obſerv'd, which do not in a manner execute themſelves; of this Nature are thoſe Laws which relate to bringing in the Prince's Revenue, which never fail to be put in Execution, becauſe the People muſt pay, and the Prince will be paid; but where only one part of the Conſtitution, the People, are immediately concern'd, as in Laws relating to the Poor, the High-ways, Aſſizes, and other Civil Oeconomy, and good Order in the State, thoſe are but ſlenderly regarded.

The Publick Good being therefore, very often, not a Motive ſtrong enough to engage the Magiſtrate to perform his Duty, Law-givers have many times fortify'd their Laws with Penalties, wherein private Perſons may have a Profit, thereby to ſtir up the People to put the Laws in Execution.

In Countries deprav'd, nothing proceeds well, wherein particular Men do not one way or other find their Accompt, and rather than a Publick Good ſhould not go on at all; without doubt, 'tis better to give Private Men ſome Intereſt to ſet it forward.

For which Reaſon, it may be worth the Conſideration of ſuch as ſtudy the Proſperity and Welfare of *England*, whether this great Engine of maintaining the Poor and finding them Work and Employment, may not be put in Motion by giving ſome Body of Undertakers a reaſonable Gain to put the Machine upon its Wheels.

In Order to which, we ſhall here inſert a Propoſal deliver'd to the Houſe of Commons laſt Seſſion of Parliament, for the better maintaining the Impotent, and employing and ſetting to Work the other Poor of this Kingdom.

In Matters of this Nature, 'tis always good to have ſome Model or Plan laid down, which thinking Men may contemplate, alter and correct, as they ſee occaſion; And the Writer of theſe Papers does rather chuſe to offer this Scheme, becauſe he is ſatisfy'd it was compos'd by a Gentleman of great Abilities, and who has made both the Poor Rates, and Their Number, more his ſtudy than any other Perſon in the Nation. The Propoſal is as follows.

A Scheme for ſetting the Poor to Work.

Firſt, That ſuch Perſons as ſhall ſubſcribe and pay the Sum of 300,000 *l.* as a Stock for and towards the better maintaining the Impotent Poor and for buying Commodities and Materials to employ and ſet at Work the other Poor, be Incorporated and made one Body Politick, *&c.* By the Name of the Governor and Company for maintaining and employing the Poor of this Kingdom.

By all former Propoſitions, it was intended that the Pariſhes ſhould advance ſeveral Years Rates to raiſe a Stock, but by this Propoſal the Experiment is to be made by Private perſons at their Risk; and 300,000 *l.* may be judg'd a very good Stock, which added to the Poor Rates for a certain number of Years, will be a very good Fond for buying Commodities and Materials for a Million of Mony at any time. This Subſcription ought to be free for every Body, and if the Sum were ſubſcrib'd in the ſeveral Counties of *England* and *Wales*, in Proportion to their Poor Rates, or the Monthly Aſſeſſment, it would be moſt convenient; and Proviſion may be made, That no Perſon ſhall transfer his Intereſt but to one of the ſame County, which will keep the Intereſt there during the Term; and as to its being one Corporation, 'its

pre-

presum'd this will be most beneficial to the Publick. For first, All Disputes on Removes, which are very chargeable and burthensome, will be at an end, this Proposal intending, that where-ever the Poor are, they shall be maintain'd or employ'd. Secondly, It will prevent one County which shall be diligent, imposing on their Neighbours who may be negligent, or getting away their Manufactures from them. Thirdly, In Case of Fire, Plague, or loss of Manufacture, the Stock of one County may not be sufficient to support the Places where such Calamities may happen; and 'tis necessary the whole Body should support every particular Member, so that hereby there will be a general Care to administer to every Place according to their Necessities.

Secondly, That the said Corporation be establish'd for the Term of one and twenty Years.

The Corporation ought to be establish'd for one and twenty Years, or otherwise it cannot have the benefit the Law gives in Case of Infants, which is their Service for their Education; besides, it will be some Years before a matter of this Nature can be brought into Practice.

Thirdly, That the said Sum of 300,000 *l.* be paid in, and laid out for the Purposes aforesaid, to remain as a Stock for and during the said Term of one and twenty Years.

The Subscription ought to be taken at the Passing of the Act, but the Corporation to be left at liberty, to begin either the *Michaelmas* or the *Lady*-Day after, as they shall think fit. And

per Cent. to be paid at the subscribing to Persons appointed for that purpose, and the remainder before they begin to Act; but so as 300,000 *l.* shall be always in Stock during the Term, notwithstanding any Dividends or other Disposition: And an Accompt thereof to be exhibited

twice in every Year upon Oath, before the Lord Chancellor for the time being.

Fourthly, That the ſaid Corporation do by themſelves, or Agents is every Pariſh of *England*, from and after the Day of during the ſaid Term of one and twenty Years, provide for the real Impotent Poor, good and ſufficient Maintenance and Reception, as good or better than hath at any time within the ſpace of Years before the ſaid Day of been provided or allow'd to ſuch Impotent Poor, and ſo ſhall continue to provide for ſuch Impotenr Poor, and what other growing Impotent Poor ſhall happen in the ſaid Pariſh during the ſaid Term.

By Impotent Poor is to be underſtood all Infants and old and decrepid Perſons not able to Work; alſo Perſons who by Sickneſs or any Accident are for the time unable to labour for themſelves or Families; and all Perſons (not being fit for Labour) who were uſually reliev'd by the Mony rais'd for the uſe of the Poor; they ſhall have Maintenance, *&c.* as good or better, as within Years they us'd to have.

This does not directly determine what that ſhall be, nor is it poſſible, by reaſon a Shilling in one County is as much as two in another; but it will be the Intereſt of the Corporation that ſuch Poor be well provided for, by reaſon the contrary will occaſion all the Complaints or Clamour that probably can be made againſt the Corporation.

Fifthly, That the Corporation do provide (as well for all ſuch Poor which on the ſaid Day of ſhall be on the Poor Books, as for what other growing Poor ſhall happen in the ſaid Term, who are or ſhall be able to labour or do any work) ſufficient Labour and Work proper for ſuch Perſons to be employ'd in. And that Pro-

Proviſion ſhall be made for ſuch Labouring Perſons according to their Labour, ſo as ſuch Proviſion doth not exceed ¼ parts, as much as any other Perſon would have paid for ſuch Labour. And in Caſe they are not employ'd and ſet to Work, then ſuch Perſons ſhall, until Materials or Labour be provided for them, be maintain'd as Impotent Poor; but ſo as ſuch Perſons who ſhall hereafter enter themſelves on the Poor's Books, being able to Labour, ſhall not quit the Service of the Corporation, without leave, for the ſpace of ſix Months.

The Corporation are to provide Materials and Labour for all that can Work, and to make Proviſion for them not exceeding ¼ parts as much as any other Perſon would give for ſuch Labour. For Example, if another Perſon would give one of theſe a Shilling, the Corporation ought to give but Nine Pence. And the Reaſon is plain, Firſt, Becauſe the Corporation will be oblig'd to maintain them and their Families in all Exigences, which others are not oblig'd to do, and conſequently they ought not to allow ſo much as others. Secondly, In Caſe any Perſons able to Labour, ſhall come to the Corporation, when their Agents are not prepar'd with Materials to employ them, by this Propoſal, they are to allow them full Proviſion as Impotent Poor, untill they find them Work, which is intirely in favour of the Poor. Thirdly, It is neither reaſonable nor poſſible for the Corporation to provide Materials upon every Occaſion, for ſuch Perſons as ſhall be enter'd with them, unleſs they can be ſecure of ſuch Perſons to work up thoſe Materials; beſides, without this Proviſion, all the Labouring People in *England* will play faſt and looſe between their Employers and the Corporation, for as they are diſoblig'd by one, they will run to the other, and ſo neither ſhall be ſure of them.

Sixthly,

Sixthly, That no Impotent Poor ſhall be remov'd out of the Pariſh where they dwell, but upon notice in Writing given to the Church-Wardens or Overſeers of the ſaid Pariſh, to what place of Proviſion he or ſhe is remov'd.

It is judg'd the beſt Method to provide for the Impotent Poor in Houſes prepar'd for that purpoſe, where proper Proviſion may be made for ſeveral, with all Neceſſaries of Care and Maintenance. So that in ſome places one Houſe will ſerve the Impotent Poor of ſeveral Pariſhes, in which Caſe the Pariſh ought to know where to reſort, to ſee if good Proviſion be made for them.

Seventhly, That in caſe Proviſion be not made for the Poor of each Pariſh, in manner as aforeſaid, (upon due notice given to the Agents of the Corporation) the ſaid Pariſh may order their Poor to be maintain'd, and deduct the Sum by them expended out of the next Payments to be made to the ſaid Corporation by the ſaid Pariſh.

In Caſe any Accident happens in a Pariſh, either by Sickneſs, Fall, Caſualty of Fire, or otherways; and that the Agent of the Corporation is not preſent to provide for them, or having notice doth not immediately do it, the Pariſh may do it, and deduct ſo much out of the next Payment; but there muſt be Proviſion made for the notice, and in what time the Corporation ſhall provide for them.

Eighthly, That the ſaid Corporation ſhall have and receive for the ſaid one and twenty Years, That is to ſay, from every Pariſh Yearly, ſo much as ſuch Pariſh paid in any one Year, to be computed by a Medium of ſeven Years; Namely, from the 25th. of *March*, 1690. to the 25th. of *March*, 1697. and to be paid half Yearly; and beſides, ſhall receive the Benefit of the Revenues of all Donations given to any Pariſh, or which ſhall be given during the ſaid Term, and all Forfeitures which the Law

Law gives to the uſe of the Poor; and to all other Sums which were uſually Collected by the Pariſh, for the Maintenance of the Poor.

Whatever was rais'd for or apply'd to the Uſe of the Poor, ought to be paid over to the Corporation; and where there are any Donations for maintaining the Poor, it will anſwer the Deſign of the Donor, by reaſon there will be better Proviſion for the maintenance of the Poor than ever; and if that maintenance be ſo good, as to induce further Charities, no doubt the Corporation ought to be entitled to them: But there are two Objections to this Article; Firſt, That to make a Medium by a time of War is unreaſonable. Secondly, To continue the whole Tax for One and Twenty Years, does not ſeem to give any Benefit to the Kingdom in that time. To the Firſt, It is true, we have a Peace, but Trade is lower now than at any time during the War, and the Charge of the Poor greater; and when Trade will mend, is very uncertain. To the Second, It is very plain, that although the Charge may be the ſame to a Pariſh in the Total, yet it will be leſs to particular Perſons, becauſe thoſe who before receiv'd Alms, will now be enabled to be Contributors; but beſides, the turning ſo many hundred thouſand Pounds a Year (which in a manner have hitherto been apply'd only to ſupport Idleneſs) into Induſtry; and the employing ſo many other idle Vagrants and ſturdy Beggars, with the Product of their Labour, will altogether be a preſent Benefit to the Lands of *England*, as well in the Rents as in the Value: And further, the accidental Charges in the Streets and at Doors, is, by a very modeſt Computation, over and above the Poor Rates, at leaſt 300,000 *l. per Annum.* which will be intirely ſav'd by this Propoſal, and the Perſons ſet at work; which is a further Conſideration for its being well receiv'd, ſince the Corporation are not allow'd any thing for this Service.

The

The greater the Encouragement is, the better the Work will be perform'd; and it will become the Wiſdom of the Parliament in what they do, to make it effectual; for ſhould ſuch an Undertaking as this prove ineffectual, inſtead of remedying it, will increaſe the Miſchief.

Ninthly, That all the Laws made for the Proviſion of the Poor, and for puniſhing idle Vagrant Perſons be Repeal'd, and one Law made to continue ſuch parts as are found uſeful, and to add ſuch other Reſtrictions, Penalties and Proviſions as may effectually attain the end of this great Work.

The Laws hereunto relating are numerous, but the Judgments and Opinions given upon them are ſo various and Contradictory, and differ ſo in ſundry places, as to be inconſiſtent with any one general Scheme of Management.

Tenthly, That proper Perſons be appointed in every County to determine all Matters and Differences which may ariſe between the Corporation and the reſpective Pariſhes.

To prevent any ill Uſages, Neglect or Cruelty, it will be neceſſary to make Proviſion that the Poor may tender their Complaints to Officers of the Pariſh; and that thoſe Officers having examin'd the ſame, and not finding Redreſs, may apply to Perſons to be appointed in each County and each City for that purpoſe, who may be called Superviſors of the Poor, and may have Allowance made them for their Trouble; and their Buſineſs may be to examine the Truth of ſuch Complaints; and in caſe either the Pariſh or Corporation judge themſelves agriev'd by the Determination of the ſaid Superviſors, Proviſion may be made that an Appeal lie to the Quarter Seſſions.

Eleventhly, That the Corporation be oblig'd to provide for all Publick Beggars, and to put the Laws in Execution againſt Publick Beggars and idle vagrant Perſons. Such

Such of the Publick Beggars as can Work muſt be employ'd, the reſt to be maintain'd as impotent Poor; but the Laws to be ſeverely put in Execution againſt thoſe who ſhall ask any Publick Alms.

THis Propoſal, which in moſt parts of it ſeems to be very maturely weigh'd, may be a Foundation for thoſe to build upon, who have a Publick Spirit large enough to embrace ſuch a Noble Undertaking.

But the common Obſtruction to any thing of this Nature, is a malignant temper in ſome who will not let a Publick Work go on, if private Perſons are to be Gainers by it: When they are to get themſelves, they abandon all Senſe of Virtue; but are cloath'd in her whiteſt Robe, when they ſmell Profit coming to another, masking themſelves with a falſe Zeal to the Common-wealth, where their own turn is not to be ſerv'd. It were better indeed, that Men would ſerve their Country for the Praiſe and Honour that follow good Actions; but this is not to be expected in a Nation, at leaſt leaning towards Corruption; and in ſuch an Age 'tis as much as we can hope for, if the Proſpect of ſome honeſt Gain invites People to do the Publick faithful Service. For which Reaſon, in any Undertaking where it can be made apparent that a great Benefit will accrue to the Common-wealth in general, we ought ont to have an Evil Eye upon what fair Advantages particular Men may thereby expect to Reap, ſtill taking care to keep their Appetite of getting within moderate Bounds, laying all juſt and reaſonable Reſtraints upon it, and making due Proviſion that they may not wrong or oppreſs their Fellow Subjects.

'Tis

'Tis not to be deny'd, but that if fewer Hands were ſuffer'd to remain idle, and if the Poor had full Employment, it would greatly tend to the Common Welfare, and contribute much towards adding every Year to the general Stock of *England*.

Among the Methods that we have here propos'd of Employing the Poor, and making the whole Body of the People uſeful to the Publick; we think it our Duty to mind thoſe who conſider the Common Welfare of looking with a compaſſionate Eye into the Priſons of this Kingdom, where many Thouſands conſume their Time in Vice and Idleneſs; waſting the Remainder of their Fortunes, or laviſhing the Subſtance of their Creditors, eating Bread and doing no Work, which is contrary to good Order, and pernicious to the Commonwealth.

We cannot therefore but recommend the Thoughts of ſome good Bill that may effectually put an end to this Miſchief ſo ſcandalous in a Trading Country, which ſhould let no Hands remain uſeleſs

'Tis not at all difficult to contrive ſuch a Bill as may Relieve and Releaſe the Debtor, and yet preſerve to his Creditors all their fair, juſt and honeſt Rights and Intereſt.

And having in this manner endeavour'd to ſhew that to preſerve and increaſe the People, and to make their Numbers uſeful, are Methods conducing to make us Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, we ſhall proceed to handle the ſecond Head.

SECT.

Scheme E.

	Acres	Value *per* Acre. *l.* *s.* *d.*	Rent. *l.*
Arable Land,	9,000,000	0---5---6	2,480,000
Paſture and Meadow,	12,000,000	0---8---8	5,200,000
Woods and Coppices,	3,000,000	0---5---0	750,000
Foreſts, Parks and Commons,	3,000,000	0---3---8	570,000
Heaths, Moors, Mountains, and Barren Land,	10,000,000	0---1---0	500,000
Houſes and Homeſteads, Gardens and Orchards, Churches and Church-yards,	1,000,000	The Land The Buildings	450,000 2,000,000
Rivers, Lakes, Meers and Ponds,	500,000	0---2---0	50,000
Roads, Ways, and waſt Land,	500,000	0---0---0	
In all	39,000,000	about 6---2	12,000,000

	True Yearly Value. *l.*	Value, as rated to the 4s. Tax. *l.*	Produce of the 4s. Tax *l.*
So the Yearly Rents or Value of the Land is	10,000,000	6,500,000	1,300,000
The Houſes and Buildings	2,000,000	1,500,000	300,000
All other Hereditaments	1,000,000	500,000	100,000
Perſonal Eſtates, ſuch as have been reach'd in the 4s. Aids	1,000,000	550,000	100,000
In All	14,000,000	9,050,000	1,800,000

So that whereas the Tax of 4s. *per* Pound, one Aid with another, has produc'd but — — — — — 1,800,000
It ſhould produce, if duly Aſſeſs'd — — — — 2,800,000

Place this Scheme p. 47.

SECT. III.

Of the Land of England, *and its Product.*

IN Treating of this Matter, we ſhall again produce one of Mr. *King*'s Schemes, which are all of them ſo accurately done, that we may venture to ſay they are not to be controverted in any Point ſo material as to deſtroy the Foundation of thoſe Reaſonings, which the Writer of theſe Papers, or any other Perſon ſhall form upon them.

He computes that *England* and *Wales* contain 39 Millions of Acres according to the following Scheme.

Vide Scheme E.

SCHEME

SCHEME F.

The Produce of the Arable Land, he thus Estimates in a Year of moderate Plenty.

	Bushels	*per* Bushel *s. d.*	Value
Wheat	14,000,000	at 3--6	2,450,000
Rye	10,000,000	at 2--6	1,250,000
Barly	27,000,000	at 2--0	2,700,000
Oats	16,000,000	at 1--6	1,200,000
Peafe	7,000,000	at 2--6	875,000
Beans	4,000,000	at 2--6	500,000
Vetches	1,000,000	at 2--0	100,000
In all	79,000,000	at 2--3 4/9	9,075,000

This is only the neat Produce, exclusive of the Seed-Corn, which in some sorts of Grain being near $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Produce, and in others $\frac{1}{8}$ may in general be reckon'd about 11 Millions of Bushels more, which makes the whole Produce to be 90 Millions of Bushels, which at 2 *s.* 3 4/9 *d. per* Bushel in Common, is about 10,338,600 *l.*

Note, That this Value is what the same is worth upon the Spot where the Corn grew; but this Value is increas'd by the Carriage to the Place where it is at last spent, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ part more.

These 79 Millions of Bushels of Grain are the Product of 8 of the 9 Millions of Acres of Arable Land; the other Million of Acres producing Hemp, Flax, Woad, Saffron, Rape, Hops, Dying Weeds, *&c.* the Value of the Product thereof may be about One Million Sterling.

So that the Rent of the Corn-Land being about 2,200,000 *l. per Annum*, and the Neat Produce thereof above 9,000,000 *l.* the Produce is full four Rents.

But

But deducting $\frac{1}{13}$ part of the Neat Produce, or 700,000 *l.* in lieu of Tyths, there remains 8,375,000 *l.* or three Rents, and near $\frac{8}{10}$.

Now the Rents or Yearly Value of the Paſture and Meadows, Woods, Coppices, Forreſts, Parks, Commons, Heaths, Moors, Mountains and Barren Land, being about 7,000,000 *l.*

The Produce being but 12,000,000 *l.* does not make fully two Rents, there being little Charge either in cultivating the Land, or gathering the Product thereof comparatively to what there is in Arable Land.

This Produce is principally in and by Cattle, Hay, Timber, and Fire-wood.

	l.
The Produce by Cattle, in Butter, Cheeſe and Milk, may be, about	2,500,000
The Value of the Wool Yearly ſhorn, about	2,000,000
The Value of the Horſes Yearly Bred, about	250,000
The Value of the Fleſh Yearly ſpent, as Food, about	3,350,000
The Value of the Tallow and Hides of the Cattle, about	600,000
The Value of Hay Yearly conſum'd by Horſes, about	1,300,000
The Hay Yearly conſum'd by other Cattle, about	1,000,000
The Timber Yearly fell'd for Building and ſuch Uſes, about	500,000
The Wood Yearly ſpent in Firing and petty Uſes, about	500,000
So the Produce (including 1 Million in Hay ſpent by Cattle) may be in all	12,000,000

SCHEME G.

An Eſtimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.

	Yearly Breed or Increaſe	The whole Stock	Value of each beſides the Skin	Value of the Stock.
			l. s. d.	*l.*
Beeves, Sterks, and Calves	800,000	4,500,000	2 - 00 - 00	9,000,000
Sheep and Lambs	3,600,000	12,000,000	0 - 07 - 04	4,440,000
Swine and Piggs	1,300,000	2,000,000	0 - 16 - 00	1,600,000
Deer and Fawns	20,000	100,000	2 - 00 - 00	200,000
Goats and Kids	10,000	50,000	0 - 10 - 00	25,000
Hares and Leverets	12,000	24,000	0 - 01 - 06	1,800
Rabits and Conies	2,000,000	1,000,000	0 - 00 - 05	20,833
	7,742,000	19,674,000	0 - 00 - 00	15,247,633

	l.
So the Value of the live Stock for Food may be	15,247,633
The Value of the Horſes, *&c.* being 1,200,000 at 2 *l.* 10 *s.* each, breeding Annually 100,000 may be	3,000,000
The Value of the Pelts and Skins over and above the Wool	2,400,000
The Value of the Wool Yearly ſhorn or pelted 12,000,000 of Fleeces, at 3 *s.* 4 *d. per* Fleece	2,000,000
The Value of the whole Stock of Tame Fowl, as Geeſe, Turkeys, Hens, Ducks, Pigeons, Swans and Peacocks	460,000
The whole Stock of Wild Fowl about	12,000
In all,	23,119,633

From theſe Schemes we ſhall make ſuch Obſervations as we think may relate to our preſent Subject.

Of the 39 Millions of Acres in Territory belonging to *England* he lays down, that there may be above a fourth part, *viz.* 10 Millions of Acres in Heaths, Moors, Mountains and Barren Land; 3 Millions of Acres in Woods and Coppices, and 3 Millions in Foreſts, Parks and Commons. This Diviſion of the Land ſeems to be made with great Judgment; Firſt, Becauſe it agrees very well with the Conſumption of ſeveral Commodities, of which we can come at a near knowledge by the Exerciſes now in being. *Secondly*, It correſponds exactly with that Increaſe in the Kingdom's General Rental, which for theſe laſt hundred Years may have been obſerv'd from the Produce of divers Land-Taxes, and from ſeveral other Particulars.

And there are undeniable Reaſons to be given, That this General Rental, *Anno* 1600. did not exceed ſix Millions *per Annum*, but through the help of that Wealth which has flow'd in to us by our Foreign Trade, it has advanc'd in ſeveral Periods of time from 6 to 8, from 8 to 10, and from 10 to 14 Millions *per Annum*. When the Generarl Rental was but ſix Millions *per Annum*, there was a great deal more barren Land; of that which was cultivated very much was capable of Melioration; and there were more Foreſts, Woods, Coppices, Commons and waſt Ground than there is now, which our Wealth did enable us from time to time to incloſe, cultivate and improve.

And for the Future, as we grow in Riches, and as our People increaſe, thoſe many Millions of Acres which now are Barren, will by degrees moſt of them be improv'd and cultivated; for there is hardly any ſort of Ground, which Numbers of Men will not render Fertile; but then it muſt be ſuppos'd, that we do not go backward in our Trade, for if that ſhould happen, inſtead of improving what is waſt, that which is improv'd and cultivated will rather return to the Wildneſs and Deſolation of former Times; for as we have ſaid in our former Diſcourſes, Land and Trade riſe and fall together. Trade brings in the Stock, this Stock well and induſtriouſ-manag'd betters Land, and brings more Product of all kind for Exportation; the Returns of which Growth and Product are to make a Country Gainers in the Ballance.

As to our quantity of Land, in Relation to its Inhabitants, as the Caſe ſtands, we ſeem now to have about 7¼ Acres *per* Head; but there are many Reaſons to think, that *England* is capable of nouriſhing double its preſent Number of People, which ſuppoſing them now to be 5,500,000 would be eleven Millions, and even then there will be as many

Acres

Acres *per* Head as they have in *Holland.* And when we have this Complement of Men, either in the natural Courſe of time, or ſooner by the help of good Conduct, we ſhall be in a State of Power to deal with any Strength in *Europe.* In the natural Courſe of time this cannot happen in a great while, but the common Progreſſion of things may be haſten'd by Art, ſo that if we are ſtudious to preſerve and increaſe our People, perandventure in not many Years, we may have Hands enow, not only to make us ſafe from the Inſults of others, but to render us formidable to all our Neighbours: And Men being the trueſt Strength and Riches of a Country, the Councils of all Wiſe States ſhould tend to obtaining and keeping together as many as the Land will Nouriſh. There are indeed Countries, to whom their full Complement of Inhabitants would be dangerous, and ſubject them to frequent Famines in bad and unſeaſonable Years for Corn. As for Example, if *France* had had as many Peole as the Land will feed in times of Common Plenty, half of 'em muſt have periſh'd during their late Dearths for want of Bread, becauſe they have a vaſt In-land Country, and only the Out Parts upon ſuch an Emergency can be reliev'd by the Aſſiſtance of other Places. And we ſee that anciently before there was much Trade, there were frequent Famines in the World, becauſe one part could not then help another; for which reaſon the Northern Nations hertofore, when their People Multiply'd too faſt, did disburden themſelves by ſending out numerous Colonies to ſeek out new Dwellings, in apprehenſion that by a ſcarce Year they might be deſtroy'd at home; but *England* (with any Moderate Care) is not liable to ſuch a Fear, tho' its preſent Numbers ſhould even be doubl'd, becauſe we have every where the Sea to Friend, and in ſuch an Extremity our Wants may be ſupply'd from other Nations.

And our Matter leading us into it, it may not be unneceſſary here to take Notice, That Countries not over-ſtock'd with Men, and tho' Situate, ſo as to be reliev'd by the Sea, may ſuffer greatly, and be reduc'd very low for want of Corn, unleſs they make ſome due Proviſion againſt ſuch a Calamity.

The Value of the Wheat, Barly and Rye, neceſſary for the Suſtenance of *England*, amounts at leaſt to ſix millions of Pounds *per Annum* at the common Rate; from whence 'tis apparent, that if a long Dearth ſhould happen here, ſuch as they lately had in *France*, tho' we may be ſupply'd upon more eaſie Terms than *France* was, and tho' we might ſtill keep our People alive, yet that a Diſaſter of this kind would exhauſt more of our Mony than a War of ten Years continuance. Suppoſe (which God forbid) that for two or three Years ſucceſſively the Seaſon ſhould prove ſo bad as to deprive us of half our uſual Crop; to ſupply ſuch a Want, what immenſe Summs muſt be carry'd out of the Kingdom? And it may be made evident, that ſuch a Scarcity did very much drein the *French*.

To Provide againſt a Calamity of the like Nature, is no doubt of the higheſt Conſequence. That we have been deficient in this point of Polity is too Notorious, tho' Providence has taken more care of us than a Negligent People deſerve. However, we have had outragious Famines in *England*, and in *Edward* the 3ds Reign, Corn did once riſe to 13 times the Common value; this indeed can hardly happen again, becauſe there are more different ſorts of Soils improv'd and manur'd now than in that Age; but at ſeveral times we have ſuffer'd Wants of this kind very afflicting, and ſometime or other our Negligence in a Matter of ſuch concern to the People's Welfare, may come to be more ſeverely puniſh'd.

By

By the beſt Accounts we are able to procure from ſuch as have look'd into theſe things, we find that in *England*, in a plentiful Year, there is not above five Months Stock of Grain at the time of the ſucceeding Harveſt, and not above four Months Stock in an indifferent Year, which is but a ſlender Proviſion againſt any Evil Accident. We enjoy the benefit of ſuch different Soils, *viz.* High Lands and Low Lands, where one hits when the other fails, and now a-days we ſeldom ſee Corn above treble its common Rate, which however would be fatal, if it ſhould at any time continue ſo long as to make large Supplies from abroad neceſſary to us. 'Tis obſerv'd, That but $\frac{1}{10}$ defect in the Harveſt may raiſe the Price $\frac{3}{10}$, and when we have but half our Crop of Wheat, which now and then happens, the remainder is ſpun out by Thrift and good Management, and eked out by the uſe of other Grain; but this will not do for above one Year, and would be a ſmall help in the ſucceſſion of two or three unſeaſonable Harveſts: For the ſcarcity even of one Year is very deſtructive, in which many of the pooreſt Sort periſh, either for want of ſufficient Food, or by unwholeſome Diet.

We take it, That a Defect in the Harveſt may raiſe the Price of Corn in the following Proportions.

Defect		*above the Common Rate.*
1 Tenth	Raiſes the Price	3 Tenths
2 Tenths		8 Tenths
3 Tenths		1. 6 Tenths
4 Tenths		2. 8 Tenths
5 Tenths		4. 5 Tenths

So that when Corn riſes to treble the common Rate, it may be preſum'd, that we want above a third of the Common Produce; and if we ſhould

want 5 Tenths, or half the Common Produce, the Price would riſe to near five times the Common Rate.

We dwell the longer upon this Subject, being convinc'd in Judgment, that nothing in the World can more impoveriſh a Country, nor tend more to ſet it back with other People in the Ballance of Trade for a long while, than ſuch a Calamity; 'tis indeed the Scourge of God but improvident States are more liable to it than wiſer nations.

The *Hollanders* cannot nouriſh their People from their Territory, and muſt always ſeek for Aſſiſtance from abroad; but in Proſpect that the Harveſt my be bad now and then, in ſome and even in all thoſe Places from whence they fetch their Corn, whereby in ſcarce times they would be impos'd upon; They take care to have Granaries and Store-houſes, where in plenty Years they lay up vaſt Quantities of all ſorts of Grain againſt a dearer Seaſon; by which good and prudent Oeconomy, thoſe Dearths which in their turn have afflicted moſt other Countries, fall but lightly upon their Common People.

On the Contrary, when ſuch a Calamity happens, they are able from their Stores to aſſiſt other Nations; and tho' we cannot go ſo high as * Sir *Walter Raleigh*, who is over-large in his Computations of this Nature, and reckons the *Dutch* to get an Immenſe Sum by this ſort of Trade; yet 'tis apparent, That they are very great Gainers from time to time, by ſelling us our own Corn dear, which they had bought cheap, and that they make us pay very largely for its Store-room.

* *Vide* Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s Remains, p. 173.

A Nation that will get by Foreign Traffick, muſt carefully watch all theſe things; and the Inſtance we have here given, is a great pull-back in the general Ballance of Trade, and what the *Dutch* in this manner Gain, is a dead Loſs to *England*.

But

But this Evil is without doubt capable of a Remedy. If they can afford to let their Mony lie dead for a Time, pay Freight backward and forward, and Store-Room, and yet be Gainers by ſelling us our own Commodity in a dearer Market, why ſhould not we think it worth our while to build Granaries and publick Store-houſes, within our own Dominions?

We take it, That Freight backward and forward in ſuch a bulky Ware as Corn is, does over Ballance the difference in the Intereſt of Mony here and there: So that we ſeem to be impos'd upon in this important Matter, meerly through that Negligence of which Wealthy Nations are but too Guilty.

It may therefore be worth the Conſideration of ſuch as Study the good of *England*, whether it would not be adviſable, and for the Publick welfare, to ſettle a Fond for erecting in every County Granaries capable of containing ſuch a quantity of Corn as as may nouriſh the People for a certain time, upon any emergent occaſion, and as may hinder us at all times from Purchaſing at a dear Rate our own Product from our more wary Neighbours.

This firſt Step would be the moſt chargeable, but in the Courſe of a few Years, the Expence would be over-paid to the Body of the Kingdom; as to filling theſe Stores with Corn, ſufficient to anſwer the People's Occaſions, we are inclin'd to think it would be beſt manag'd by private Undertakers, whom the hopes of Advantage will eaſily invite into ſuch a Buſineſs. But here again will come the common Objection made to Publick Things, That ſome private Men will be thereby Gainers; and ſo, in the Name of God, let 'em, provided they do the Publick Service.

However, there are many Reaſons to think, That ſuch a Buſineſs, from the very nature of it, would be more uncorruptibly manag'd, than moſt other

publick

publick Matters. First, Some Persons would look after it as a Work of more meritorious Charity than any that can be thought on. Secondly, In case of Male Administration, the Clamors of the common People would be irresistible. Thirdly, A great many different sorts of Men would find themselves concern'd in point of Interest, to see it well and justly administer'd.

'Tis not here pretended, to give any regular Scheme of this whole Matter, which would take up more time than consists with the brevity design'd in these Discourses; but 'tis hop'd, the Hints now given, will suffice to make some good Patriots in due season lay to heart a business of such high Importance to their Land, to its Product, and to the entire Body of the People.

That Corporation for setting the Poor to Work, of which a Scheme has been here propos'd, may very properly provide Granaries round the Kingdom.

It would likewise be very advisable to review the Ancient Laws concerning Corn, for they no ways square with the present Numbers of our People, nor with the Growth of *London*, and indeed ought to be more adapted to many other Circumstances of the Times we now live in.

All Countries thrive or decline by Trade, as they well or ill manage their Product and Manufactures; and wise Nations observe carefully every part, where they think to have any probable Advantage. If they excel in Product and Manufacture, as in *France* the Government bends it self to encourage the People in the pursuit of what is judg'd profitable to the Publick. If they have little Product of their, as in *Holland*, they fall to be Carriers of the World, and to buy Goods in one place to vend in another, whereby the Bulk of their Riches has been gain'd.

Eng-

England has an Excellent Product of its own, wherewith to ſuſtain its Inhabitants: The Woollen Manufacture is a Wealth in a manner peculiar to us. We have beſides the Product of other Countries ſubject to our Dominion the *Weſt-Indies*. The *Eaſt-Indies* are an inexhauſtible Mine of Vanities, to barter for the Vanities of other Countries, which a rich Nation will always covet. We have Ports and Situation, and every thing that can contribute to make us the foremoſt People of the whole Commercial World, only a little Induſtry may be wanting which to ſtir up is the Drift of theſe enquiries.

We have look'd into Mr. *King*'s Computation of the Corn, becauſe it ſhould be the Fundamental Care of a good Government, to provide that the People never want it, for two or three Years defect there pulls down whatever the Merchant has been doing for a long time.

As to his Eſtimate of our live Stock in Cattle, many Concluſions perhaps uſeful may be form'd from it, which we omit, as fearing to be too Voluminous: We ſhall only obſerve, That it ſeems more the National Intereſt of *England*, to employ its Land to the Breeding and Feeding of Cattle, than to the Produce of Corn; For, as Mr. *Fortrey* has well noted, * *The profit of one Acre of Paſture in the Fleſh, Hide and Tallow of an Ox, or in the Fleſh, Wool and Tallow of a Sheep, or in the Carcaſe of a Horſe, is of ſo much greater value abroad, than the like Yield of the Earth would be in Corn; that the Exportation of this Nation might be at leaſt double to what it is, if rightly diſpos'd.*

* *England's* Intereſt and Improvement. P. 15.

'Tis true, in theſe Matters Men are apt to follow what they think their particular Profit, but the Influence of good Laws would go a great way towards incilning them more to purſue what is for the general Advantage; and indeed the private Concerns

cerns of of Men ſhould be always made ſubſervient to the Publick Intereſt.

Nor is force at all needful to bring this about, for Men in moſt of their Meaſures, where the Adminiſtration is wiſe and ſteady, may be induc'd to purſue the common Welfare by directive Laws, by Examples from the Prince and great Ones, and by ſome few not very expenſive Encouragements. As for Example, 'tis in the Power of a King of *England*, not only to have as many Horſes bred, but of what Shape and Size He pleaſes; His Encouragement will at any time increaſe the Studds, and when He countenances the Shape and Size that He thinks will profit His Country moſt that way, the Breeders will forthwith turn all their Care and Induſtry.

Our Anceſtors have not been unmindful to promote the breed of Horſes, as we may ſee by 27 *H.* 8. 6. 32 *H.* 8. 13. foreſeeing what an Advantage might accrue thereby to *England*; but thoſe old Laws want reviſing, and to be more adapted to preſent uſe.

Our Fore-fathers indeed were againſt tranſporting Horſes and Mares above ſuch a value, 11 *H.* 7. 13. 1 *Ed.* 6 5. but when thoſe Prohibitions were enacted, the buſineſs of Trade was not ſo well underſtood, as it is at preſent. However, in practice we have of late Years conſulted our National Intereſt, which in all appearance is to let this Commodity be traded for, as well as any other.

It may be convenient to reſtrain the carrying out of Mares, but as to Geldings and Stone-horſes we can ſee no danger in it. On the contrary, if ſuch Numbers were call'd for, as would invite us to increaſe our Breeds, it would no doubt bring a great Profit to the Kingdom. Stone-Horſes yield moſt abroad, and coſt no more rearing than Gel-

Geldings : Againſt this is objected, That we may thereby ſtrengthen our Enemies, by mending the Breed of other Countries ; but there is little Strength added to that Enemy, whoſe Mony we take for a periſhable Commodity : Beſides, the Nation we have moſt Reaſon to diſtruſt, labour under a Natural Impediment of not excelling in the Breed of Horſes, their Ground is not proper for it. They do not want Stallions, of which they may have as good, if not better than Ours from other Parts, but they have neither Mares nor fit Paſture ; and if they had Mares, they would be yet to ſeek ; for 'tis Notorious that the Shape, Strength and Beauty of Horſes proceed from the Soil ; and when that is chang'd, in the next Race they degenerate.

This Matter has been taken notice of, becauſe it has been frequently deſir'd that the ancient Prohibitions here mention'd might be reinforc'd by ſome new Law ; but whether or no ſuch a Meaſure be right for *England*, is humbly ſubmitted to better Judgments.

Mr. *King* computes the Value of the Horſes yearly bred to be about 250,000 *l.*

This Eſtimate ſeems not to be out of the way, and from it we ſhall obſerve that by good Laws and a due Care in their Execution, and by Encourgement from the great Ones above, it might peradventure be brought about to double our yearly Breed ; and if this could be compaſs'd, and if great Numbers of them ſhould be ſold in Foreign Markes (provided it be deem'd ſafe for the State) 'twould be a new Addition to our National Stock, and be juſt ſo much put into the Scale, yet more to incline of our ſide the general Balance.

Our Mines are another Product of the Earth, and undoubtedly capable of great Improvements ; we ought to reſpect them as the Parents of all our Trade,

Trade, and which made us known to the firſt Merchants of the World, the *Phœnicians*. We have Tin, Lead, Copper, Calamy, Iron, Coal, Culm, Allom, Copperas, with other ſort of Minerals; and what is in this manner dug out of the Earth, cannot be a leſs Article than about 7 or 800,000 *l. per Annum* in the whole Rental of the Kingdom.

They who work theſe Mines and deal in theſe Materials, know beſt what Laws and Conſtitutions they want to make their Buſineſs more eaſie at Home, and to give their Commodities a freer Vent Abroad; but if they need any Help from the Legiſlative Power, moſt certainly they ought to have it, ſince their Stock and Labour turn ſo much to the Common Good; for whatever their Product yields in Foreign Markets, is clear National Profit.

There are lately publiſh'd ſome extraordinary Accompts of the Mines in *Cardiganſhire*, where 'tis ſaid there are Eight large Veins of Silver, Lead and Copper Oar, lying near together in one Mountain, nigh a Navigable River and a good Port.

* *Mine Adventure and Expedient*, p. 7.

* 'Tis alledg', That theſe Mines with a large Stock, in a few Years, may be advanc'd to a clear Profit 170,000 *l. per Annum*. This Computation does not ſeem at extravagant, to thoſe who have look'd into the Accompts of what Mines produce in other Countries, provided the Oar be good, the Vein like to laſt (and large ones ſeldom fail) and provided there be no invincible Impediment from Nature to their Working; they have ſtood ſtill ſeveral Years for want of a good Agreement among the Adventurers.

'Tis ſaid Sir *H. M.* has put 'em in a way of being wrought; but if his *Expedient* ſhould not ſucceed, and, if new Differences ſhould ariſe, Legiſlative Authority may very well and juſtly interpoſe, even to compel the Partners to ſome Agreement, whereby the Work may be carry'd on;

on; for 'tis a Juſtice due to the Publick at no time to ſuffer a few Stock-Jobbing Citizens to ſtand in the way of any National Advantage, the Fraud and Corruption of which ſort of Men have hurt *England* in more than one Particular.

If theſe Mines come but any thing near the Value Mr. *William Waller* has put upon them, and with Reaſons very probable, the are a fit Object of the States Care; and upon Inſpection into their true Worth, if private Purſes cannot raiſe a Stock ſufficient to ſet 'em going, it were better done upon ſome publick Fond, to be repaid out of the Profits, than to loſe what is repreſented as ſo immenſe a Treaſure. But ſhould it prove leſs 'tis not to be neglected, for Nations (like private Men) who will thrive muſt look into ſmall Things as well as great; and for this we have the Examples of *France* and *Holland*, whoſe Miniſters examine into the minuteſt Matters, where the Publick may poſſibly Reap any Advantage; and 'tis a very commendable piece of Wiſdom, were it but for this ſingle Reaſon, That to do ſo conſtantly begets a Habit of Care and Diligence in things of higher importancance. Vide *Eſſay on the Value of the Mines*, &c.

The Fiſhery ſhould be here treated of as being the Product of the Peoples Labour, but this Point we have elſewhere handled. However, it falls naturally into our preſent Subject to obſerve, That to recover the Fiſhery, and to bring us to the Height and Perfection our Coaſt and Situation are capable of, would increaſe the Numbers of our People (for Men always multiply where they have Conveniences of Living); It would find Employment for Poor; It would raiſe Rents, and give a higher Value to all that Land produces; It would ſet us right in ſeveral Nations where we are believ'd to deal at Loſs, and particularly in thoſe Places where our Exportations bear no Proportion, at leaſt in Bulk, Vide *Diſcourſes on the Publick Revenues and Trade*, Part II. p. 135.

Bulk, with our Importations, which might be ſupply'd by Fiſh. We cannot therefore but earneſtly recommend the ſerious Thoughts of this Matter, and by what Methods it may be retriev'd, to all ſuch as love their Country, and who wiſh to ſee us every Year more and more Gainers in the Ballance of Trade.

Having touch'd upon theſe Heads, we ſhall proceed to ſay ſomething of Wooll, which is a main Article in the Produce of Land.

Mr. *King* computes the Value of the Wooll ſhorn, to be about 2,000,000 *l. per Annum.*

Part II. p. 414. And in the Diſcourſes upon the Revenue and Trade, we compute, by a General Medium, That the Material is improv'd one with another, fourfold in the Workmanſhip; ſo that the Value of the Woollen Manufacture made here, may amount to 8,000,000 *l. per Annum.*

Perhaps neither of us are much out of the way in theſe two Calculations; but ſuppoſe us a little under or over the Mark, all People will agree with us, That this Branch of our Product is very large, and of the higheſt Importance.

The Writer of theſe Papers has an Accompt from a Perſon, upon whoſe Judgment and Experience in theſe Matters there is great Reaſon to rely, That our Exports of all kinds, in the Woollen Manufacture, amount to above two Millions *per Annum*; which is ſo large a Part of our General Exportation, that it muſt maim the whole Body of our Trade, to receive any Hurt in ſo principal a Member.

Whatever Goods we make up of Foreign Materials, and ſell in the Markets abroad all above the Coſt of the Materials is clear Gain to *England*; in the ſame manner all our clear Returns from the Plantations which we Export are Neat profit.

But

But where the Materials and Manufactures too are both our own, as in this inſtance of the Woollen Goods, two Millions carry'd out when the general Ballance of Trade is conſider'd, muſt be eſteem'd as two Millions gain'd to the Kingdom; for the Return of this Exportation ſupplies our Conſumption of Foreign Goods (which would otherwiſe be bought with Mony) with ſome Overplus, which Overplus is what muſt incline the Scale to turn of our ſide.

Some People have been apt to fear that we ſink in the Woollen Manufacture, becauſe the Accompts of the Draperies exported, have been heretofore larger than of late Years; but ſuch do not contemplate, that tho' the Old may have leſſen'd, what is commonly call'd the New Draperies have increas'd, conſiſting in Bays, Serges and Stuffs: So that upon the whole, infinitely more of the Material of Wooll has of late Years been wrought up for Foreign uſe than in former Times; and herein our Merchants have been only forc'd to follow the Modes and Humor of thoſe People with whom they deal, and the Co[illegible] they have perſued has hitherto not been detrimental to the publick.

Nor is there any Cauſe to apprehend, but that we may increaſe from time to time in the general Manufacture of Wooll, tho' the Exportation of particular Commodities may now and then vary: For upon the whole, our Material is better and fitter for all uſes than that of moſt Countries.

Twere better indeed that the Call from abroad were only for the fine Draperies, becauſe then we ſhould be in a manner without a Rival; no Country but *England* and *Ireland*, having a Soard or Turf, that will rear Sheep, producing the Wooll of which moſt of our Draperies are made. 'Tis true, the Wooll of *Spain* is fine above all others,

but 'tis the wear only of the Richer Sort; and of *Spaniſh* Cloaths not above 9000 Pieces are ſent abroad *Communibus Annis.* And even in the working up of this Wooll, perhaps it may be made out, that our very Climate gives us an Advantage over other Countries.

The Learned Prelate, who has oblig'd *England* with that Noble Work, his *Hiſtory of the Reformation*, Diſcourſing once upon theſe Matters, with the Writer of this Eſſay, did urge a thing which the Philoſophy ſeem'd very ſound and right, and upon which we have ſince reflected often; He ſaid, that Nature had adapted different Countries for different Manufactures; that cold and moiſter Climates are fitter for the working up of Wool, becauſe there the Sun does not exhauſt its natural Moiſture, nor make it brittle, which would render it ill to work, and bad to wear; That hot Climates are beſt for the working up of Silk, becauſe the Matter is there more diſpos'd to imbibe the Dye, and to take a more durable impreſſion of it, the Sun helping, at the ſame time, both to preſerve and to give it Luſtre.

That we have many natural Advantages over all Foreign Nations, who ſhall pretend to ſet up Looms, is beyond all diſpute; but 'tis a very great Queſtion, whether there are not weighty Reaſons to apprehend Neighbours of another ſort, we mean the People of *Ireland*.

The Country is very large, it abounds in convenient Ports; 'tis excellently Situate for Trade, capable of great Improvements of all kinds, and able to nouriſh more than treble its preſent Number of Inhabitants.

Its Soil, Soard and Turf, are in a manner the ſame with ours, and proper to rear Sheep: All which Conſiderations beget a reaſonable fear, that in time they may come to rival us in our Darling moſt Important Manufacture. That

That they ſhould increaſe in People, that their Land ſhould be drein'd and meliorated, that they ſhould have Trade, and grow Wealthy by it, may not peradventure be dangerous to *England*: For 'tis granted, their Riches will center at laſt here in their Mother-Kingdom.

And Colonies that enjoy not only Protection, but who are at their Eaſe, and Flouriſh, will in all likelyhood be leſs inclinable to innovate, or to receive a Foreign Yoke, than if they are harraſs'd and compell'd to Poverty, through the hard Uſage of the People from whom they are deriv'd. For tho there are now and then Inſtances of Countries that rebel wantonly, yet moſt commonly great Defections proceed from great Oppreſſion.

It ſeems therefore a Point of the higheſt Wiſdom to give the Planters of *Ireland* all Encouragements that can poſſibly conſiſt with the Welfare of *England*: For 'tis an Out-work to the Seat of Empire here; if it ſhould be gain'd by any Neighbouring Power, the Sum of Affairs would be put in danger. 'Tis to be preſerv'd but by a Numerous Army, or by its own proper Strength. How far the firſt way may affect our Liberties is not difficult to determin, it follows then that the ſafeſt Courſe muſt be to let them thrive by Husbandry, and ſome Trade, whereby the Natives and Inhabitants will not only have the Means, but an Intereſt to defend themſelves.

If through a miſtaken fear and jealouſy of their future Strength and Greatneſs, we ſhould either permit or contrive to let them be diſpeopled, poor, weak and diſpirited, or if we ſhould render them ſo uneaſie as to incline the People to a deſire of Change, it may invite Strangers to look that way; and if brought to be naked and defenceleſs, they muſt be a Prey to the firſt Invader.

This will be avoided, if they are ſuffer'd to proſper, and not only ſo, but Strength thus added to one Member will make the Body-Politick much the ſtronger.

For as all the Blood with a ſwift Motion paſſes frequently through the Heart, ſo whatever Wealth out Countries acquire, circulates about, coming into the chief Seat of Empire, from whence 'tis diſpers'd into all its Parts; and ever ſince *Ireland* did improve, it can be made appear *England* has had no ſmall Proportion of its Gains.

What made *Rome* ſo immenſly rich? Her Citizens but little minded Arts or Handicraft, War was their chief Employment. 'Twas counted Ignoble in a Senator to exerciſe Merchandize, nor indeed was the Genius of the People addicted to it, but being the Head of that large Dominion, the Fountain of Law, and the Spring from whence all Power, Honors, and Magiſtracies were deriv'd, thither all Men reſorted; ſome for Pleaſure, others upon Buſineſs: So that what was got by the *Sicilians*, *Rhodians*, *Cretans*, and by the Trading Cities, not only of *Greece* but *Aſia*, came at laſt to center there.

But this holds more ſtrongly, where the Seat of Dominion is in a great Emporium, for ſuch a City will not only be the Head of Power but of Trade, governing all its Branches, and giving the Rules and Price; ſo that all Parts thereon depending, can deal but ſubordinately to it, till at laſt 'tis found that Provinces work but to enrich the Superior Kingdom.

That what has been here ſaid is true, in our preſent Caſe, appears manifeſtly from this, that all People agree, there is not in *Ireland* above 500,000 *l.* in current Caſh, notwithſtanding their large Exportations for many Years, which could not be, if they had not ſome conſtant Drein, whereby they are

are exhauſted. 'Tis true, improving Countries lay out a great Stock in Foreign Materials for Building, *&c.* So that they ſeldom abound much at firſt in the Species of Mony; but allowing for this; yet in the natural Courſe of Things they ought to have more Species, if what they got elſewere had not been ſpent here, and return'd hither by Bills of Exchange from *Holland*, *France*, *Spain*, the *Weſt-Indies*, and other Places.

But tho' we are ready to agree, That hitherto their Gains both at home and abroad have chiefly center'd here; yet in proceſs of time, 'tis poſſible that in the Management of their Product and Foreign Traffick, they may come to interfere with, and bring Prejudice to their Mother-Nation. And remote Fears being allowable where the whole Safety of State is concern'd, they ſhould not wonder to ſee *England* ſo much alarm'd at the Progreſs they make in the Woollen Manufacture.

As has been ſaid before, 'Tis ſo great a Part of our Exportation, that any conſiderable Failure and Interruption therein muſt ſet the Ballance of Trade againſt us with a Witneſs; it falls therefore naturally into our preſent Subject to ſay ſomething of this Matter.

Laſt Seſſion of Parliament, a Bill paſs'd the Houſe of Commons, and was committed in the Houſe of Lords, For Prohibiting the Exportation of the Woollen Manufactures of *Ireland* to Foreign Parts.

This Point has of late been much debated, and the general Subject of Men's Diſcourſes; The Writer of theſe Papers was then inclin'd to the milder Side, being indeed in his Judgment againſt Prohibitions, becauſe moſt of ſuch as are come within his Obſervation, ſeem to have been puſh'd on (without Doors) rather for private Ends, and to ſerve ſome particular Turn, than calculated to produce any publick Benefit.

But having now more maturely conſider'd this nice Controverſie, he begins to lean to their Opinion, who think ſuch a Bill neceſſary and more eſpecially if the Promoters of it can make out the Suggeſtions upon which it was founded.

Where the Common-wealth is truly concern'd, and where her Safety is in Queſtion, they have very narrow Minds, who let their Compaſſion be too much extended to private Objects: Our chief Tenderneſs ſhould be towards her, and rough Examples in the infancy of a Miſchief are rather merciful than cruel, becauſe fewer People ſuffer then, than would otherwiſe do, if the Evil were permitted to take deeper Root.

If their Manufactures interfere with ours, ſo as to hurt *England*, it muſt be undoubtedly adviſable to intercept their Growth by ſome effectual Law betimes, before ſuch an Error in Government grow too big for our Correction; before too many Families have turn'd their Stock that way; before they have increas'd their Stock of Sheep, or bred up too great a number of Artiſts (all which Circumſtances would make their Caſe yet harder;) for we ſhould preſerve our ſelves with as little Hurt to them a poſſible.

But it ſeems, ſome People make a doubt, whether or no we have Power thus to intermeddle in their Matters; queſtioning whether Laws made here are binding upon them, till they have receiv'd a Sanction in their own Parliament. And Mr. *Molyneux* counts it a very extravagant Notion, that has not the leaſt Colour from Reaſon or Record, to term them a Colony from *England*. But we muſt beg leave to differ with him in Opinion. For we take them ſo far to be a Colony in the Senſe (by the Interpretation both of Law and Reaſon) as renders them ſtill dependent upon their Mother-Kingdom.

Nor

Nor is this at all impugn'd by the Conceſſions made to the ancient *Iriſh* by *Henry* the 2d, King *John*, and *Henry* the 3d; but to ſet this in a better Light, the Poſture of *Ireland* in thoſe Times muſt be conſider'd.

The firſt Adventurers that went over thither, namely, *Richard* the Son of *Strongbow*, and *Robert Fitz-Stephen*, who ſtipulated under certain Conditions to aſſiſt *Dermot Fitz-Murchard*, had not a ſtrength ſufficient to reduce the Country, and little was done towards it of any conſequence, till the Expedition of *Henry* the 2d, *Anno* 1172. with a Royal Army, to whom the Clergy, Nobility, Gentry and People, made an abſolute Surrender of the Kingdom; and, by the deſcription Hiſtorians give of it, it ſeems to have been that ſort of Yielding which the *Romans* call'd *Deditio*, which was *ſe dare in Manus Poteſtatem & Arbitrium.* And their giving themſelves up to *Henry* the 2d, without a Battel or Blood-ſhed, gave him yet a ſtronger Title, becauſe the Act was leſs conſtrain'd, and more flowing from the Will. 'Tis true, ſo wild and numerous a People were not to be kept in Order by a handful of new Inhabitants; the King therefore gave them a Conſtitution, by which they were to govern themſelves, as a free Country under him their Lord. After this, the Dominion thereof was ſettled upon *John* his Youngeſt Son, and two and twenty Years after in him reunited to the Crown of *England.* From King *John*, *Henry* the 3d, and their Succeſſors, the ancent *Iriſh* and the firſt Adventurers (of whom many as * Mr. *Spencer* has obſerv'd, have taken the Names, Manners and Humours of the Natives) derive ſeveral Franchiſes and Immunities, and among the reſt to hold a Parliament. The Story of thoſe Times is it ſelf dark, but the Reaſon of their Councils is yet darker. From *Mathew Paris*,

* *Edmund Spencer's* View of the State of *Ireland*, P. 222.

and *Giraldus Cambrenſis* it appears, That theſe Conceſſions were made to the Body of the Old *Iriſh*, tho' but few, in Practice, ſubmitted to them; for to uſe Mr. *Spencer*'s own Words, *To whom did King* Henry *the 2d, impoſe thoſe Laws? Not to the* Iriſh, *for the moſt of them fled from his Power into Deſarts and Mountains, leaving the wide Country to the Conquerour, who in their ſtead eſtſoons plac'd* Engliſh *Men, who poſſeſs'd all their Lands, and did quite ſhut out the* Iriſh, *or the moſt part of them. And to thoſe new Inhabitants and Colonies he gave his Laws, to wit, the ſame Laws under which they were born and bred, the which it was no difficulty to place among them, being formerly well inur'd thereunto; unto whom afterwards there repair'd divers of the Poor diſtreſs'd People of the* Iriſh, *for Succour and Relief of whom, ſuch as they thought fit for Labour, and induſtriouſly diſpo'd as the moſt part of their baſer ſort are, they receiv'd unto them as their Vaſſals, but ſcarcely vouchſaf'd to impart unto them the benefit of thoſe Laws under which themſelves liv'd, but every One made his Will and Commandment a Law unto his own Vaſſal: Thus was not the Law of* England *ever properly apply'd unto the* Iriſh *Nation, as by a purpos'd Plot of Government, but as they could inſinuate and ſteal themſelves under the ſame, by their humble Carriage and Submiſſion.*

But after this, during the Wars between the Houſe of *York* and *Lancaſter*, they ſhook off both the Rule and Laws of *England*, repoſſeſſing their ancient Seats, driving us by degrees to that which was properly call'd the *Engliſh* Pale.

In truth it does not appear, That they embrac'd our Form of Government for a great while: So that the Models of it given heretofore, from hence ſeem chiefly to have been intended for the better Rule of our own People, not but they were likewiſe meant as a Benefit to the *Iriſh*, if they would be contented to become a more civiliz'd Nation.

If

If their Ancient Parliament Rolls were Extant, it would more plainly appear what uſe they made of their Conſtitution, and thereby it would be ſeen whether or no both their Houſe of Lords and Commons did not chiefly conſiſt of the *Engliſh* Planters.

If as Mr. *Molyneux* aſſerts, Ireland, *tho' annext to the Crown of* England, *has always been look'd upon to be a Kingdom compleat within it ſelf, and to have all Juriſdiction to an Abſolute Kingdom belonging, and Subordinate to no Legiſlative Authority upon Earth*; theſe Immunities muſt be deriv'd from the Conceſſions granted at *Caſhal* by *Henry* the 2d. But with whom was this Compact made? With the Native *Iriſh*; and their Claim to it would be very juſt, if they had perform'd the Conditions of the Stipulation; but their Title ſeems weaken'd by 52 Rebellions which they have made againſt the Government of *England*. We would not be thought here to inſinuate, that a People may loſe their Natural Rights by an Inſurrection againſt their Prince, but certain Priviledges not Fundamental, they may forfeit by non-uſure or miſ-uſure. Beſides, the Caſe between a Prince and his Native Subjects, and between a Government and the People of a Conquer'd Country, is quite different. In the firſt Inſtance the Relation is the ſame, as betwixt a Father and a Son, the Child may Err, and the Parent will forgive; but in the other Caſe the Tie is not the ſame, they are not ſo near a Kin. 'Tis true, the Prince is Father of the People, in one place as well as in the other, but in his Politick-Capacity he is at the Head of another Common-Wealth, with whoſe Blood and Treaſure the ſtranger Country was perhaps Conquer'd. And if a Foreign People, thus ſubdu'd, Rebel, they without doubt forfeit ſeveral Priviledges, which were not any Natural Rights of their own, but Forms of living preſcrib'd, and Conceſſions granted by

by the Conquerors. And the *Romans* in the beſt and pureſt Times of the Common-wealth, did frequently deprive Subject Cities and Countries, Rebelling, of their Land, and of their Immunities: To be a State not Subordinate to any Legiſlative Authority upon Earth, is a Previledge that may be forfeited by a Subject-Country, and yet leave to the People their Natural Rights unhurt: the *Iriſh* were once a Subject-Country, appears from the intire Reſignation of themſelves to *Henry* the 2d. as Head of the Common-wealth of *England*. To reduce a wild Nation, it was expedient to put their Liberties upon a good Foot. He reſtor'd them therefore to be a free People, and ſo they and their Deſcendents might have been. They might have continu'd an Independent Kingdom, and the Old *Iriſh* might have preſerv'd both their Land, and the Immunities thereon depending, if they had not themſelves alter'd their own Conſtitution.

But by Rebelling frequently, and by being as often vanquiſh'd, they chang'd their own Form of Government. They were heretofore Proprietors of the Land, and therefore had Right to be the two Eſtates in Parliament of Lords and Commons, but this was by degrees loſt, and became veſted in the new Inhabitants: Inſomuch that, to uſe Mr. *Molyneux*'s own Words, *Now 'tis manifeſt, That the great Body of the preſent People of* Ireland, *are the Progeny of the* Engliſh *and* Britains, *that from time to time have come over into this Kingdom; and there remains but a meer handful of the ancient* Iriſh *at this Day, I may ſay not One in a Thouſand.*

Are the Conceſſions granted by King *Henry* now veſted in this Thouſandth Part? And are they the Body-Politick of *Ireland*, of which not One in a Thouſand ſits in Parliament; and of which very few have Voices in chooſing thoſe who are to ſit there? If any, theſe certainly are to be the diſtinct

State,

State, and *To have all Juriſdiction to an Abſolute Kingdom belonging*, for with their Anceſtors thoſe Stipulations were made, under which Mr. *Molyneux* pretends to claim.

But the Old Inhabitants having loſt the greateſt part of their Property, have loſt ſo much of their ſhare in the Conſtitution, which is now devolv'd upon thoſe Colonies which *England* has from time to time ſent to Conquer and Poſſeſs the Land, who are now properly the Body-Politick of that Kingdom.

Theſe we allow have forfeited nothing, by any Rebellion the Natives have made, they are Purchaſers, and at a dear Rate with the frequent hazard of their Lives and Fortunes: We muſt therefore ſee how far the ancient Rights of the *Iriſh* are devolv'd upon them, and whether under that Claim the New Inhabitants may juſtly term themſelves an Independent Nation.

Whoever Conquers, Conquers in the Right of that Country at whoſe Expence the War was made; and tho the Property of the Land be often granted to the Adventurers, the Dominion thereof is always reſerv'd to the Nation that ſends her People out. 'Tis true, where a part of the People divides its ſelf from the reſt to ſeek new Seats at their own coſt, as they did among the *Scythians*, *Goths* and *Vandals*, there the Caſe was otherwiſe, for they rambled ſo far as no more to communicate with their Mother-Country.

But it does not appear, That *Fitz-Stephen* or *Richard Strongbow*, went out upon ſuch Terms as thoſe Northern Nations did. On the contrary, their Endeavours had little Succeſs till ſeconded by the Power of *England*, at whoſe Expence all the ſucceeding Conqueſts of *Ireland* have been either made or ſecur'd; ſo that if the ancient *Iriſh* had any Rights of Dominion, and if thoſe Rights are forfeited,

feited, the Forfeiture devolves upon *England*, and not upon the Adventurers, nor their Succeſſors,

Nor is it indeed conſiſtent with the Principles of Government that a part of the People ſhould ſeparate from the reſt, and be (eſpecially ſo near at hand) an Independent Dominion, for that were to have Protection where they owe no Duty, which is an Abſurdity in Politicks.

When a part of the People divides from the reſt to ſeek more Territory, if they are at their own Coſt, and ſtrong enough to eradicate or keep under the Natives, they become a New Empire, and may be juſtly term'd a diſtinct Nation: But if not at their own Expence, and if they are weak and always ſtand in need of being Protected by their Mother-Country, they are in all appearance to be accounted but as a Colony.

Nor are Names to alter the Nature of Things. 'Tis granted *Ireland* has been very anciently call'd a Kingdom, tho' our Princes did not take the Stile of Kings thereof till the Reign of *Henry* the 8th. 'Tis likewiſe apparent, That they have many diſtinct Juriſdictions; That they are a State within themſelves; That they have an undoubted Right to hold Parliaments; but all this does not hinder them from being ſtill a Colony, nor can it make them an Independent People.

Sigonii Commentaria.

Almoſt every Colony that the *Romans* planted was a Model of their own Republick, and fram'd according to it, by thoſe whom the Senate had deputed for its Settlement. They had an Annual *Duumviratus*, in Imitation of the conſular Authority. They had likewiſe *Cenſors*, *Ædiles* and *Quæſtors*; and which comes ſtrongeſt to our preſent Caſe, every Colony had its particular Senate: But will any one pretend to argue from thence, That all theſe were Diſtinct and Independent Commonwealths?

Theſe

These Branches and Scions from the great Trunk of the Republick, had all of 'em the Face of Formal Governments; they had Magistracies and Councils, Power of Life and Death, and to raise Mony for their Common Safety, and to make Laws for their better Rule; but this is no Argument that they had all the Parts of Sovereign Empire.

'Tis true the Inhabitants of *Ireland*, from ancient Concessions, have a Priviledge perhaps above the *Roman* Colonies, namely, to Tax themselves by their own Suffrages, within their own Limits; but this is no more than what is Claim'd by several Provinces of *France*, which nevertheless account themselves subordinate to the Sovereign Power of the whole State.

There is a part of Empire not communicable, and which must reside Sovereignly somewhere; for there would be such a perpetual clashing of Power and Jurisdictions, as were inconsistent with the very Being of Communities, unless this last Resort were somewhere lodg'd. Now this Incommunicable Power we take to be the Supream Judgment of what is best and most Expedient for the whole; and in all Reason of Government this ought to be there trusted and lodged, from whence Protection is expected.

That *Ireland* should judge of what is best for it self, this is just and fair; but in Determinations that are to reach the whole, as namely, what is most expedient for *England* and *Ireland* both, there without all doubt, the Supream Judgment ought to rest in the King, Lords, and Commons of *England*, by whose Arms and Treasure *Ireland* ever was, and must always be defended.

Nor is this any claiming the same Empire over *Scotland*, as Mr. *Molyneux* would suggest, for there is no Parity of Reason in the Cases: *Scotland* to *England* (as *Aragon* to *Spain*) is a distinct State, Governing

Case of Ireland, p. 84.

verning it self by different Laws, tho' under the same Prince, and is truly but a Kingdom Confederated with the Realm of *England*, tho' Subject to our King. The Land thereof was not acquir'd to the present Inhabitants by the Arms of *England*. Protect them we do, as the Strongest Allies always are to defend the Weaker, but this puts 'em not in the Degree of Subordination we are treating of. They are not our Descendents, and they are but Politically our Brethren; whereas the *English-Irish*, who are now chief Lords of that Soil, are naturally our Offspring.

Their Inferior Rule and Jurisdictions are not disputed, but that Super-eminent Dominion and supream and uncontrollable Regiment over themselves, which they pretend to, is neither safe for *England* to grant, nor for them to ask.

Such a Power would be dangerous, because by some Accident it may come to be so exercis'd, as to be their and our Ruin.

We have had bad Kings, and those Kings have had evil Counsellors: Suppose us then, in some future Age, under such Circumstances, as to have a Prince and his Council so angry with the People, as to desire their Destruction, which was our Case *Mat. Paris.* once with King *John*, who would have sold us to the *Moors* to wreak his own Discontents. And suppose this Prince willing to set up *Ireland* in opposition to this Kingdom, may not a Prince, so dispos'd, give the Royal Assent to Laws in *Ireland*, that would utterly destroy *England*? And what Remedy would *Poining*'s Act be in such a Juncture? In a Case like this, what way have the People of *England* to preserve themselves, but to represent their Grievances to the Prince? Who, when he sees the Error of his Council, may be induc'd to join in some Supream Exercise of the Legislature here, coercive, and such as may keep *Ireland* in the degree of Subordination, that

that ſeems requiſite to the well-being of both Nations.

Suppoſe a Prince bent to hurt *England*, ſhould give his Aſſent to a Law there, that the *Iriſh* may tranſport all their Wooll to Foreign Countries; would not this, as they ſay, cut the Turf from under our Feet, and at one Blow, in a manner, ruin all our Woollen Manufactures? There are many other Inſtances, in which, if they were indulg'd, the greateſt part of our Traffick would be carry'd to their Ports.

In Matters of Trade, even the beſt of Kings may be ſurpris'd, of which we have a late Example; and the ill Conſequences the *Scotch* Act will probably have, ought to make us very watchful over what our Neighbours do, eſpecially where they depend upon us.

That the greateſt part of the preſent Inhabitants of *Ireland*, chiefly thoſe who claim the Land-Property, are a Colony from *England*, has been here peradventure ſufficiently made out; and we take it to be their beſt Hold, to be always ſo accompted, becauſe it gives them a laſting Title to be protected and defended by us. And if they are a Colony, it would be a ſtrange Defect in our Conſtitution, if we wanted any of the Powers requiſite to purſue the Ends of Government, of which the Principal is to take care, that no one part of the People be permitted to hurt the other; but if the Legiſlature of *England* cannot, in Important Matters, reſtrain that of *Ireland*, *Ireland* is at leaſt in a Capacity to ruin *England*, which would make our Form of Government at one and the ſame time Ridiculous and Dangerous.

But to be thus out of our Juriſdiction, would in the Concluſion be as fatal to them as to us; for tho' they ſhould grow Rich at our Expence, and tho' a large part of our Trade were diverted thither, they

they would not yet be able to ſubſiſt alone, and by themſelves. And if we by Loſs of our Trade become weaken'd, how can we give them that Aſſiſtance which from time to time they have always wanted? So that this diviſion of Strength would be deſtructive to both Countries. It muſt therefore be their Intereſt as well as Ours, That the Supream Power, and the chief Wealth, ſhould be ever preſerv'd to Center here in the Seat of Empire.

Upon the whole Matter, it ſeems the Right of *England*, and as well for the Benefit of *Ireland* its beſt and nobleſt Colony, that the Legiſlative Authority here ſhould upon all Emergencies, make ſuch Regulations and Reſtrictions, relating to Trade eſpecially, as ſhall be thought for the Weal-Publick of both Countries.

And having premis'd theſe Things, we ſhall proceed to handle more cloſely the Subject of our Queſtion; namely, Whether it is neceſſary to Prohibit by Law, the Exportation of Woollen Manufacture from *Ireland* to Foreign Parts?

To put an early Stop to their turning their Stock and Induſtry this way, appears requiſite for many Reaſons.

Firſt, *Ireland* contains near a half as much Territory as *England*, and the Soil being of the ſame Nature, may be brought to produce near half as much Wool as *England* yields; and this Material being the Baſis upon which our Trade is built, they who can come near us in it, will come juſt ſo near us in our Trade abroad.

Secondly, Countries thinly Peopled, can ſooner improve in the Breed of Cattle, than any other way, becauſe 'tis a Work which a few Hands may manage.

Third-

Thirdly, Where there is Plenty of a Material, which, Manufactur'd, yields a good Price, Hands will ſoon be invited over to Work it up.

Fourthly, But this holds more ſtrongly, where not only the Material, but all ſorts of Proviſions are cheap; and in Countries which have not been yet improv'd, where every new Comer hopes to make a ſudden Fortune.

From which Poſitions it follows, If *Ireland* be permitted to proceed in the Exportation of Woollen Goods,

Firſt, that in no long Courſe of time they may come to carry out to the Value of a Million *per Annum.*

Secondly, That the cheapneſs of Proviſions will enable them to afford their Commodities cheaper than *England* can do in Foreign Markets.

All that have either writ or ſpoke upon this Subject, agree, That the whole Controverſie turns upon this ſingle Point, whether they can make the ſame Woollen Goods cheaper there than here.

To ſet this in a true Light, we muſt conſider the firſt Material, and thoſe who work it up.

As to the firſt Material, beyond all doubt Wooll is a third cheaper there than in *England.*

As to the Workmanſhip, the Clothiers affirm Spinning to be one half of it, and that of all Hands is agreed to be cheaper there than here. And for the Combing and Weaving, the Price of Courſe muſt abate, as Work-men increaſe; for Handycraft in Countries, where Living is cheap, can be dear no longer than till Artiſts are bred up. And a great many Artiſts will be inſtructed before the Multitude of Inhabitants can render Proviſions dear in ſuch a Place as *Ireland.* But to judge rightly of theſe Matters, we muſt contemplate the Body of the People in each Country.

* Political Anatomy of *Ireland*, p. 76.

* Sir *William Petty* affirms, That the Inferior Rank of People in *Ireland* (thro' whoſe Hands Spinning muſt paſs) do not expend one with another above 52 Shillings *per* Head. The Expence of the ſame Rank cannot be leſs here than 5 *l. per* Head.

'Tis an undeniable Truth, That the Common Proviſions for Life are one half cheaper there than here: 'Tis likewiſe as plain, That Meat and Drink are one half of Mankind's Expence reckon'd in a Maſs together. And theſe Advantages of Living, muſt enable them to afford the ſame Commodity cheaper than we can do, where not only our Numbers make Proviſions dear, but where new Exciſes give all things of our Home-Conſumption yet a higher Price.

* Intereſt of *England* with Relation to the Trade of *Ireland*.

Mr. *Clement*'s (for we take him to be the Author of * that Fine Diſcourſe upon this Subject, inſcrib'd to the Marquis of *Normanby*) makes this Judicious Obſervation, *That if any one offers his Goods cheaper than the uſual Price, that will then become the Market Price; and every one elſe muſt Sell at the ſame, or keep his Goods.*

The Cheapneſs of Living, and all other Circumſtances conſider'd, it ſeems very probable, That if they ſhould come to have the neceſſary Complement of Work-men, and to flouriſh in this Manufacture, they will be able to ſell it one third cheaper than we can do.

If they can make for a Million, and afford it by one third cheaper than we, it follows, That at leaſt one half of our Exportations in that Commodity muſt immediately determin.

And the Conſequence of this would be, That Rents muſt every where fall. The Purchaſe of Land muſt ſink. The Poor muſt want Employment, and grow upon us; half our Foreign Trade muſt forthwith ceaſe, and in the other half, we muſt be

be Losers in the Ballance, which is chiefly kept on our Side by the Woollen Manufactures.

Not only a third, but an Abatement of ten *per Cent.* forc'd upon us, by the Rivalship in Trade of another Country, would throw us into more Disorders, than the most knowing man in *England* can readily describe.

And to ask where will be the Stocks of Mony to set up so large a Manufacture? Is but an evasive way of Arguing; for where the Prospect of Gain is certain, Mony never fails to come. And if it should ever be determin'd, That *England* cannot restrain that Country in this Exportation, Foreigners will carry Stocks to an Improving Place, where they may Reasonably expect many more Advantages, than what shall arise from this Manufacture. As for Example, To lay out Mony upon good Securities, at ten *per Cent.* Interest, to Buy Land capable of great Melioration at ten Years Purchase. And to have almost all the Necessaries of Life half as cheap again as in other Parts; are not all the Circumstances sufficient to invite thither, not only Foreign Stocks, but very much of our own Mony, and a great Number of our Work-men, where their Industry will turn to a better Accompt than it does here.

No Wise State, if it has the Means of preventing the Mischief, will leave its Ruin in the Power of another Country. And if Wars have been thought not only Prudent, but Just, which have been made to interrupt the too sudden Growth of any Neighbour-Nation, much more justifiable may a Mother-Kingdom exercise the Civil Authority in Relation to her own Children; who from her had their Being, and still have their Protection, especially when her own Safety is so much concern'd.

Nor can this be thought Rigour; 'Tis but a reasonable Jealousie of State, and only severe Wisdom.

which Governments ſhould ſhew in all their Councile; 'Tis a preventing Remedy which operates gently in the beginning of the Diſeaſe, before there are many, and thoſe inveterate Humors to contend with. And if a timely Stop be put to theſe Exportations from *Ireland*, it will hurt but a very few (which is never to be regarded, where the good of the whole Publick is in Queſtion) and even that Few, without any great difficulty, may have their Induſtry turn'd to ſafer Objects.

For theſe and ſeveral other Reaſons, which will occur to ſuch as think ſeriouſly of this Subject, it ſeems for the Publick good, That the Legiſlature of *England* ſhould, by ſome Reſtrictions, keep *Ireland* from interfering with us in this Principal Foundation of our whole Traffick. And to do it by a Poſitive Law here, and not to leave it to the Adminſtration there, as ſome Propoſe, appears to be the rather requiſite; becauſe when this Step is made, and when they are render'd incapable of Exporting Woollen Goods, there will lie a Neceſſity upon the Governing Part and Landed Men, of doing their utmoſt to promote other Improvements, of which their Soil is capable.

Nor is it fair to urge, That we may Proceed from one Prohibition to another, till we leave them nothing, and till they are quite undone. They can Fundamentally hurt us no other way, their Rivalſhip is dangerous in none but the Woollen Manufacture, where all *Lucrum Ceſſans* is *Damnum Emergens* to *England*, ſince all our Affairs abroad turn and depend upon it; nor can we ſuffer any Competitors in it, if we mean to flouriſh and be Gainers in the General Ballance of Trade.

To think this Kingdom will either peeviſhly or covetouſly hurt that Colony, is an abſurd Imagination. 'Tis obvious enough, that too much depends upon the poſſeſſion of ſuch an Iſland, to render 'its Inhabi-

Inhabitants deſperate, and deſirous of a Change; if they have a large Trade, and flowing Riches, the Benefit thereof will redound to us at laſt: And the wiſer a Government is, the more it will deſire to ſee 'em proſper, except in this ſingle Inſtance, where their Wealth would be built upon our Deſtruction.

But ſuch a Prohibition as we have been Treating of, will have very little Effect, unleſs they can be likewiſe hindred from carrying out their Wooll; to prevent which, their Situation conſider'd, will be a very hard Matter; but there are no difficulties of the like Nature, which are not to be overcome, if the Adminiſtration be ſtrict and ſteady.

They, who would prohibit the Exportation of Woollen Goods from *Ireland*, to Foreign Parts, have hitherto propos'd ſetting up there the Linnen Manufacture, but this Deſign is likewiſe not without its Dangers: The ſetting up the Linnen Manufacture will be leſs hurtful than to ſet up the Woollen, but we are to conſider, That *Ireland* will be always able to ſupply it ſelf with Draperies at Home, and that there will be no Market for their Linnen, but *England*, and its Dependences. Now 'tis evident, that our Woollen Goods are ſold in ſeveral Countries, namely, *Holland*, *Hamburh*, *Germany*, the *Han's* Towns, and all the Eaſt Country; many of which Places will not be able to take off our Woollen Goods, unleſs we deal for their Linnens: And in Fact, and by Experience, it has been ſeen, in the Caſe of the *Eaſt-India* Trade, ſince there has been Imported from thence vaſt Quantities of Linnens, ſuch as Callicoes, Muſlins, Romals for Handkerſhifts, which anſwer'd the end of Lawns, Cambricks, and other Linnen Cloath, we have not Exported that vaſt quantity of Draperies to thoſe Northern Parts, of which Sir *Walter Raleigh* makes mention. As our Call for their Linnens has dimi-

niſh'd, their Call for our Draperies has proportionably decreas'd; and not only ſo, but theſe People have been compell'd by Neceſſity to fall upon making Courſe Woollen Cloath, by which they ſupply themſelves, and other Places, which heretofore we were wont to furniſh. So that it deſerves a very ſerious Conſideration, what future Effect it may have upon our Woollen Goods, to promote a Conſiderable Linnen Manufacture in *Ireland*.

Upon the whole Matter, it ought to be carefully examin'd, Whether or no a better Expedient may not be thought on, to ſtop their Progreſs in the new Draperies, than to introduce the Linnen Manufacture there? and whether it would not be the beſt for both Kingdoms to take off the Prohibition that now lies upon *Iriſh* Cattle?

This Point has been formerly much debated, and it remains yet very doubtful, when this Prohibition was ſet on foot, which was moſt conſulted, Publick Good, or Private Intereſt; The Numbers of the Breeding were without doubt ſtronger, at that time, than thoſe of the Feeding Lands; but 'tis to be fear'd, in the making that Act, that the general Intereſt of *England* was not ſufficiently conſider'd.

If the People of *Ireland* are permitted to bring their Cattle hither, it will lower the Price of Fleſh in *England*; a Matter very important to a Country that Subſiſts ſo much by Manufactures. 'Tis true, the Breeding Counties will be thereby ſomewhat hurt, but it will encourage Improvements and Melioration of Barren Land, in order to Feed, which will be advantagious to the whole Publick of the Nation. It will divert thoſe of *Ireland*, from thinking to extend their Trade too much abroad; a Point not to be ſlighted. And it will in a manner confine the principal Part of their Dealings to this Kingdom; which, for many Reaſons of State, will be beſt and ſafeſt for *England*. 'Tis

'Tis therefore ſubmitted to better Judgments, whether or no to open the way hither for their Cattel, will not be moſt adviſable; and the trueſt Method to hinder their Progreſs in Manufactures, without doing any thing that may look like Injury or Oppreſſion.

'Tis no true Objection to ſay, That the People of *Ireland* will not fall readily into this ſort of Trade, which has been now ſo long intermitted; for, as we are Inform'd, the Payments are very ill made, for that Fleſh, Tallow and Hides, that are Exported to Foreign Parts. That the Merchant makes the Butcher ſtay ſometimes two or three Years, upon pretence of Bills of Exchange, and Returns expected from the *Weſt-Indies*, *Spain*, and other Parts; and if the Butcher be ill dealt with, it muſt follow, that the Landlord cannot be paid his Rent: Whereas when the Trade was open for *England*, the Gentlemen of *Ireland* receiv'd ready Mony, or if they gave Credit, it was anſwer'd by the next Return; and *England* was to them as *Smithfield* is to *Lancaſhire*, *Lincolnſhire*, or any other *Engliſh* Feeding County; beſides, it would keep down the Exchange, which would be another Encouragement to the *Iriſh* Nobility and Gentry, who ſpend ſo large a Part of their Eſtates in *London*.

So that in all likelihood, the People of that Kingdom, if the ſaid Prohibition were taken off, would cheerfully ſubmit to a Law here, binding them not to Export to Foreign Parts their Woollen Goods; nor would they perhaps think of ſetting up the Linnen Manufacture, which is likewiſe not without Conſequences very pernicious; and for theſe Reaſons, the Expedient here propos'd, is now offer'd to Publick conſideration.

Before we quit our preſent Subject *of Land and its Product*, we ſhall offer another Hint. The Courſe

Draperies is that part of our Woollen Manufacture, in which we are in greateſt Danger to be rival'd by other Countries; it ſtands therefore in need of moſt Encouragement. There are many Parts of the World, whoſe Poverty diſables them from buying our Woollen Goods, becauſe of their high Price. As *Ruſſia*, *Poland*, *Tartary*, &c. and therefore they are ſupply'd by the *Germans*, or ſome other Neighbours, with a ſort of Cloath very contemptible, in Compariſon of what we could make to anſwer the ſame Ends and Uſes. Suppoſe then, inſtead of paying five *per Cent.* Cuſtom outward bound, That ſuch Courſe Cloaths not exceeding ſuch a certain Value, ſhould for a term of Years receive upon the Exportation ten *per Cent.* Bounty Mony by way of Encouragement from the State, for ſo much as the Exporters can make appear was carry'd out, to Countries with whom we had no Dealings of that kind before, and that ſuch their Exportation are in order to enlarge our Trade. A recompence of this Nature would in all probability increaſe the Woollen Manufacture of *England*, in not many Years, at leaſt one third,

We have the more largely handled the *Iriſh* Prohibitions, becauſe in all appearance the Ballance of Trade will very much depend upon the Meaſures *England* ſhall take, in relation to that Colony; ſince we ſhould proceed very heavily in all our Foreign Traffick, if *Ireland* is left in a Capacity to diſturb us abroad, in the vent of our Woollen Manufactures.

And having treated of the Numbers of the People, and of Land, and its Product, we ſhall proceed to ſay ſomething of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.

WHETHER it be under a Common-wealth, an Abſolute Monarchy, or in a Mix'd Government, the Affairs of a Country can never go on proſperouſly, unleſs the Publick Revenues are well and wiſely ordered. *Richlieu* ſays, *Ceſt le Point d' Archimede qui eſtant fermement etabli, donne moyen de mouvoir tout le monde.* *Teſtament Politique*, Part 2. §. 7.

Common-wealths are ſeldom to blame in this part of polity, and when they quit it, ſuffering their Treaſure to be imbezzel'd by the Men in Power, they ſeldom fail of falling ſoon after into the Hands of a ſingle Perſon. In Abſolute Monarchies, where 'tis neglected, the Prince is compell'd by his Want to Flea and Rack his Subjects, and to wink at all ſorts of Rapine in thoſe whoſe Buſineſs it is to contrive Ways of ſupplying his neceſſities, till at laſt he becomes Tyrannical and Odious to the whole People.

Profuſion has the ſame ill Effects in Conſtitutions where the Regal Authority is limited by Laws. *Richlieu* ſays, *A neceſſitous Prince can never undertake a glorious Action; and Neceſſity ingendring Contempt, he can never be reduc'd to that condition without being expos'd to the Attempts of his Enemies, and of thoſe who are envious of his Greatneſs.* Beſides, when the ibid.

Crown

Crown is brought very low, it alters the due Ballance of Power, which ſhould be kept even and well pois'd to preſerve ſuch Forms of Government; for it either inclines the People who hold the Purſe to intrench upon ſuch Prerogatives as are neceſſary for the Prince's Safety, and to keep the Kingdom's Peace, or it gives bad Men an opportunity of ſuggeſting to him that wicked Council (which was given to King *Charles* I.) of making himſelf eaſy, by ſubverting his People's Rights.

Teſtament Politique, Par. 1. c. 4. §. 1.

This able Stateſman lays down, *That good Order in the Revenue depends more on thoſe who have the Adminiſtration than on Laws and Regulations, which remain uſeleſs unleſs ſuch as are employ'd to ſee them obſerv'd be willing to perform their Duty.*

The Legiſlative Part of the Conſtitution gives the Mony, but it principally belongs to the Miniſterial Part to take Care that what is granted be not waſted, diverted, or miſapply'd; and if ſuch as are truſted fail to do this, it is incumbent on the Legiſlature to interpoſe, and call 'em to a ſtrict Account.

The Wealth of a Country is Finite, as well as the Subſtance of any private Man; and when a Miniſtry ſet themſelves induſtriouſly about it, they can as well ruin a whole People, as the Duke of *Buckingham* could ſee an end of his great Eſtate.

Henry III. of *France*, for want of Order and by being ill-ſerved, in a few Years conſumed an immenſe Sum, and anticipated all the Crown-Revenue. His Succeſſor *Henry* IV. with a very little Care of his own, but by the infinite Application, Prudence and Honeſty of the Duke of *Sully* his Treaſurer, paid moſt of thoſe Debts off, and left behind him, at his Death, Five Millions Sterling in his Coffers. And at this Day, for want of Conduct in the Miniſtry, *Spain* is not the richer for the Silver Mines of *Potoſi*. So that the Wealth or Poverty

Poverty of the Publick does, in a manner, wholly depend upon the good or bad Adminiſtration of its Affairs.

Machiavel does not ſeem to think Liberality a neceſſary Virtue in a Prince, becauſe, to ſupport it, there muſt go ſo much Oppreſſion of the People. *And that a frugal Prince ſhall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number: And that he ſhall be eſteemed Near and Parſimonious only by thoſe Few to whom he gives but little.* And he ſays, *That a Prince ought not ſo much to concern himſelf (ſo he exacts not upon his Subjects, ſo he be able to defend himſelf, ſo he becomes not deſpicable and commits no Rapine upon his People) tho' he be accounted Covetous, for that it is one of thoſe Vices which fortifies his Dominion.* And he obſerves, *That Pope* Julius II. *was liberal till he came to the Papacy, but frugal afterwards, which enabled him to do ſuch great Things againſt the Power of* France.

That the Buſineſs of moſt Kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this: It imports the lower Rank of Men only and the People (whoſe Cries ſeldom reach the Prince till it is too late, and till all is paſt Remedy) that Matters ſhould be frugally ordered, becauſe Taxes muſt ariſe from their Sweat and Labour. But the great Ones, who heretofore have had the Prince's Ear and Favour, or who hoped to have him in their Poſſeſſion, were ſway'd by another ſort of Intereſt; they liked Profuſion, as having had a Proſpect to be Gainers by it: They can eaſily ſet their Account even with the State, a ſmall Charge upon their Land is more than ballanc'd by a great Place, or a large Penſion. At the ſame time the People who are to pay all, and expect to receive nothing, are glad to ſee a frugal Court; which tho' it be not ſo good for its Followers, never fails to inrich a Nation.

'Tis

'Tis true, *Galba* is an Inſtance that the Virtues of a cloſe-handed Prince may be unſucceſsful in Countries govern'd by the Sword, and where the Soldier is riotous, and in long Poſſeſſion of a ſlack Diſcipline. And perhaps in all Abſolute Monarchies, he who Governs ſhould rather lean towards Munificence than Thrift. But Frugality in the State can never be dangerous in a Trading Nation, rul'd by Laws of its own making; and it is not only neceſſary in it ſelf, but profitable in the Example, teaching private Men that good Husbandry in their Domeſtick Affairs, which never fails to inrich the whole Body-Politick.

Much nobler is it to enjoy the Praiſes of an Univerſal People, living in Plenty and at their Eaſe, not burthen'd by Taxes and Duties; than to have the good Words of a few Flatterers, or thoſe Harpies which commonly haunt a Court to gripe all they can: who, when they are gorg'd themſelves, pollute all the Remainder with their foul and obſcene Claws, ſo that no Body elſe deſires to touch it. Beſides, we have hardly an Inſtance of any Prince, that in time of Need, was truly aſſiſted and defended by his Minions, and the Creatures of his Bounty and Favour; but a King belov'd for wiſe, juſt and careful Government, has been very ſeldom deſerted by his People.

But ſuppoſe a Prince ſhould deſire to exerciſe in a very ample manner the inbred Magnificence of his Mind; if he will diſcharge the Truſt committed to him by the King of Kings; if he will not make what he counts Virtue deſtructive to his People he muſt find Matter to ſupply his liberal Inclinations; which he only can do, who ſees that his Miniſters look well after his Income and Expences

Some Perſons have a ſtrange Notion, That large Payments to the State are not hurtful to the Pub-

Publick; That Taxes make Mony circulate; that it imports not what *A* pays, when *B* is to receive it: But we hope to ſhew, that they who argue in this manner, are very much miſtaken.

We have formerly touch'd upon this Matter in the *Diſcourſes on the Revenues, and Trade of* England, to which we refer the Reader; but the Neceſſity of our preſent Argument compels us here to handle this Point ſomething more at large. Part I. p. 196, 197, 198.

All Nations have a certain Annual Income upon which the People live and ſubſiſt, out of which Taxes of all kinds ariſe; which Income we take to be ſince the War,

In *England*, —— —— 43,000,000 *l. per An.*
In *France*, —— —— —— 81,000,000 *l. per An.*
In *Holland*, —— —— 18,250,000 *l. per An.*

And we muſt beg leave to repeat, in this place, ſomething which we have laid down in thoſe Tracts; "That to nouriſh the Maſs of Mankind, as P. 195. "to their Annual Expence in the Way and Form "of Living practis'd in each of the three Coun- "tries, ſuch an Annual Income is neceſſary as is "ſet down in the foregoing Scheme. By Annual "Income we mean the whole that ariſes in any "Country, from Land and its product, from Fo- "reign Trade and Domeſtick Buſineſs, as Arts, "Manufactures, *&c.* and by Annual Expence, we un- "derſtand what is of Neceſſity conſum'd to Cloath "and Feed the People, or what is requiſite for "their Defence in time of War, or for their Or- "nament in time of Peace. And where the An- "nual Income exceeds the Expence, there is a "Superlucration ariſing which may be call'd "Wealth or National Stock. The Revenue of "the Government is a part of this Annual In- "come, as likewiſe a part of its Expence; and

"where

" where it bears too large a proportion with the " whole, as in *France*, the common People muſt be " miſerable, and burthen'd with heavy Taxes. " That part of the Prince's Revenue that nouriſhes " his own Perſon is very little; but in great Mo- " narchies, where numerous Armies, large Fleets, " and pompous Courts are maintain'd, there the " Expence ſwells high, inſomuch that to the Main- " tenance of the Governing part, *viz.* the Prince, " his Officers of State, Military Power, *&c.* which " are not in time of Peace above one 26th of the " whole, there is required near the Ninth Penny " of the Annual Income. And in ſuch Countries " the Governing part are Rich or at their Eaſe, " but the other 25 parts, who are the Body of the " People, muſt be oppreſſed with Taxes as may " be obſerv'd in the French Dominions. And this " holds more ſtrongly, where the Publick Debts " make the Payment of a ſixth part of the Annual " Income neceſſary, which, for ſome time, is like " to be the Caſe of *France*.

To explain theſe Aſſertions ſhall be the Subject of this Section, whereby it will appear how much the Ballance of Trade may be affected by our Payments to the Publick.

We ſhall endeavour to ſhew, in the laſt Section, That the Wealth of a Country does in a great meaſure procced from a right Adminiſtration of its Affairs: However, it may happen ſometimes to increaſe in Riches where Things are in the main ill adminiſter'd, as *England* did to the Year 1688. in the two Reigns that preceeded this; but whoever looks carefully into the true Reaſon why we grew ſo faſt in Wealth during thoſe Eight and twenty Years, will find it was becauſe we paid all that time but ſmall Taxes and Duties to the Government, comparatively with other Nations.

For

For in 1688. our groſs Payments to the Publick, in which Charge of Management was included, did not exceed —— —— } 2,300,000 *per Annum.*

Which was but little above one 20th Part of the then —— —— } 44,000,000 An. Inc.

But our Caſe is very much alter'd, now, and ſince that Year, a great many new Revenues have been erected. We ſtill pay the Old Exciſe, the Cuſtoms and Poſt-Mony; beſides which, there is laid Additional Duties upon Beer, Ale, and other Liquids; Additional Cuſtoms, the continued Acts and Joint Stocks, Duty on Marriages, *&c.* double Duty on Stamp'd Paper, Duty on Hackney Coaches, on Malt. The double Tonnage, the former and laſt Duties upon Salt. The Duty on Windows, upon Leather, Paper and Coals.

The Old and New Impoſitions of all kinds reckon'd together, and including the new Poll, and the 3 Shillings Aid, it will be found that there was collected from the People about —— —— —— } 5,500,000 LaſtYear.

Which is above one eighth part of our preſent. } 43,000,000 An. Inc.

During all the War, there has been levied here great Sums every Year, and many of the foremention'd Fonds are to continue ſo long, that it will be ſeveral Years before our Annual Payments can be conſiderably diminiſh'd. And there is ſuch a diffe-

difference between a Twentieth and an Eighth, or indeed a Tenth, or a Twelfth Part (which yet we ſhall not come at in ſome time) as muſt inevitably affect the Nation's Trade, and the whole Body of its People.

When there was rais'd no more than about a Twentieth Part, there were great Sums of Mony to circulate in Foreign Traffick, and to employ in enlarging our Home-Manufactures, which two Fountains of our Wealth muſt be dry, when the Springs that heretofore fed 'em are diverted, and let into another Channel.

There is ſcarce any of theſe new Revenues, which do not give Trade ſome deſperate Wound. The Additional Duties on Beer and Ale, and the Tax upon Malt, are apparently a Burthen upon the Woollen Manufactures, affecting the Carder, Spinner, Weaver and the Dyer, who all of them muſt be rais'd in their Wages, when the Neceſſaries of Life are rais'd to them. The Conſequence of which will be, That our Woollen Goods muſt come at a heavy and diſavantagious Price into the Foreign Markets.

There is no Man will pretend, that High Cuſtoms are not pernicious to our Commerce abroad. A Nation is not Gainers in the general Ballance of Trade, by the Dealing of a Few, who are able to employ in it great Stocks; ſuch may make to themſelves an Immenſe Gain, but they go but a little towards inriching the *whole* Publick, which ſeldom thrives, but when, in a manner, the Univerſal People bend their Thoughts to this ſort of Buſineſs; when every one is ready with his ſmall Stock, and little Sum, to venture and rove about the World: Of theſe ſome proſper, and others are undone; however, in the way of Merchandize, Men who do not thrive themſelves, may yet contribute very much to make their Country Rich, which

which gets by the Dealings of all, and does not ſuffer by the unfortunate Conduct of here and there a Merchant. But when the Cuſtoms are High, all theſe under Dealers, who all along in *England* have made up the chief Bulk of our Trading Men, muſt hold their Hands, tho' in Skill, Induſtry, and inventive Parts and Wit, they may exceed Merchants of more Wealth, and of a higher Rank. Nor is it indeed practicable for Men of but a moderate Fortune to Deal at all, when more than treble that Sum is neceſſary to have ready now to pay the King, which formerly would ſet up a Subſtantial Trader, and maintain him in ſufficient Buſineſs.

But of all the new Impoſitions, none are ſo dangerous to the very Being of Trade, nor ſo hurtful to all its Parts and Members, as the high Duties lately laid upon Salt. Firſt, They affect the Common People in the whole Courſe of their Living, whoſe chief Nouriſhment is Bacon, and other Salted Fleſh, ſo that this Exciſe has an univerſal Influence upon all our Manufactures whatſoever. But the general Prejudice it may bring to Navigation, is yet of much a higher Conſequence.

Mr. *King*, in his Computations of the Naval Trade of *England*, *Anno* 1688. and the National Profit then ariſing thereby, reckoning what Proportion was Navigated by our ſelves at that time, and what by Foreigners, is of Opinion, That with Relation to the value of our whole Trade here at home, our own Navigation was ſomewhat more than three fourths, and the Foreign Navigation near one fourth; But reckoning the value of the Foreign Navigation at the Market here, and of our own at the Markets abroad, then the Foreign Navigation ſeems to have been at that time in Proportion to our own, as one to two and three fourths, and with reſpect to the Tunnage of Ships, our own

Navigation ſeems to have been at that time two thirds, and the Foreign Navigation one third, according to the following Scheme.

Vide Scheme H.

From whence he Concludes,

	l.
That our Gain upon the Ballance by our own Shipping being ——	1,250,000
And our Loſs upon the Ballance by Foreign Shipping being —— ——	0,550,000
The Increaſe of Money, or Adequate Treaſure, by the Ballance of Trade in General, might be *Anno* 1688.	700,000

And that the Advantage to Foreigners Trading to *England* in their own Ships, might be at that time in General thus.

	l.
By Freight, or Advance of the Price of our Commodities Exported by them, above the value here —— ——	250,000
By Freight, or Advance of the Price of their own Commodities Imported here above their value abroad —— ——	400,000
Beſides, the Increaſe of Goods Imported to their own Countries over and above their own Exports, according to the value of them in their own Countries —— —— —— —— ——	100,000
In all,	750,000

Upon

Scheme H.

A SCHEME of the Naval Trade of England, *and the National Profit arising thereby, Calculated for the Year,* 1688.

Exported,	Value here *l.*	Value abroad *l.*	Value upon the Ballance	*l.*	Gain by Freight, *&c.*	*l.*
By our Selves,	3,310,000	4,120,000	Value abroad	4,120,000	To our Selves,	810,000
By Foreigners,	1,000,000	1,250,000	Value here	1,000,000	To Foreigners,	250,000
	4,310,000	5,370,000		5,120,000		1,060,000
Imported,						
By our Selves,	5,570,000	2,870,000	Value abroad	2,870,000	To our Selves,	2,700,000
By Foreigners,	1,550,000	1,150,000	Value here	1,550,000	To Foreigners,	400,000
Groſs Imports,	7,120,000	4,020,000	Groſs Imports	4,420,000	Groſs Imports,	3,100,000
Groſs Exports,	4,310,000	5,370,000	Groſs Exports	5,120,000	Groſs Exports,	1,060,000
In all—	11,430,000	9,390,000		9,540,000		4,160,000

	Val. abroad		Val. abroad
So the Exports by our own Shipping being —	4,120,000	In all —	6,990,000
Imports by our own Shipping —	2,870,000		
National Gain by our Shipping in the Ballance of Trade —	1,250,000		
	Value here		
And the Imports by Foreign Shipping being —	1,550,000	In all —	2,550,000
Exports by Foreign Shipping —	1,000,000		
National Loſs by Foreign Shipping in the Ballance of Trade	550,000		9,540,000

Place this Scheme p. 93.

Upon the whole He Concludes,

	l.
First, That the General Increase of our Mony or Adequate Treasure, and of Wares and Commodities over and above the value of our Gross Exports, was *Anno* 1688. —— ——	2,810,000
And the Gain made by Foreign Nations with *England*, in their own shipping, was —— —— —— ——	750,000
So that the Naval Trade of *England* was at that time, generally profitable to our Selves and Foreigners in all —— —— —— ——	3,560,000
Secondly, That the National Profit to *England* by Foreign Trade was then at least —— —— —— ——	1,700,000

	l.	*l.*
Whereof in Mony or Adequate Treasure =	700,000	1,700,000
And in Wares or Commodities Treasur'd up, or applied to the Increase of the National Stock, besides what we consum'd our selves ——	1,000,000	

Whoever considers these Computations, will find 'em very Judiciously made, and that Mr. *King* has done as much as could be performed meerly by the Stength of Numbers.

To come to an exact Knowledge in this Matter, and such as would be almost beyond Contradiction, the Books of the Customs should be look'd into; and from thence might be drawn an Accompt of all the Exportations from *London*, and the Out-

Ports to every diſtinct Country; and alſo of all the Importations to *London*, and the Out-Ports from every diſtinct Country, and what might at that time be the value of thoſe Goods, being computed by able Merchants: And this to be done for ſome competent Number of Years by reaſonable Mediums, it may be very nearly gueſs'd from ſuch a View, how the Ballance of Trade ſtood from time to time.

But where a thing ſo much within their Reach (and which the *French* Miniſters are ſaid to do in their Exports and Imports) has not been done by the Men of Buſineſs here; there is no way of knowing how the Ballance ſtands, but by conſidering the Numbers of the People, and their probable Conſumption of our Home Product, and of Foreign Materials, from whence a Judgment may be form'd, not indeed perfectly demonſtrable, but very near the truth.

Mr. *King* obſerves, That by how much the Nation does not conſume of its Imports, but either lays up, or increaſes the Stock of Gold or Silver, or other Adequate Treaſure, or of durable Commodities in Specie; by ſo much, at leaſt, does the Nation gain by Foreign Trade, beſides all other Advantages of Navigation.

'Tis difficult to know how our Navigation has proceeded for theſe ten Years laſt paſt, but 'tis to be feared, That the Gain which Foreigners have made, by fetching and carrying in their own Bottoms, has been much greater of late, than it was heretofore; which muſt be a very conſiderable Prejudice to *England*, and highly tend to ſet the Ballance of Trade againſt us.

Reckoning long and ſhort Voyages together, the principal Expence of fitting out a Trading Veſſel, is Drink and Meat. The Exciſes and Duty upon Malt, without doubt, make Drink ſufficiently dear to the Freighter. And the Duty upon

Salt

Salt makes Victualling a very heavy Burthen upon him, all which muſt end in leſſening our Navigation from time to time; for undoubtedly Foreigners obſerving how dear Freight is with us, will Trade in their own Ships as much as poſſible.

In Barrelling up Beef and Pork, we heretofore made uſe of St. *Martin*'s, *&c.* or *Oleron* and *Engliſh* Salt mixed together; and with theſe Materials the Fleſh was beſt prepared, both for wholſomneſs, and long keeping; our own Salt without Foreign Mixture being fiery, corroſive, and very Scorbutick. As we are informed, the St. *Martins*, and worſer ſort of *French* Salt, from 1676, to 1688, was delivered in *London*, at about 2*l.* 5*s. per* Tun, and forty Buſhels to the Tun. And that from *Oleron*, from 2*l.* 10*s.* to 2*l.* 15*s. per* Tun. But now the very Duty for forty Buſhels of *Oleron* Salt amounts to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* beſides the 25 *per Cent. ad valorem*, of which formerly the prime Coſt came to but 2*l.* 15*s.* at higheſt: the Duty likewiſe upon forty Buſhels of *Lisbon* Salt comes to 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* of which the prime Coſt was formerly, at higheſt, but 3*l.* 10*s.* And as to our *Newcaſtle*, and *Limington* Salt, which is now generally made uſe of in Salting Beef and Pork for Trading Veſſels; the very Duty for forty Buſhels amounts to 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* of which, before the War, the prime Coſt came but to 3*l.* at the deareſt Market: Inſomuch that we are credibly inform'd, a Merchant can ſtore himſelf in *Ireland*, for a long Voyage, with Salt, Beef and Pork, ready pack'd up, almoſt as cheap as he can buy the Salt in *England*.

So that for long Voyages, the Merchant will either Victual in *Ireland*, or Salt his Beef and Pork on ſome Foreign Coaſt, as he Sails along, where Proviſions ſhall be cheap, which muſt bring a great Damage to the Landed Intereſt here; or if he does

not do ſo, Victualling will be ſo expenſive to him, as to make Freight much dearer than it ought to be in a Country that expects to thrive by Trade.

The Conſequence of all which will be, That the Body of our Merchants muſt lie under a general Diſcouragement; They will neglect looking after National Gain, which *Engliſh* Merchants have perhaps heretofore as much conſider'd in their Dealings, as any Trading Men in the whole Commercial World: They will have an Eye to nothing but their own temporary Profit, and ſuffer Strangers to go away with thoſe Gains which *England* was wont to make by Freight; from whence it will follow, That we muſt decay in our Stock of Shipping, and decreaſe every Year in the breed of Seamen; and when this happens, we muſt no more pretend to ſuch a Naval Strength as has hitherto made us terrible to all our Neighbours.

Trade, without doubt, is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that Wealth which introduces Luxury; it gives a riſe to Fraud and Avarice, and extinguiſhes Virtue and Simplicity of Manners; it depraves a People, and makes way for that Corruption which never fails to end in Slavery, Foreign or Domeſtick. *Licurgus*, in the moſt perfect Model of Government that was ever fram'd, did baniſh it from his Common-wealth. But, the Poſture and Condition of other Countries conſider'd, 'tis become with us a neceſſary Evil. We ſhall be continully expos'd to Inſults and Invaſions without ſuch a Naval Force, as is not to be had naturally but where there is an extended Traffik. However, if Trade cannot be made ſubſervient to the Nation's Safety, it ought to be no more encourag'd here than it was in *Sparta*: And it can never tend to make us ſafe, unleſs it be ſo managed as to make us increaſe in Shipping and in the Breed of Seamen.

Freight

Freight is not only the moſt Politick, but the moſt National and moſt certain Profit a Country can poſſibly make by Trade; Therefore all Duties muſt be pernicious that burthen it, and make it dear. And we have dwelt the longer upon this Article of the Salt Duty, becauſe it ſeems to have more dangerous Conſequences, in relation to our Commerce abroad, than all the other Impoſitions put together.

The late Tax upon Coals is a heavy Burthen on all Handicrafts working on Iron, a Manufacture in which we are now come to a great Perfection. And the Skill and Neatneſs of our Work-men is ſuch in Locks, Keys, Hindges, and other Curioſities of this kind; that our Exportations of theſe Commodities may in time grow very conſiderable, if this new Duty does not interrupt their Induſtry.

We have ſhewn in ſeveral Inſtances, how the Exciſes lately ſet a foot, may affect us in the general Ballance of Trade. And we have done it with a deſign of making it appear how much it is for the Common Good, to endeavour to get out of thoſe Debts, for which theſe Revenues are the Security and Fund.

Mr. *King*, in a Scheme of his, of the Yearly Increaſe and Decreaſe of the Actual Stock of *England*, from the Year 1600. to 1698. and what it may probably amount to by the Year 1710. if the preſent Peace continue, (and none of thoſe Accidents of Plague, War, Fires and Civil Diſcords intercede, which more or leſs do certainly diminiſh or hinder the Increaſe of the Nations Wealth, whenever they happen) computes, That *Anno* 1600. the ſaid Actual Stock was but about 25 Millions, making a Yearly Increaſe of about 4 or 500,000 *l.* That *Anno* 1630. it was about 37 Millions, making a Yearly Increaſe of about one Million. That in 1664. (the Year before the laſt

great Plague) it was about 64 Millions, making a Yearly Increaſe of about 1,200,000 *l.* And that *Anno* 1688. it was about 86 Millions, making a Yearly Increaſe of 2,400,000 *l.*

And Concludes,

Firſt, That the laſt Plague, the Fire of *London*, and the *Dutch* War, did actually diminiſh the ſaid Stock, at leaſt 9 or 10 Millions, and hindred the Increaſe of 18 or 20 Millions more.

Secondly, That the laſt War with *France* with the other Circumſtances of the Revolution, and the Recoyning the Mony, has actually diminiſh'd the ſaid Stock about 12 Millions, and hindred the Increaſe of about 28 Millions beſides.

Thirdly, That the Nation will not arrive to the ſame Degree of Actual Stock, which it had *Anno* 1688. till about the Year 1705, nor make an Increaſe of 2,400,000 *l. per Annum*, as it did in 1688. till about the Year 1706. nor then neither, unleſs the Taxes be conſiderably diminiſh'd; that thereby our Navigation and Commerce may be fully reſtored, to what it was before the late War.

We do not pretend to give any Accompt of the preſent Poſture of our Foreign Trade, nor how it ſtood during all the laſt War, for it would be launching into a very wide Sea; but without doubt, the Immenſe Sums that have been rais'd every Year, and the variety of new Duties that have been lately levied, are a heavy Burthen upon it.

And in order to give ſome little Light into this Matter, and to ſhew how the Ballance has been, and may be thereby affected, we ſhall briefly State what Mony has been Annually granted ſince the War.

For

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
For *Anno* 1689. Granted for the War, and to pay 60,000 *l.* to King *Charles*'s Servants, and to pay 600,000*l.* to the *Dutch*, in all that Year	1,844,786	16	04
For *Anno* 1690. Granted for the War —— ——	2,535,452	01	02
For *Anno* 1691. Granted for the War, and for Building Ships —— ——	4,794,861	07	00¾
For *Anno* 1692. Granted (besides what was paid out of the Revenue of the Crown towards the War) —— ——	3,337,268	08	09¾
For *Anno* 1693. Granted for the War —— ——	3,471,482	16	01
For *Anno* 1694. Granted for the War —— ——	5,030,581	09	09
For *Anno* 1695. Granted for the War —— ——	4,883,120	00	06
For *Anno* 1696. Granted for the War, and to make good some Deficiences, and to make good the Clipp'd Mony, and for the Civil List, and *French* Protestants	7,961,469	00	00
For *Anno* 1697. There was Granted for the War, and to make good the Deficiencies of former Funds, and for the Civil List, and *French* Protestants	11,887,160	00	09¾
For *Anno* 1698. There were Funds given, amounting to about —— ——	4,500,000	00	00
Carry over —— ——	50,246,182	00	05¼

Ordinary

		l.	s.	d.
Brought over ——		50,246,182	00	05¼
Ordinary Revenue of the Crown, reckon'd at a Million *per Annum*, by a Medium during ten Years, might produce in the whole about		10,000,000	00	00
	In all,	60,246,182	00	05¼
But in these Articles several Sums are twice reckon'd; as for Example, where one Fund was taken away, and another given in its place; and where Funds have been Granted to supply the Deficiencies of other Funds, for which Articles there may be deducted about ——	l. 7,000,000	12,000,000	00	00
And the ordinary Crown-Revenue might be charged, during that time, towards the War, with about ——	5,000,000			
So that there has been actually granted but about		48,246,182	00	05¼

'Tis

'Tis not pretended, that the foregoing Accounts are exact to a Tittle; but according to the beſt Information we are able to procure, they are as near the Truth as is requiſite in our preſent Argument.

Having ſhewn what has been granted in Fonds, we ſhall now ſhew what was intended by the Parliament; and for five Years, very little more demanded for the Fleet and Army.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
For *Anno* 1689,	3,295,628	04	05
For *Anno* 1690,	4,010,760	06	07
For *Anno* 1691,	4,172,393	09	07½
For *Anno* 1692,	3,629,439	12	03
For *Anno* 1693,	4,117,080	09	06
For *Anno* 1694,	5,030,581	09	09
For *Anno* 1695,	4,883,120	00	06
For *Anno* 1696,	5,024,854	04	11
For *Anno* 1697,	4,880,078	19	11
For *Anno* 1698,	1,300,000	00	00
	40,343,936	17	05½

Note, that from *Anno* 1693 incluſive, to *Anno* 1697 incluſive, the difference between what was demanded by the Miniſters, and granted by the Parliament for the Fleet and Army during thoſe Five Years, amounted in the whole time but to 1,465,623 *l.* 19 *s.* 9½ *d.*

Suppoſe the Expence of the Civil Liſt from 1689 incluſive, to 1698 incluſive, to have been one Year with another 600,000 *l. per Annum.*

The

	l.	s.	d.
The Expence of the Civil List then in Ten Years may have been	6,000,000	00	00
Towards which the ordinary Revenue of the Crown, besides what it has been charged with to the War, may yield about	5,000,000	00	00
But in 1696 and in 1697, there was granted by the Parliament for the Civil List *per Annum*, 500,000 *l.* in the whole	1,000,000	00	00
So that in this Computation the Expence of the Civil List is to be reckon'd at but	5,000,000	00	00

And the Accounts of *England* may run thus,

	l.	s.	d.
Actually granted	48,246,182	00	05¼
Expence of the War,	40,343,936	17	05¼
Expence of the Civil List	5,000,000	00	00
	45,343,936	17	05¼
Remains	2,902,245	02	11¼

So

So that except in the Articles of Intereſt Mony, and except in the Article of 1,465,623 *l.* 19*s.* 19½ *d.* in which the Demands of the Miniſters for the State of the War, exceeded what was granted by the Parliament, the Expences of the Government ſeem to have been fully ſupply'd, and that there remains an over Ballance of 2,902,245 *l.* to be accounted for.

Now as to Intereſt-Mony for the 5,000,000 *l.* with which the Crown-Revenue may have been charg'd towards the War, thoſe Fonds, moſt of 'em, have and will anſwer the Principal and all the Intereſt allow'd by Parliament: And other Intereſt, which ſeveral Fonds fell ſhort of ſatisfying, have been in a great meaſure made good by the Supply of 7,000,000 *l.* granted to anſwer the Deficiencies.

And as to the State of the War having exceeded what was granted, in Ballancing the general Accompt, this Article ought to be conſidered, if during the whole War the Muſter-Rolls have been full; and if all along we have had our Complement of Ships and Seamen, according to that State of the War which was every Year laid before the Parliament.

But upon the whole Matter, conſidering what has been granted, and what may probably have been expended, there ſeems good Reaſon to think that the Publick of *England*, if all Accompts were narrowly Inſpected, cannot be much in Arrear either to the Fleet, Army, or the Civil Liſt.

So that if there ſhall remain any great Arrear, in all likelihood it muſt chiefly ariſe from exorbitant Premiums, unwarrantable Intereſt, and other ways of laying out Mony, hurtful to the King, and diſtructive to the People.

The rough Draught of our general Accompts here given, which is as perfect as a By-ſtander only could

could procure, may perhaps afford some little Help to such as will think of these Affairs; and this rude Model may contribute towards the forming of a better Scheme.

The Forty Eight Millions granted, as we have said, by Parliament for several Years from 1689 to 1698 inclusive, have not been actually levied. To state exactly how much of it has been already rais'd, and what proportion of it remains secured by remote Fonds, is not to be done without greater Helps than the Writer of these Papers can come at: But so far we know, and may affirm safely, that a great part of the Product of Land, our Trade, and Manufactures, remain still Mortgaged for upwards of Twenty Millions.

Two of the Nine Pences on Beer and Ale are to be esteemed as a Perpetuity, the Third Nine Pence is engaged for a long Term of Time; the first Duty upon Salt can be look'd upon no better than as a perpetual Fond; the new Customs, continued Acts and Joint-Stocks, the Duty on Marriages, Births, *&c.* the first Duty on Stamp'd Paper, the Duty on Windows, half the Duty on Glass-Ware, the new Duties on Whale-Fins and Scotch Linnen, are continued to the First of *August*, 1706. The last Duties upon Salt, and Stamp'd Paper, are Perpetuities; there is a further Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage granted from the last of *January*, 1699. for His Majesty's Life-time; and the Impositions upon Malt, Leather and Paper, are not expired.

To imagine we can buy off and redeem, in any moderate time, all these Perpetuities or long Fonds, is a vain Hope; but this may be laid down for a certain Truth, That *England* will never Flourish in Trade and Manufactures till the greatest Part of 'em are clear'd, and till our affairs are brought to such a Posture, that we may not pay to the Government either for the Support of the Crown, or

on

n Accompt of Fonds, where the Principal is ſunk, bove 2,300,000 *l. per Annum*, or about a twentieth art of the Nation's general Income, which was ur Condition befor the War.

And unleſs this can be compaſs'd it will be found, That in no long Courſe of Time we ſhall languiſh nd decay every Year, by Steps eaſy enough to be erceiv'd by ſuch as conſider of theſe Matters. Our Gold and Silver will be carried off by degrees, Rents will fall, the Purchaſe of Land will decreaſe, Wooll will ſink in its Price, our Stock of Shipping will be diminiſhed, Farm-houſes will go to ruin, Induſtry will decay, and we ſhall have upon us all the viſible Marks of a declining People.

It may indeed be objected, That *France* for about forty, and *Holland* for above a hundred Years have thriven by Trade, notwithſtanding that all the while they have lain under the burthen of heavy Taxes. To which may be anſwered, That where (as in *France*) the Adminiſtration in other Things is exact and right, the Subjects, though Poor, may enlarge their Traffick, for general good Order makes amends for a great deal of Oppreſſion; but they would yet have had more Trade if their Prince had left 'em richer: Beſides, Arbitrary Power has compell'd 'em to that Domeſtick Thrift, which of it ſelf goes very far to make a People ſucceed in Foreign Commerce, tho' their Payments to the Publick are exceſſive. And as to the *Dutch* they have been ſo long inur'd to this Parſimony, that the more they are to pay the State, the more they ſave at home; and they always take care not to clog their Importations; and from this Polity it comes that high Taxes are not hurtful to their Trade.

But in Countries where the Adminiſtration of Affairs is looſe, partly through the mildneſs of the Laws, and partly through the bad Execution of 'em, where the People have been in a long poſſeſſion of

Eaſe

Eaſe and Plenty, and where they think it an Eſſential part of Freedom to be as Expenſive and Luxurious as they pleaſe, and where no Man retrenches upon any Publick Accompt whatſoever: Among ſuch a People, high Taxes, Duties, and Impoſitions, muſt inevitably occaſion a decay of Trade; and tho' their Dealings ſeem large, and not to be interrupted, they ſhall carry on ſuch a ſort of Traffick as will bring along with it at laſt their certain Ruin.

A variety of new Impoſitions and remote Fonds do not only hurt us in the Ballance of Trade, as we have ſhewn, but they are dangerous to Liberty, without which, Trade can never truly Flouriſh, and without which it is indeed of no Importance; for to what end ſhould men acquire Wealth, which they cannot call their own? And accordingly under Deſpotick Governments (except in ſome places where the Adminiſtration of the Tyranny is very wiſely carried on) but few trouble themſelves with the Thoughts of Foreign Traffick.

Who ever conſiders the vaſt number of Duties now a-foot, will find that 'tis not impoſſible to make 'em the Engines wherewith bad Men, ſome time or other, may endeavour to undermine our Civil Rights. 'Tis true, in this Reign we have no reaſon to entertain ſuch a Fear, but a Country that will preſerve its Conſtitution muſt provide againſt remote Dangers.

At preſent we pay to the Government, beſides the Three Shillings Aid and Poll-Mony, ſo many Duties, Old and New, as amount to about Three Millions and a half *per Annum.* Some of 'em, 'tis true, expire ſhortly. But ſuppoſe Neceſſity or bad Management (and there is nothing which ill Huſbandry cannot devour) ſhould compel us to continue what is now expiring for a longer time; and admit that for preſent Subſiſtence, and to pay old Debts, theſe Fonds of Three Millions and a half

per

per Annum ſhould be ſettled as a Security to Lenders, for ſome certain time to come.

Suppoſe then a Government in the Poſſeſſion of ſuch a large Revenue at firſt legally granted, put into a Method of Collection, and to the Payment of which the People ſhall be accuſtomed.

And ſuppoſe, in ſome future Reign, the Miniſters ſhould be either weary or afraid of Parliaments, and deſire to Govern by the Sword, and without Law. That this may happen is not impoſſible, becauſe we have heretofore ſeen Stateſmen ſo diſpos'd.

'Tis to be hoped this is a Danger very remote indeed; but when a Miniſtry ſhall be ſo madly inclin'd, the Symptoms of their approaching Frenzy will be evident enough; for at ſuch a Seaſon we ſhall ſee 'em chooſe rather to be ſupply'd by diſtant Fonds, than with what will produce ready Mony: And they will take care that Revenues granted may not be well managed nor improved to the Height, with this Deſign, That the People may be kept in the dark, both as to what they give, and as to what each Branch is like to yield.

Suppoſe then an Ambitious and Deſperate Set of Men, with all theſe Thoughts about 'em, and reſolved to make their Maſter Abſolute, may they not, with the Help of ſuch an ample Revenue, quite overthrow our Conſtitution? Arbitrary Miniſters have heretofore ſtopp'd the Exchequer; and if we ſhould ever ſee Men of the ſame Stamp upon the Stage of Buſineſs, 'tis not impoſſible but that they may run into the ſame Wicked Meaſures, eſpecially if they ſhould be back'd with the Support of a Standing Army.

The Liberties of a People are but in a very precarious Condition, when they can be ſubverted by one pernicious Counſel: It ſhould therefore be the Care of ſuch as Love their Country, to render this

fatal Advice as dangerous and impracticable as Laws can make it.

At a time when there is ſuch an Immenſe Revenue Collected every Year, it ſeems a fault in our Conſtitution that ſufficient Proviſion is not made againſt diverting and miſapplying the Publick Treaſure, and againſt breaking into Appropriated Fonds. And to ſpeak in Plain Words, There is Reaſon to fear that the Laws have not made it Criminal enough to ſtop Payments in the Exchequer.

When a Town that apprends a Siege finds it ſelf weak by Nature in one place, the firſt Care of the Defenders is to fortifie that Poſt as well as ever they can. In the ſame manner a Conſtitution that is attackable one way, ſhould ſtrengthen that Part with ſevere Laws. The Exchequer therefore ſhould be fenced about with all poſſible Skill, that it may never be invaded by bold and deſigning Miniſters.

A Stop, there would at once pull down all our Civil Rights. Nay, to ſtop the Principal only, tho' the Payments of the Intereſt ſhould be continued, would be fatal to our Conſtitution, for there would yet remain an Income large enough to make Parliaments uſeleſs; and if wicked Men ſhould thus ſet up for themſelves, they would ſtill have a Revenue ſufficient to bear their Expences, and to keep up an Army to awe ſuch as their Conduct ſhall diſpleaſe.

Some indeed will argue, That a corrupted Miniſtry will as ſoon make new Levies of Mony, as venture thus to divert what has been already granted and appropriated: But this Objection has no weight in it. The People more willingly ſubmit to a Tax once lawful, than to pay a new Duty againſt Law. The Tonnage and Poundage illegally levied in the former part of King *Charles* I's Reign, did not occaſion half the Clamour as the new Impo-

Impoſition of Ship-Mony. In the beginning of King *James* IId's Reign, the Tonnage and Poundage, and Temporary Exciſe, determined by King *Charles* his Death, was paid without oppoſition; but if King *James* had attempted to raiſe a new Tax by Regal Authority, his Subjects without doubt would not have paid it. Beſides, when a Tax is lawful in its Original, 'tis to be feared that the People will not much concern themſelves who is to receive it, the Court or ſuch as have truſted the Exchequer; but they would be alarm'd to ſome purpoſe if they ſhould be called upon to make new Payments not warranted by Law. So that in all probability more Danger may ariſe to our Liberties from breaking into old Fonds appropriated, and ſtopping the Exchequer, than from making new and forcible Levies upon the Subject.

And tho' there is no cauſe in this Reign to fear ſuch Attempts, yet it muſt certainly be Wiſdom to provide againſt future Evils, eſpecially when 'tis poſſible that one deſperate and wicked Council may deſtroy that Conſtitution for which we have been ſo long Contending.

The true way to hinder ſuch a Diſeaſe from ever coming upon the Body-Politick will be to remove the Cauſe, by leſſening aſſoon as poſſible theſe Payments to the Publick of three Millions and a half *per Annum*, beſides Polls and Land-Taxes; which large Iſſues may endanger Liberty, and without doubt hurt us in the Ballance of Trade.

The Debts for which theſe Fonds are a Security, by Negligence will every Year increaſe, inſomuch that in a very ſhort time, and with a very little more Careleſſneſs, the Raiſing more and more will grow unavoidable for our Common Defence, till at laſt we ſhall come to Pay conſtantly between five and ſix Millions *per Annum*. And when this Kingdom ſhall be arrived at that Period of ill Conduct, we

may venture to Pronounce, That the Common People of *England* will in all Circumſtances be then as poor and miſerable, as the Common People of *France* were before the War. And we deſire all good Patriots to carry this Reflection in their minds.

On the contrary by good Management this Debt may be leſſen'd, ſo that the Fonds which are its Security (inſtead of being continued) may be dropt every Year, till at laſt we may come to pay to the Government for its Support and Defence, ſuch a Sum as will not be dangerous to our Freedoms, nor prejudicial to our Foreign Traffick.

He who propoſes Thrift may pleaſe the Common People, but he ſhall be ſure to diſguſt others: However the Writer of theſe Papers thinks it his Duty to Recommend Frugality in the State; and he believes 'tis the Wiſeſt and Honeſteſt way of Inriching the Publick, to make it Rich out of its own Revenues.

As to what Improvements may be made in the Revenues already granted, we refer the Reader to what we have formerly ſaid upon this Subject in our Diſcourſes on the Revenues and Trade of *England*; We have laid down that ſeveral Branches there ſpecified may, by good Management, and without Oppreſſion, be Annually Encreaſed 736,075 *l.*

Part I. page 119.

Nor upon Enquiry ſince, do we find any Reaſon to receed from this Opinion: on the contrary we have good cauſe to think, that they are rather capable of greater Improvements than we had then taken notice of.

The *Malt* is indeed an Article in that Accompt; but 'tis an expiring Duty which the People of *England* hope never to ſee continued, therefore an Abatement is to be made upon that Head: But the remaining Branches, if well look'd after, would eaſe us of very many Burthens.

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In that Diſcourſe, we have ſhewn ſeveral Reaſons not yet Anſwered, Why the Exciſe on Beer and Ale ſingle and double is Improvable in the whole 318,000 *l. per Annum*, but inſtead of riſing, the Exciſe is again fallen ſince the Accompt was Stated.

	l.
Single and Double Exciſe, Year Ending 24 *June*, 1697. Produced about	900,000.
The ſaid Duties, Year Ending 24 *June* 1698. Produced about	860,000.
The Duties fallen, about	40,000.

So that the Exciſe now almoſt Doubled produces but about the ſame Sum which it yielded formerly with the ſingle Duty only upon it; for which we ſhall preſume to ſay, the Managers neither have given, nor can give, any well grounded and ſolid Reaſon.

When we conſider how much the Exciſe was Advanced in ſix Years by good Management, we cannot but be of Opinion, that a very great Sum might be raiſed every Year towards Clearing the groſs Debt, by Skill and careful Conduct, in ſuch as Govern the reſpective Brances.

But tho' it imports the State to a high Degree to have the utmoſt of its Legal Dues, and juſt Revenues, fairly brought in, yet a great deal more depends upon having this Revenue Frugally and Wiſely laid out; For, as in private Inſtances, He who lives with Oeconomy, ſhall be Richer, tho' his Gains are but ſmall, than a Prodigal, let his Gettings be never ſo large; So Governments which manage their Affairs thriftily, ſhall have more Wealth than States which have the way to obtain never ſo large Contributions from their People.

What is to be got by good Management in bringing in the Revenues, is nothing in Compariſon of what may be ſaved in laying out the Publick Treaſure; one way the Profit is limited and narrow, and the other boundleſs, one way we can reckon but by Hundreds, the other way by Millions.

Teſtament Politique, Par. 2. c. 9. §. 7.

A *Venetian* Ambaſſador once told Cardinal *Richlieu*, That there needed no more to make *France* happy, than wiſely to lay out what was vainly diſſipated. *Qu'elle Scut auſſi bien deſpenſer ce qu'elle diſſipoit ſans Raiſon que la Republique ſcavoit bien n'employer pas un ſeul Quadrain ſans beſoin, et ſans beaucoup de Menage.*

A State muſt be plunged into endleſs Debts and Difficulties, unleſs it has a ſtrict Eye over all its Expences, eſpecially ſuch as relate to a War, which is always a greedy Monſter, but Devours much more when 'tis left to feed at random.

To come at ſuch a future Thrift as may bring us out of that Debt which lies ſo heavy in the other Scale when we conſider of the Ballance of Trade; One way perhaps will be ſevere to Enquire how the Forty Eight Millions already given have been expended: Beſides it will not peradventure be difficult to ſhew that of the many Millions ſtill owing, a large Sum might be ſaved, if the Publick Accompts from their very beginning were overhaled.

A Government that will get out of Debt, muſt look nicely into every particular; It ought in Prudence to examine into all Grants made by the Crown, when the People lay under the Burthen of Heavy Taxes.

'Tis ſaid that the Forfeitures in *Ireland*, and the Lands poſſeſſed by the Crown in 1688, would ſatisfie a large part of what the Publick is now Indebted.

'Tis

'Tis alledged that Gains unwarrantable in Law, and not to be juſtified by any Neceſſity whatſoever, have been made in ſeveral Contracts with the Crown, if all this were look'd into, very Probably ſomething might be ſav'd towards diſcharging the Nations Debts.

There is one piece of Management which the Writer of theſe Papers is very much ſurprized at, and it relates to the Exchequer Bills.

	l.	*l.*
The firſt Subſcription at 10 *per Cent*, was for	400,000.	Premium 40,000.
The ſecond Subſcription at 10 *per Cent*, was for	700,000.	Premium 70,000.
The third Subſcription at 10 *per Cent*, was for	500,000.	Premium 50,000.
The fourth Subſcription at 8 *per Cent*, was for	400,000.	Premium 32,000.
The fifth Subſcription at 4 *per Cent*, was for	1,000,000.	Premium 40,000.
Total Subſcriptions.	3,000,000.	tot. Prems. 232,000

Beſides, theſe Premiums there is a Current Intereſt upon the Bills of above 7½ *per Cent.* And 'tis likewiſe obſervable, that the whole ſtruck into Exchequer Bills is but 2,700,000 *l.* to circulate which there has been a Subſcription of 3 Millions, ſo that the Engine which carries, is heavier than the weight it bears, which ſeems but clumſy Workmanſhip; beſides 'tis remarkable that there is yet ſunk of theſe

Bills but 1,250,000*l.* And of the Exchequer Bills a vaſt Sum are become Specie Notes at the Current Intereſt, tho Mony now lies, or ought to lie, for their Diſcharge.

There is likewiſe another Piece of Oeconomy after which, ſometime or other, it may be worth while to make Enquiry. The Old *Eaſt-India* Company offer'd to raiſe the two Millions then wanted, and to depoſit 200,000*l.* to make good their Propoſal, nor did they propoſe or expect any Premium or deduction whatſoever; Yet their offer was diſcouraged and rejected by ſome of our Men of Buſineſs; and the ſame Perſons have thought it reaſonable to allow the New Company a Premium of 62,500*l.* which was defalk'd out of the firſt Payment of 200,000*l.* part of which Premium is contrary to the Expreſs direction of the Act of Parliament.

'Twill coſt *England* a large Tax to raiſe the Sums laviſh'd in theſe two Inſtances, but we ſhall ſay no more upon theſe Particulars, leaving the Reader to make his own Comment upon ſuch unaccountable Proceedings.

When the Affairs of a Private Man are in diſorder, he ſinks faſter towards the latter end than in the beginning; The ſame thing holds in a Government whoſe Revenues are entangled, the further it goes the more the Debt Swells, unleſs ſuch as are concern'd in the Adminiſtration reſolve before it be too late, to enter upon Wiſe and Thrifty Meaſures.

Where the King's Perſon is belov'd, where his Virtues are rever'd, and where the Government is of the Peoples own Forming, and Election, the Subjects will ſeldom fail to exert themſelves ſtrongly, and are very willing to ſtretch their Purſes, in order to put the Publick Revenues into ſuch a poſture that the Adminiſtration may be Eaſie, and that the Kingdom may be Protected; but they muſt

be

be invited to this by ſeeing that what they give is Frugally managed, and not Profuſely waſted, and by obſerving that their Mony goes to Support the State, and not to Enrich Private Perſons.

Men when they are worn out with Diſeaſes, Aged, Crazy, and when beſides they have the *Mala Stamina Vitæ*, may be patched up for a while, but they cannot hold out long; for Life, tho' it is ſhortned by Irregularities, is not to be extended by any Care beyond ſuch a Period. But it is not ſo with the Body-Politick, by Wiſdom and Conduct that is to be made long-liv'd, if not Immortal; its Diſtempers are to be cured, nay its very Youth is to be renew'd, and a Mix'd Government grows Young and Healthy again, whenever it returns to the Principles upon which it was firſt founded.

The Diſorders we labour under are capable of a Remedy, and our Difficulties are not ſuch but that they may be maſter'd: Thoſe Payments to the Publick, by good Management may be leſſened, which inevitably muſt ſet the Ballance of Trade againſt us.

While theſe Immenſe Debts remain, the Neceſſities of the Government will continue, Intereſt muſt be high, and large Premiums will be given. And what Encouragement is there for Men to think of Foreign Traffick (whoſe Returns for thoſe Commodities that inrich *England* muſt bring no great Profit to the private Adventurers) when they can ſit at home, and without any Care or Hazzard get from the State by dealing with the Exchequer, Fifteen and ſometimes Twenty, Thirety, Forty and Fifty *per Cent.*? Is there any Commerce abroad ſo conſtantly advantageous? Will Men who can ſafely, and without Trouble, reap ſuch Gains, breed their Children to be Merchants? Will they venture great Stocks to make Diſcoveries, and employ their Induſtry to enlarge and extend

tend our Dealings in diſtant Parts? Will they think of building that multitude of Trading Veſſels which alone can rear us up a ſufficient Breed of able Seamen? And if that Tide of Wealth which was wont to flow in Trade, be diverted to another Channel, and if we mind no other Traffick but that which juſt ſupplies our Luxuries, muſt we not in a few Years be Loſers in the general Ballance?

Where Intereſt is high, the Merchants care not to deal in any but rich Commodities, whoſe Freight is eaſy, and whoſe Vent is certain in corrupted Countries; And of theſe Coſtly Wares very many carry out Mony, and but few bring any back to the Kingdom. 'Tis the Bulky Goods, whoſe Returns are not of ſo great Profit, that breed moſt Seamen, and that are moſt Nationally gainful; but ſuch Goods cannot be very much dealt in where Intereſt is high, nor can any Laws in the World lower it where great Sums are continually borrow'd by the Government. And by theſe Inſtances it muſt ſufficiently appear, how much our Payments to the Publick may affect the Ballance of Trade.

And, treating upon this Subject, we cannot but take Notice, where the Prince is frequently abſent from his own Dominions, ſojourning for a long ſpace of time in a Foreign Country, in which He, His Court, and His whole Retinue are oblid'g to make great Expences, That this is highly prejudicial to the Ballance of Trade, and, without doubt, muſt incline the Scale to that Nation's Side where the Mony is ſpent.

Upon the whole Matter, If the Revenues already granted are well look'd after, and improv'd; if the Accompts of the Fleet and Army are carefully inſpected; if the Grants are ſtrictly examin'd; if the State enters intirely upon Frugal Meaſures; and

and if we reſolve to exert our Selves, ſo as not to let this dangerous Burthen lie long upon us, this Great Debt may be clear'd in ſome moderate time, and thoſe large Payments to the Publick will ceaſe, which are like ſo many bloody Iſſues that emaciate the Body-Politick, and render it Hectical and Conſumptive; and if this Debt were paid, we ſhould get rid of that variety of new Exciſes, and high Cuſtoms, which hurt Foreign Traffick, and interrupt us in our Domeſtick Buſineſs, and which are more eſpecially a heavy Weight upon the Woollen Manufacture.

Even in a Common-wealth 'tis dangerous for one part of the People to be very much indebted to the other; and in *Rome* it was the occaſion of great Seditions. When the State has borrow'd large Sums, and iſſued out Securities by Tallies upon different Fonds, 'tis commonly ſaid the Publick is ſo and ſo indebted; but in truth the Caſe is otherwiſe, and more properly ſpeaking, theſe ſort of Fonds divide a Country into two Ranks of Men, of which one are Creditors and the other Debtors; and this Diſtinction does without doubt belong to all Nations where the People pay Taxes to one another, as it now happens to be our Caſe in *England*. The *Creditors* are the Bank, ſuch as deal with the Publick for Storers, Lenders of all kinds, beſides a great many Foreigners, whoſe Mony is lent to the State in Engliſh Names. The *Debtors* are the Landed Men, the 5th or 6th part of whoſe Rents are pawn'd for the Publick Service from Year to Year, by Aids and Land-Fonds. All Merchants likewiſe who pay Cuſtoms, and all Shop-keepers and Retailers are, according to our Diſtinction, to be accompted *Debtors*. Thus almoſt all *England* may not be improperly divided into *Debtors* and *Creditors*, nor in a long and expenſive War was this wholly to be avoided, but with-

without doubt it cannot be wise nor safe to let this Distinction long continue; for tho' such as Receive may like their Condition and think themselves at Ease, yet such as are to Pay cannot be so well contented. 'Tis true, some modern Politicians have run upon another Notion; and several Persons have thought that the more Fonds are erected, the more People are engaged to preserve the present Government. This Policy indeed of theirs would hold good if they could make out, That the Lenders are stronger; and more in number than such as are concern'd in Payments to the Publick: But it rather seems to hold in Sense and Reason, That the throne of that Prince, in a Free Nation, must be the most firmly established, whose Affairs permit him to ask the fewest Taxes from his People.

France was once upon a right foot in relation to its Liberties; and they who peruse their History with Care will find, That Arbitrary Power did not so much bring in high Taxes, as high Taxes introduced Arbitrary Power; for when that Golden Idol of an Immense Revenue was once set up, all the Nation bowed to it.

In the Second and Third Sections we have shewn, That the probable Methods to make a Country Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, are to take Care of Increasing and Employing the People, and to Improve Land and its Product. In this Fourth Section we have set forth how this Ballance may be affected by our Payments to the Publick. And in the last Discourse we shall endeavour to shew, That the Wealth and Prosperity of a State depend chiefly upon a wise, steady and honest Administration.

SECT. V.

That a Country cannot Increaſe in Wealth and Power but by Private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a ſteady Courſe of Honeſty and Wiſdom, in ſuch as are truſted with the Adminiſtration of Affairs.

AT Romæ ruere in Servitium Conſules, Patres, Equites, quanto quis illuſtrior, tanto magis falſi ac feſtinantes. *But at* Rome *they all ran headlong into Slavery, the Conſuls, the Senate, the Gentry; and the Nobler the perſon was, the more falſe, and the greater haſte he made.* This was the Condition of *Rome* when *Tiberius* aſſum'd the Empire; but God forbid it ſhould be ever the Caſe of *England*, for our Conſtitution will be entirely loſt when ſuch a Corruption happens; we may indeed preſerve the Name of Liberty, and ſome of its outward Forms, but no more than what will help to keep our Chains the faſter on: Tyrannies have been often ſubverted, where the Princes govern meerly by their own Will, without giving to their Subjects the leaſt appearance of being free; but thoſe abſolute Monarchies are harldy to be ſhaken,

ſhaken, and that Servitude is laſting, where the People are left to make their own Fetters.

It is a matter of great wonder, that from the time of *Auguſtus* downwards, the *Romans*, who were ſeldom without Brave and Virtuous Men, ſhould never make One Attempt to reſtore the Commonwealth, and to ſhake off that Power which ſome of the Emperors exercis'd with ſuch exorbitance; but in all likelyhood it proceeded from this, that the Souldiers and Common People, without whom no great Revolution can be made, believ'd themſelves ſtill free, becauſe, in ſhow, the Commonwealth had the ſame Form as in elder times: there was a Senate, Conſuls, Tribunes, and an appearance of all the Antient Magiſtracies, tho nothing remain'd of the antient Liberty: But this the Common People did not feel, for the Cruelty and Fraud of *Tiberius*, the Madneſs of *Caligula*, the Stupidity of *Claudius*, the Riots and Luſt of *Nero*, the Gluttony and Sordid Mind of *Vitellius*, the Vanities of *Otho*, and the Enormous Vices of *Domitian* did little hurt to the Inferiour Rank of Men, who all the while had *Panem & Circenſes*, which was all they deſir'd; but the Miſchiefs theſe Monſtrous Princes brought upon the World, fell chiefly upon Nobler Heads; who yet could not reſcue their Country, ſo much were the Common People lull'd aſleep, with the Opinion they entertain, that the Laws ſtill govern'd, becauſe they ſaw every year Conſuls and a Senate; but this Senate being corrupted made the Tyranny boundleſs and ſafe: For the People could never be induc'd to oppoſe that Power which ſtill bore ſome Reſemblance to their Antient Form of Government.

In the ſame manner, if in future Ages our Parliaments ſhould be debauch'd in Principles, and become willing to be the Inſtruments of a Prince's Will, and to act as he directs them, Arbitrary Power

Power would be here settled upon a lasting Foot; for the Common People would never join with any who would attempt to redeem their Country, because they will be deceiv'd by Names and Forms, and think the Laws govern'd, and that they are free, if the outward show of the Constitution is still preserv'd.

When Corruption has seiz'd upon the Representatives of a People, 'tis like a Cronical Disease hardly to be rooted out. When Servile Compliance and Flattery come to predominate, things proceed from bad to worse, till at last the Government is quite dissolv'd. Absolute Monarchies are in danger of great Convulsions, when one Man, their Prince, happens to be weak, or wicked; but Commonwealths, or mix'd Constitutions are safe till the Chief Part of the Leading Men are debauch'd in Principles. However, Monarchy has this Advantage, that the one Man, their Prince, is mortal, and if bad, he may be succeeded by a better; but a People thoroughly corrupted never returns to right Reason; And we see that the depravity of Manners, which began in *Rome* presently after the second *Punic* War, among the Nobility and Gentry, became every year worse and worse, till at last *Cæsar* destroyed the Commonwealth. And after his time, under the succeeding Emperors, every Senate grew more abject and complying than the other, till in Process of Time the old *Roman* Spirit was utterly extinguish'd, and then that Empire by degrees became a Prey to Barbarous Nations.

If all parts of the State do not with their utmost Power promote the Publick Good, if the Prince has other Aims than the safety and welfare of his Country, if such as represent the People do not, preserve their Courage and Integrity; If the Nations Treasure is wasted, If Ministers are allow'd

to

to undermine the Conſtitution with Impunity, If Judges are ſuffer'd to pervert Juſtice and wreſt the Law, then is a mixt Government the greateſt Tyranny in the world; it is Tyranny eſtabliſh'd by a Law, 'tis authoris'd by Conſent, and ſuch a People are bound with Fetters of their own making. A Tyranny that governs by the Sword, has few Friends but Men of the Sword; But a Legal Tyranny (where the People are only call'd to confirm Iniquity with their own Voices) has of its Side the Rich, the Fearful, the Lazy, thoſe that know the Law, and get by it, Ambitious Churchmen, and all thoſe whoſe Livelihood depends upon the quiet Poſture of Affairs; And the Perſons here deſcrib'd compoſe the Influencing Part of moſt Nations; So that ſuch a Tyranny is hardly to be ſhaken off. Men may be ſaid to be inſlav'd by Law, or their own Conſent, under Corrupt or degenerate Republicks, ſuch as was the *Roman* Commonwealth from the time of *Cinna*, till the Attempts of *Cæſar*, and under degenerate mix'd Governments ſuch as *Rome* was while the Emperors made a ſhow of Ruling by Law, but with an aw'd and corrupted Senate: To which Form of Government, *England* was almoſt reduc'd, till the King came over to put our Liberties upon a better Foot.

But what has been, may be, and tho we are ſafe during his Reign, yet in after Ages, bad and deſigning Miniſters may think their Conduct is no way to be maintain'd but by the Sword, and that they cannot ſecurely prey upon the Commonwealth, till they have made their Maſter abſolute; upon which Score, in theſe Inquiries concerning the Methods whereby *England* may be a Gainer in the General Ballance of Trade, we think it needful to lay down, That all that Wealth and Power which

which must defend this State upon any Emergencies or Invasions from abroad, depends upon our preserving inviolate the antient Constitution of this Kingdom.

Men do as industriously contrive Fallacies to deceive themselves (when they have a Mind to be deceiv'd) as they study Frauds whereby to decieve Others; And if it leads to their Ends, and gratifies their present Ambition, they care not what they do, thinking it time enough to serve the Publick, when they have serv'd themselves; and in this view very many betray their Trusts, Comply, Give up Peoples Right, and let Fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves, that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, 'twill be then time enough to make a stand, and redeem the Commonwealth. The same Notion led *Pompey* to joyn with those who intended to Subvert the *Roman* Liberties; But he found them too strong, and himself too weak, when he desir'd to save his Country.

In the same manner, if there be any in this Nation who desire to build their Fortunes upon the Publick Ruin, they ought to consider that their great Estates, high Honours and Preferments, will avail 'em little when the Subversion of Liberty has weaken'd and impoverish'd us so, as to make way for the bringing in of Foreign Power.

It imports all Degrees of Men in their several Posts, to endeavour at the Preserving that Form of Government, under which we have prosper'd for near seven hundred Years. It happens seldom that any Country is totally subdu'd by Foreign Force; and Civil War is indeed a raging Fever; but it goes away of itself, when the Humours that fed it are spent, and is often no more than the Sign of a Health too florid, and the Effects only of too much Blood in the Body Politick: But ill

Conduct in a State long continued, waſtes it by ſlow and certain degrees, and at laſt brings an incurable Conſumption upon all its Parts and Members.

If the Affairs of this Kingdom ſhould ever happen to be ill conducted, which we hope is a Remote Fear, the Legiſlative Power muſt then interpoſe with its Authority, and the united Wiſdom of the Nation muſt reſcue Us out of weak and polluted hands, for ſuch a Miniſtry is a ſurer Engine to deſtroy a State, than any its Enemies can bring againſt it.

'Tis true, ſuch as would correct Errors, and watch that no Invaſion may be made on Liberty, have been heretofore call'd a Faction by the Perſons in Power; but 'tis not properly their Name, and ought to be given to another ſort of Men.

'Tis wrong to call them the Faction, who by all dutiful and modeſt ways promote the Cauſe of Liberty, as the true means to endear a Prince to his Subjects, and to lay upon them a ſtronger tye and obligation to preſerve his Government. For a People will certainly beſt love and defend that Prince, by whom the greateſt Immunities and moſt good Laws have been granted.

They cannot properly be term'd the Faction, who deſire a War ſhould be manag'd upon ſuch a Foot of Expence as the Nation is able to bear; Who would have the Publick Treaſure not waſted, the Prince not deceiv'd in his Grants and Bargains, who would have the Miniſtry watchful and Induſtrious, and who, when they complain, are angry with Things and not with Perſons.

The Name of Faction does more truly belong to them, who, tho the Body Politick has all the Signs of Death upon it, yet ſay all is well; that the Riches of the Nation are not to be exhauſted, that there is no miſgovernment in all its Buſineſs,

that

that it feels no decay, that its OEconomy is perfect, and who, all the while, are as arrogant and assuming as if they had sav'd that very People, whom their Folly and mad Conduct has in a manner ruin'd.

They may be rather term'd the Faction, who were good Patriots out of the Court, but are better Courtiers in it, and who pretended to fear excess of Power while it was not communicated to them, but never think the Monarchy can be high enough advanc'd, when they are in the Administration.

In Nations (where for a long time Matters have not been plac'd upon a Foot of Honesty) their great Assemblies consist commonly of two Parties, in both of which Sides there are many who have the same right Intentions to the Publick, and many, who in all their Councils consult only their private Interest.

Of one side, some out of Principle love their Country, and are jealous of its Liberties; and yet at the same time are careful of their Princes Honour and Interest. In all their Proceeding they have nothing in view but the Publick Good, they study not so much how to blame the Past, as which way the Future is to be mended; They do not accuse the Statesman, and yet let the Fault continue, as well knowing, that Impeachments of Men, and not of Crimes produce new, but seldom better Ministers.

They desire the Necessities of the State should be well supply'd, the Person of the Prince reverenc'd, and his Government maintain'd. When his Ministers have made false steps, or when their Councils have had unsuccessful Events, they desire not to inflame the Assembly where they sit, but are willing rather to assist with their superior knowledge, and to bring the minds of Men to the

Temper and Calmneſs that is proper in weighty Deliberations.

Perſons, of this Character are in moſt Aſſemblies of a People, but they are often join'd and follow'd by ſuch as have quite another View and Aim, and who in all their Actings, conſult not the Common-Welfare, but either wreak their own Diſcontents, or purſue ſome Ambitious, Hope, and upon ſuch, or the like Accompts, mix themſelves with the wiſer and better ſort: However the Good and the Bad, being thus mingled and blended, compoſe altogether what in vitious times is called the Country Party.

On the other ſide, there are ſome very nice in what may intrench upon the Regal Authority, yet never forgetful of the Peoples Rights. 'Tis true, their Poſt often compells them to excuſe all Faults, tho guilty of none themſelves: They are forc'd too frequently to move for Mony, but wiſh there was leſs occaſion for it: They hate not ſuch as differ from 'em in Opinion, and ſecretly approve of the Right Courſe, which ſometimes they muſt not follow; but with ſuch as have been here deſcrib'd, there will too often join an Ignorant, Mercenary, and Servile Crew, who like all things, and examin nothing; Unanimous in Evil, Diligent in Miſchief, Variable in Principles; Conſtant to Flattery, Talkers for Liberty, but Slaves to Power. Such as theſe will too frequently in vitious times mingle with the ſound Part of a Court, ſtiling themſelves the Court Party, and the Princes only Friends.

In former Reigns, by the Artifice of deſigning Stateſmen, the Repreſentatives of the People were divided into thoſe two Parties: Beſides, in moſt Aſſemblies which meet by Authority of a ſingle Perſon, there are ſtill ſome who are taught to have the Secret, and they ſtile themſelves the *Managers*:

gers: The Eyes of every one are bent upon them, their words are obſerv'd, and in moſt things they give the firſt Turn. At Court indeed they pretend to ſway and govern every Motion: but in Matters eſteem'd indifferent, they carry with 'em many of the beſt ſort, and are certainly followed by all ſuch as are willing to be guided. Theſe are believ'd to have weigh'd beforehand, and to know what is wiſeſt, moſt ſafe, moſt expedient, or at leaſt moſt grateful: And when they appear, it is imagin'd there has been put into their Heads the whole extracted Quinteſſence of all the Miniſterial Wiſdom. In the Houſe they undertake for the Court, and at Court for the Houſe, receiving ſingly, the Thanks of what proceeds from the joynt Affection of all the reſt, and are thought alone to give what the whole Nation pays.

To tell what time-deſigning Men began to erect for themſelves this new Office, and when and how this Impoſition took its Riſe, would be too long a Digreſſion from the preſent Matter; but we may truly affirm, Things have never gone well with our Princes, nor their People, ſince it was firſt invented.

Good Kings at all times, without any Danger, may repoſe their intire concerns upon a Houſe of Commons; the National Intereſt will go on there without driving, and when Difficulties ariſe, the Miniſters only make them; For when the King and People have but one Intereſt, it goes on of its own Accord, and ſuch as pretend to be buſy for the Prince in that Place, are working for themſelves, and not for him.

But if in after Ages our Diſorders and Corruptions ſhould make this Office Neceſſary; If there muſt be Managers; If ſome muſt lead and others follow, 'tis reaſonable the Guides ſhould be well inſtructed.

Nothing therefore can more import the Prince, than that they who will aſſume ſuch a Province, ſhould be Men of Grave Diſcretion, and ſolid Judgment; Wiſe and not Subtle; Cool, Temperate, Steady, Diſcerning, and Patient of Contradiction: And indeed they cannot be proper for that Poſt, unleſs they have in their Heads an Univerſal Scheme of their own and the Buſineſs of other Countries.

When Giddy Young Men without Experience are rely'd upon and truſted in this Station, they embroyl the Princes Affairs; By their Ignorance they give his Enemies Advantage, and by their Inſolence diſoblige his Friends.

A Man can be no more born a Stateſman than a Phyſician or a Lawyer; and let the Mind be never ſo happily diſpos'd, Time muſt ripen what is begot by Nature.

Hobb's *Leviathan* p. 10.

Mr. *Hobbs* ſays, *He that has moſt Experience in any kind of Buſineſs, has moſt ſigns to gueſs at the Future time; and conſequently is the moſt Prudent: And ſo much more Prudent than he that is new in that kind of Buſineſs, as not to be equall'd by any Advantage of Natural or Extemporary Wit.*

The Sanguine Hopes conceiv'd by Young Men are by no means proper in Weighty and great Deliberations; and they ſeldom make good Stateſmen: Elder Years, where they produce not Wiſdom, bring at leaſt Caution, which is ſomething like it.

They who have ſeen much, are us'd to frequent Diſappointments, and therefore not inclin'd to venture; eſpecially they rarely hazzard the ſumm of affairs upon any ſingle Council.

Young Men are good to execute the Reſults of elder Wiſdom, but the ſame Fire which makes them beſt for Action, renders them unfit for Council: Yet there is now and then a fortunate Genius, in whom the Prudence of Age, and the Warmth of Youth

Youth meet together; but of ſuch the Examples are not common.

Pierce Gaveſton, *Hugh Spencer*, and the Duke of *Buckingham*, are ſufficient Inſtances that the Conduct of Young Miniſters is ſeldom Succeſsful to themſelves, nor to their Maſters: They do the leſs Miſchief if they meddle only in the Pleaſures of their Prince; but when warm Heads, full of Conceit, with ſlight Wit, and no true Wiſdom, pretend to guide a whole State, and to have Majority at their Beck and Rule, in a ſhort time they occaſion more Diſorders than can be remedy'd in many Years.

When Perſons ſo deſcrib'd come to have a Corrupt Majority of their ſide, They diminiſh the Nations Stock and its Coin, They loſe its Trade, They Anticipate all the Princes Revenues, They charge the Subject for many Years to come with a great Number of New Duties and Impoſitions; They bring the State into an Immenſe Debt, and plunge it into ſuch Difficulties, that hardly any new Revenues can be well erected; But 'tis hop'd *England* will never fall into ſuch deſtructive Hands.

Our Wealth and Greatneſs depend abſolutely upon keeping the Legiſlative Power to future Ages untainted, Vigilant for the Publick Safety, Jealous of the Peoples Rights, Watchful over the Miniſters, and to have the Members not aw'd by Armies, nor to be ſeduc'd by Preferments, Bribes or Penſions; That we are ſafe at preſent is granted, and that we are not now under any Dangers of the like kind, and that this Important Poſt is well ſecur'd, is allow'd: But writing for Poſterity, to which theſe Papers may peradventure be tranſmitted, we think it needfull to give theſe Cautions.

While we preſerve our Conſtitution as we receiv'd it from our Anceſtors, bad Men may have a ſhort Power to do Miſchief; however, their Rage and Folly will be at laſt corrected; but if we ſuffer our Civil Rights to be invaded, and if our Ancient Form of Government ſhould be loſt, then ill Miniſters will proceed without Comptrol; they will in a ſhort time diſſipate the Nation's Treaſure, the People will have no Stock for Trade, they will loſe their Induſtry, they will grow inclinable to change, Reſty and Indifferent in the Cauſe of Liberty, and perhaps willing to ſubmit to any foreign Force, like *Spain* which has been both deſpotically and weakly govern'd.

Freedom and Wealth proceed hand in hand together, and if one is loſt the other will not long continue: But this Notion is not much regarded by thoſe who can only be great, and have no ways of making their own Fortunes, but by the deſtruction of their Country.

For ſuch as propoſe to thrive by Diſorder and Miſgovernment, have a ſtrong Intereſt to beggar the People. The Confuſion which publick Wants and private Neceſſities introduce, ſuits beſt with their Deſigns: A wealthy Nation may be jealous of its Rights, and watch any Invaſions upon its Freedom, and a rich Gentry may be unmanageable; and ſuch bad Men may think, that the beſt Courſe to keep us humble is to make us poor.

If any ſhould be ſo wicked to have Thoughts of enſlaving *England*, they will endeavour to Mate and Quell the Stomachs of the Common People, by reducing them to the Miſery and Want which decay of Trade, if it ever happens, muſt bring upon this Nation; and they will try to diſtreſs the Gentry in their Eſtates to that Degree, as to make 'em rely upon the Court for a Livelihood and Subſiſtence; for which Reaſons they will wink at the

loſs

loss of our Foreign Traffick, and perhaps contrive its Destruction, knowing that upon the Prosperity of Trade, Rents and Land have for many Years depended. Nor can ill Ministers desire a better Circumstance, than to have Men of the best Fortunes reduc'd by their Necessities to come and Cringe and Sue to them for a small Employment. Does not this bring all into their Power? Must not such as shall have the Distribution of these Favours be courted and follow'd by the major part of the Gentry? Would not so great a Capacity of helping others add to their strength, make 'em rich and safe, and indeed set them in a manner above Impeachments?

If bad Men should ever get into Power, they will not only contribute to ruin our Foreign Trade, but they will try to impoverish the Kingdom by exorbitant Taxes, thereby to bring the Gentry and People yet more under their Subjection; they will likewise plunge their Master into Debts and Necessities, to render their Tricks and Arts of more use, and to put a higher Value upon the Band they shall have in pay; for in former Times we have seen that when a Court wanted, they who procur'd Money to be given, were thought to give it; by which means they obtain'd Favour cheaply at the Expence of Others: And this single Merit atton'd for all their Faults, it excus'd false Steps and Negligence, it shelter'd their Bribery, and cover'd their Disability for the Publick Service.

Besides, they will intangle their Master's Affairs, because a Prince that does not need Money, may come not to need them, whose Talents, in all likelihood, will consist in procuring Taxes, not in well laying out the Sums granted: Therefore a wanting State, a troubled Government, and an indebted Exchequer will be their Region; Large Premiums, exorbitant Interests,

eſt, Diverting Appropriated Fonds, Choice of Fonds on which to place their own Mony, Preferring one Debt and Poſtponing another, will be always good Matter for ill Stateſmen to work upon, but afford much a better Harveſt when the Government ſtands in want of Mony; Immenſe Sums given every Year will be a brave and ample Field for their Avarice to range in, which would be cramp'd and confin'd, if bound within the narrow Limits of what a Nation may be able to pay.

Of all things, they Love a long and an expenſive War, and fear Peace; for Peace produces Order, and gives the Prince leiſure to enquire into the Abuſes of the State; It lets him into a right knowledge of Perſons in the Kingdom, and the Dregs which float upwards when the Liquor is ſtirr'd, muſt ſink to the bottom in quiet times; Peace reſtores Liberty of Speech, whereas in War all is ſilenc'd with the ſingle Word *Neceſſity*; In Peace there is no need to court Factions, Turbulent Spirits are not ſo uſeful, Thrift may be introduc'd, and ſuch ſudden Fortunes cannot be rais'd out of the Publick. Grievances may be calmly debated, the Management of the Revenues inſpected, The Conduct of the Miniſters may be examin'd; And good Laws may be propos'd without the Perpetual Objection of, *Are you for bringing in the* French *and Popery*? But War will better anſwer their Deſigns, who mean to thrive by the looſe Adminiſtration with which War is generally accompany'd, and who propoſe to proſper by the Calamities and Miſery of their Country.

The Buſineſs of *Ireland* at the beginning of the Revolution, is a pregnant Inſtance how much deſigning Men love a long War. That Kingdom might have been preſently Reduc'd, the Nation was diſpirited. He who held the Government was ready to give up the Marks and Enſigns of his Authority

thority, with the Strengths depending on it; They were ſtruck with a Panick Fear, and had readily ſubmitted if in any reaſonable time a ſmall Force had been ſent thither. But one People does rarely yield ſo much to the Fame of another, as to Surrender without being ask'd or ſummon'd. It was deſir'd that a few Troops might be carry'd over to confirm and countenance our Friends, and to give our Enemies a fair Colour for purſuing that Courſe to which they were enough perſwaded by their true Intereſt, tho' they could not modeſtly acquieſce, unleſs ſomething had been done that might ſave Appearances; for a great Army could not with any Decency Disband, without ſo much as hearing of an oppoſite Strength, to which (in the general Fright that poſſeſs'd their Party) they might have yielded with ſome Saving to their Honour. But *Ireland* was for a long time ſlighted, and the Natives were ſuffer'd to gather into a formidable Power. That Diverſion gave our Neighbour Kingdom opportunity to take Breath, and time to recover from the Fright and Amazement which ſo potent a League had brought upon them. The Troops who Periſh'd ſo miſerably at *Dundalk* and elſewhere, would have been a great Addition to the Confederate Force. The Vigor that actuates the Minds of Men in their firſt Proceedings ſhould have been carry'd againſt *France*, and not have been let to conſume it ſelf, and ſlacken within our own Dominions. If by good Conduct the Affairs of *Ireland* had been betimes appeas'd, the Power of theſe three Nations had been united, and we might have enter'd the Liſts with our Strength intire, and a Treaſure unwaſted, which probably would have wrought ſuch Effects, and begot ſuch a Terror as might have produc'd long ago as ſound and honourable a Peace as we enjoy at preſent, after the Expence of ſo much Blood and Mony.

This

This War ſtood *England* in 4,128,672 *l.* 5 *s.* 3 *d.*½ and both Nations in 4,515,693 *l.* 0 *s.* 8 *d.*¼. But if we come to reckon the Burnings, Waſte and Depredation, and the irreparable loſs of Men, *Engliſh* and *Iriſh*, by Sickneſs and in Battel, and the *Iriſh* Damage redounding to us at laſt, it may be ſafely affirm'd that we are the worſe for that War by at leaſt 7 Millions.

However that fatal neglect did divert from the War againſt *France* above 4 Millions, and did engage in Civil Broils thoſe Arms which were ſo needful in the beginning to make a ſtrong Impreſſion upon our Enemies abroad.

But a certain Party of Men were too buſy themſelves at home for to mind the Nations Foreign Concerns. They were dividing the Spoil here; They were hunting after Places, and ſharing among one another the Dignities and Offices of the State, which took up all their time, and employ'd all their Care. Beſides, ſuch an early Coalition and Union of the whole Strength of the three Kingdoms, might have terrified *France* too ſoon, and taken away their Hopes of a ſucceeding War, which is the Crop and Harveſt of deſigning Miniſters, the Field in which they Fatten, and a Spendthrift, to whom they are Stewards without Accompt.

If not minding the Affairs of *Ireland* did hinder the Peace ſo long, then we owe to that fatal Council the Beginning of the Debt, which now preſſes ſo hard upon us; for without the Colour of ſuch a War, thoſe Immenſe Sums could not have been conſum'd, which for theſe laſt five Years have been Levy'd in this Kingdom.

When King *James* went away, we were reduc'd to what Mr. *Hobbes* calls the State of Nature, the Original Contract being diſſolv'd, and the Ligaments broken, which held us before together: The Nation was

was then a Blank, apt to receive any Impreſſion: The old Building was pull'd down, and the Faults in it before might have been Corrected, if the Architects had been skilful, and ſuch Lovers of their Country as they pretended to be. Never men had ſuch an Opportunity of doing Good, as they who had the chiefeſt Hand in making the Revolution. They had a Prince willing to conſent to whatever might ſet us upon a right Foot, if they had met his deſign of Landing here with equal Virtues. The Gentry and People were at that time newly awaken'd from their Lethargy in which they had been for many Years; they ſaw how narrowly Religion and their Liberties had eſcap'd; Their Fears had made 'em Wiſe and Sober; Their Eyes were univerſally open'd; And they were wrought up to a Temper (which ſeldom happens in a whole Nation) of being capable to receive good and honeſt Councils. It was in their Power for ever to have baniſh'd Flattery and Corruption from the Court, and from another Place where thoſe Vices are yet more hurtful; and when they had chang'd Perſons, if they had taken Care at the ſame Inſtant to mend Things, they had wrought a general Reformation in our Manners. It was in their Hands to have given us a Sound Conſtitution; they had before 'em the Errors of preceeding Reigns, by which they might have Corrected their Model: They ſhould have enter'd upon a ſtrict OEconomy, neither Plundering for themſelves, nor ſuffering others to grow Rich at the Publick Coſt. They ſhould have been as Careful in the State, as their Maſter was Active in the Field; they ſhould have begg'd leſs, and done more. They ſhould have avoided Bribery, than which nothing could be more unſeemly in Reformers of a State; and which was certain to keep out the beſt, and let the worſt Men into all their Buſineſs. They ought to have known

known that a new Settlement was to be maintain'd by severer Rules and Methods than perhaps are necessary in a Court where the Prince is born in Purple. And lastly, They should have made this Reflection, That more than ordinary Virtue of all kinds was needful to answer the Peoples Expectations, and that more than common Wisdom was requisite to maintain and justifie so great a Change.

The worst and most unhappy Kings that ever were would have Rul'd better, had it not been for the wrong Suggestion and wicked Incitements of the Flatterers about 'em; but those Pests and Poisons of a Court are yet more to blame, when things succeed not well with Wise and Virtuous Princes.

That Declaration which the King sent to *England* before he came over, was the Pole Star by which our State Pilots were to steer their Course. 'Twas well known that to keep the same Parliament sitting so many Years was what had chiefly debauch'd the Gentry of this Kingdom; it was therefore expected that in the Act for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, some Provision should have been made against that Evil for the future. Several Ministers, who betray'd their King and Country, have gone on to the last with Impunity, by keeping Parliaments quite off; but more have found a Shelter for their Crimes in Houses, which they have held long together, and of which they have had the Handling for many a Sessions. Could Men pretend to be Patriots, and not take Care of securing that Post? Could our Freedoms be any way certainly lost, but by laying aside the use of Parliaments, as was design'd in the Reign of King *Charles* the First, or by keeping them so long sitting, till a Majority of Members should be under Engagements with the Court, as had almost happen'd in the Reign of King *Charles* the Second? Were

we

we not both times upon the very brink of Ruin, and in hazard of being no more a free People? Did it not therefore Import that Party which had heretofore made such high Professions for Liberty, to provide that *England* might be no more threatned with the same Danger? Should not this have been a main Article in our Contract with their Majesties upon their Accession to the Throne, who readily consented to all things that might make us safe and happy, The King having promis'd in his Declaration, *To do all things which the Two Houses of Parliament should find necessary for the Peace, Honour and Safety of the Nation, so that there may be no more danger of the Nations falling at any time hereafter under Arbitrary Government.*

'Twas certainly a great Omission not to bring on in the very beginning of the Revolution, the Act for Triennial Parliaments, which our own Corruptions produc'd at last: If the State had enter'd early into that wholesom Council, it had made the King's entire Reign more easy to himself, and less costly to his People. It had given a Rise to that Virtue and Publick Honesty he came over to Plant, and had answer'd all the ends of his Declaration. They who were not well principled, must have pretended so to be, for the Paths and Road to Preferment had been thereby quite alter'd: The Ingredients which before Compos'd a Statesman, were Skill to govern the House; Ability now and then to make an Important Turn; Knowledge of the Members, that is, who were to be taken off, and what was their Price; Diligence in keeping that Band together who were right or wrong to be unanimous. They who were thus qualify'd themselves, or who would blindly follow the Professors of these pernicious Arts, engross'd the whole Business and Employments of the Nation. But by neglecting to put Matters under a good Settlement in the beginning

ning, one and the ſame Houſe of Commons came to continue ſitting with ſhort Intervals for Six Years, and this wrong Meaſure being taken, renew'd all the former Errors of our Conſtitution, and for a time reſtor'd to Men the ſame diſhoneſt Intereſt they had before; and if any were ſo Wicked, gave them freſh opportunity and room to endeavour once more the Subverſion and Ruin of this Kingdom; not by the very ways practiſed in former times, but by the ſame corrupt Inclinations and Councils dreſs'd in other Shapes; And tho', without doubt, none of 'em are choſen into this Parliament, yet 'tis to be fear'd, that in thoſe Seſſions of Six Years continuance, there was rear'd up a new brood of Men of Buſineſs, as high Flatterers, more falſe, deſigning, and rapacious than their Predeceſſors; but without the ſame Skill and Dexterity to ſupport their Malice.

However 'tis hop'd the Act of Triennial Parliaments may have given a Check to this Ulcer, which was growing in the Body Politick, and that it may hinder the Gangreen from proceeding further; yet tho' the old Venome may be reſtrain'd a while by Remedies, 'tis to be fear'd it lurks ſtill within us, ready to break out upon the firſt Occaſion.

If that party which once ſeem'd ſo Jealous of our Rights had not abandond all their old Principles, they might have form'd us a laſting Eſtabliſhment, ſuch as could not have been ſhaken by Domeſtick Rage or Foreign Power; whereas now we depend alone upon the Reputation, Merit and Virtues of the King, that bind and hold us together; but when he muſt yield to Nature (which Misfortune we hope is very diſtant from us) in all Humane Probability, nothing can be expected but Confuſion and Civil War.

When

When the Breaches made upon our Constitution in the late Reigns, had induc'd many of the best Sort to judge a Revolution needful, the People had reason to expect that in a new Modell'd Government, all things should have been set upon the Foot of Honesty and Virtue, and to see all that Male-Administration reform'd, which some Persons had been reasonably complaining of for 30 Years. We thought to see a Virtuous Court, a watchful State, an industrious and frugal Ministry. If all these our Expectations had been answer'd, what Disasters from without or within could have hurt *England*? Must not the Change have been tacitly consented to, (if not applauded) even by those that suffer'd in it? Had we not at Home a Discontented Party, which was to be silenc'd by shewing 'em an Honester, more steady, more disinterested, and a Wiser Conduct than what they had known before, and still linger'd after? Had we not abroad a Potent Enemy against whom our Strength was to be Husbanded discreetly, that it might last the longer? And lastly, Was not the best and most irreproachable Managment in the World necessary and hardly sufficient, to enable us to carry on that War, with which so great an Alteration was certain to be follow'd?

But instead of Building upon these Foundations, and taking such Measures as had render'd our Proceedings safe in their Consequences, and not obnoxious to any Censure, some Persons have given manifest Proof that they were Acted by no sort of Principle, and that in their doings they were rather sway'd by Private Interest, Revenge, Ambition, and their other Appetites; than guided by any sense of the Publick good; for we no sooner had upon the Throne a Prince fear'd and reverenc'd abroad, and Idoliz'd here, but some Persons immediately forgot the Cause for which they call'd him over.

If we had ſhewn any Deſire to aſſiſt and imitate his Perfections, what a fair Fame of our ſelves had we tranſmitted to after Ages?

If ſome Men had conſider'd wiſely they would have found, that all things were not ſecure, becauſe Religion was out of danger, whoſe Concerns are ſoon forgotten when we begin to be preſs'd with other Fears: Beſides, if Matters are not ſo orderd, that *Spain* may not fall under the Power of *France*, Popery, and univerſal Monarchy are ſtill to be apprehended.

Proſperity, a flowing Trade, and great Riches, may admit of Prodigality, Negligence in the State, and falſe ſteps in the Miniſtry, but a People exhauſted by long Taxes deſire to ſee in thoſe above 'em Thrift for the Publick, Vigilance, and as much good Conduct as can be expected in humane Buſineſs. Power is ſeldom Invidious to the Common People when plac'd in virtuous Hands, nor are Calamities intolerable, which could not have been avoided by any Care or Caution. When the Miniſters do well, thoſe under 'em ſuffer quietly; but on the Contrary, If they obſerve themſelves rul'd in the Subordinate parts of Government, by ſuch as make a prey of the common-wealth, and to that end only take upon 'em its Adminiſtration, if they plainly perceive their miſeries and Misfortunes to proceed chiefly from the Corrupt or weak Councils of ſuch Stateſmen, they become diſhearten'd and loſe that Mettle and Spirit, without which the high deſigns of their powerful Neighbours are not to be reſiſted.

But tho ſome Errors might be committed in the beginning of the Revolution, 'tis hoped all things are now well; that Peace has put an End to thoſe Diſorders in Government which War does commonly beget, and that our preſent Management is not lyable to any Cenſure. And what is ſaid here,

and

and what may be obſerv'd hereafter of the like kind in the Series of this Diſcourſe, is not at all the preſent caſe of *England*; 'tis hoped we are not a Corrupt People, but in Proceſs of time we may grow ſo, and loſe that Virtue which is preſumed to ſhine in this Age. This Section is therefore directed to Poſterity, which alone is concern'd in the Ethicks here advanced.

In future Ages perhaps Ambitious and Deſigning Men may deſire to embroyl their Maſters affairs only, to make him more Dependant upon their Arts; hereafter Men of Arbitrary Principles may deſignedly neglect the Concerns and Care of Foreign Traffick, with a purpoſe to Impoveriſh, and ſo to enſlave the People: In the next Age likewiſe deſigning Miniſters may take Advantage of the Martial Temper of a Prince, and inſtead of Reigning in his High Courage with grave Councils, they may diſguiſe from him the true State of his Affairs, and puſh him on to a new War, without making right Proviſions, or without ſuch previous Leagues as may make it tollerable in the Progreſs, or happy in the Concluſion; and perhaps they may deſire the Semblance of a War, only to have a pretence for a Standing Army.

For the Benefit therefore of future times, it may be proper to ſhew by what ſteps thoſe Vices and Immoralities that affect the Publick firſt creep into a Country, and what Progreſs they come afterwards to make, and to ſhew what ſort of Men and what kind of Councils intangle a Princes Affairs.

But tho' this Paper be directed to Poſterity, and tho' 'tis nothing but a Caution to future times, yet probably it may offend ſome perſons who are tender in theſe Matters.

However we ſhall venture to aſſirm that if this Nation ſhould ever be under any great Diſorder, the trueſt Courſe to mend it, will be to plant in

the Minds of the better ſort Morality, and the Shame of doing ill to their Country, And we ſhall preſume to aſſert that obſerving the Rules and Dictates of Virtue, does not only lead to Heaven and a bleſſed State hereafter, but is the beſt way of ſecuring to a People in general, Proſperity, Peace, Safety, Power, and Happineſs in this preſent World.

To trace thoſe Men who may deſign to Change this Conſtitution in all their dark and crooked Ways, and to follow 'em in all their Mazes will be difficult; however we ſhall do our beſt to deſcribe the Perſons, and to ſhew their Councils, that they may be narrowly watch'd by all ſuch as Love their Country.

But to do this we muſt take a ſhort View of things paſt, and a little conſider the poſture of Affairs at the Reſtoration of King *Charles* the IId. and how they ſtood during his Reign and the Reign of his Succeſſor.

When that Prince was recall'd from Exile, by the Voice of the whole People (who had been tired with the many Changes in Government, that happened from *Cromwell*'s Death to the Year 1660) 'twas almoſt impoſſible, but that we ſhould run from one to the other Extream; And 'twas reaſonable to fear that Men ſhould readily embrace Servitude, who knew not how to make a right uſe of Liberty. Upon which Accompt many have wonder'd why our Ancient Form of Government was not at that time alter'd, and how it came to paſs we did not then embrace Abſolute Monarchy.

But we are to conſider that King *Charles* was a young Prince, more inclined to taſte the Pleaſures of Power, than willing to feel its Weight; He had undergone many Troubles, which he intended to recompence with great Eaſe and Luxury; ſo that the

the rugged Work of Subverting the Laws suited neither with his Age nor Temper. Had he lived longer, as Time and Opposition began to sower his Blood, what he might have attempted is very doubtful.

Besides the unactive Genius of the King, there happen'd then another Circumstance very fortunate for *England*, which was, that the Services and Merit of the Chancellor *Clarendon*, and the Treasurer *Southampton*, did strongly induce him to put the Administration of his Affairs into their Hands. They were both Persons of Age and Experience, They had konwn the Former Reign, They had seen the Grounds and Rise of the Civil War, They understood the Nature of our Constitution, They saw what had Depos'd one King, and found that unlimited Power was hard to compass, and difficult to keep; And having their Masters Ear, and at first a large share in his Affection, They kept him within Bounds. The Skill in the Laws of One, the Eloquence of the Other, the General Abilities of both, made 'em esteem'd by the People, and awful to their very Prince, and this gave a weight to all their Councils. They had Authority enough in their Persons to be listen'd to, when they spoke bold and necessary Truths: Having Superior Knowledge and Desert too, to be heard, they did not stand in need of saying always what was pleasing, which is the miserable and servile Condition of Upstart, Weak and Obscure Statesmen; but less were they Oblig'd to Flatter every Flatterer. Having a Foundation of Merit, they scorn'd the mean Aid of Parties, or to be the wretched Journey-men of any dark Cabal: Knowing what was their Masters and the Nations Interest, and intending to promote both; They gave wholesom advice, without Fear of offending either Prince or People. That Kingly Government was then kept within the Limits of the Law, That our Constitution was not given up

between the Fears of One, and the Hopes of the Other Party; and that our Civil Rights were ſtill preſerv'd, was chiefly owing to the Wiſdom, Courage, and Integrity of thoſe two able Stateſmen.

But even then, and all along afterwards, there were ſtill ſome among us impatient to make their Maſter Abſolute; they conſiſted principally of ſuch as had large Ambition, and Slender Merit, who are the beſt Inſtruments for any Tyranny. Theſe were ever embroiling the King with his Parliament, either to protect them, or to juſtifie ſome of their illegal Actions. Sometimes they got him to appear a violent Churchman, and at other ſeaſons to favour the Diſſenters, but at no time to take Care of Religion it ſelf. They perſwaded Him to extend the Regal Power in every thing; They got him to ſeize all the Charters, in order to influence Elections. By their Councils He rais'd an Army, under Colour of declaring War with *France*; By their Inſtruments They made him abſolute in *Scotland*, at the ſame time doing what they could to weaken the Proteſtant Intereſt in *Ireland*: But their chief Aim was to procure Him ſo large a ſtanding Revenue, as might make Parliaments uſeleſs for the future. 'Tis true, they propos'd this Revenue for his Life only; but if that firſt ſtep had been made, it had not been difficult afterwards to entail it on the Crown: Beſides, what has been granted to one Prince, has been always continu'd to his Succeſſor without any Struggle.

That theſe Things were done with a Deſign to change the Conſtitution, is viſible enough: And 'tis as evident that theſe Councils were either promoted by Perſons, who wanted the Sublime Part of Wiſdom, neceſſary for the Conduct of Great Affairs, and therefore were to form a Government that might ſubſiſt by Tricks and Arts, or they were forg'd

forg'd by a ſet of Men, whoſe Avarice and Ambition no Regular Eſtabliſhment could ſatisfie, whoſe Crimes a Free State would look into, and whoſe Arbitrary Proceedings a Parliament would not ſuffer: They were therefore to build their Fortunes, Gratifie their High Deſires, and find Impunity, by ſetting up the Regal Power above the Laws.

In the next Reign, yet more open Invaſions were made upon our Liberties, not by the ſame Men, but by Men acting upon the ſame Principles. But they proceeded more cuningly before than afterwards: For in the former Reign 'twas thought beſt to begin with altering the Conſtitution, and that when this was done, Religion might be chang'd of courſe: But the hot Zeal of the Catholicks would not permit 'em to go by Slow and Regular Meaſures; They therefore made a ſtrange and unpolitick Attempt, never like to ſucceed, which was firſt to Convert, and then to Inſlave the Nation.

While theſe Matters were tranſacting, there appeared all along Perſons, both in and out of the Court, who did moſt Virtuouſly oppoſe thoſe Deſigns, that, firſt ſecretly, and then openly, were forming againſt their Country.

As ſome were contriving to Subvert our Civil Rights, others did as carefully watch their Preſervation, which Invading and Defending, divided *England* into what was then call'd the Court and Country Party.

Never was Liberty more cunningly attacked, nor more Nobly Protected, than in that Houſe of Commons which ſat Eighteen Years. It contained bold bad Men, with Hearts and Heads fit to contrive the Subverſion of a State. But there were in it alſo Perſons of another Character, very Great indeed, with quite Superior Judgments, and with Minds ſo rightly adapted for Government, that the

Weight of the whole Empire might be ſafely repos'd upon their Shoulders; in whom Converſation withe the dead Wiſdom of paſt Ages, was join'd with Experience, and a perfect Knowledge of this preſent World. Theſe brave Spirits from the Beginning reſiſted that Inundation of Flattery and ſervile Compliance, with which great Revolutions in Corrupt times are certain to be attended. They Vigorouſly oppoſed that Unanimous Band, which diligently promoted Arbitrary Power. Sometimes they ſav'd us when we were within three or four Votes of utter Ruin; They hindered that Increaſe of the King's Revenue, which alone would have put an end to Parliaments. Theſe were the Prime Leaders of ſuch whom the People for ſome Years were pleas'd to Term the Country Party; and by good Patriots, ſo call'd, our Conſtitution was for a while preſerv'd.

But after the Year 1679. on both ſides the Minds of Men grew ſo inflam'd, and ſuch Animoſities did ariſe between 'em, that they could no longer call one another by the Civil Appellation of Court and Country Party, ſo that the different ſides began to be diſtinguiſh'd by other ſorts of Names.

'Tis indeed below the Gravity of a Sober Writer to uſe the Common Cant words of the Town, but 'tis ſometimes unavoidable, eſpecially when that which was only Mirth and Cant at firſt, became at laſt a ſerious Matter.

The Accidental words of *Guelf* and *Ghibelin*, in Proceſs of time grew to be the Names of Powerful Parties, into which ſeveral Countries were divided, and in which Emperors, Kings, Popes and Princes engag'd, and theſe Names of diſtinction continued for ſome Ages, producing Wars and Actions of great Importance.

In the ſame manner the words of *Whig* and *Tory*, intended at firſt as reciprocal Reproaches, in a ſhort time

time grew to be the Names by which two great Parties were contented to be call'd, and into which in a manner the whole Nation was divided.

They were termed *Whigs*, and indeed they called themſelves ſo, who under another Name, had heretofore oppoſed the Corrupt and Illegal Proceedings of the Court, who foreſaw the Dangers that would ariſe from a Catholick King, who were for correcting the Exorbitances of *Weſtminſter-Hall*, and for putting a ſtop to extravagant Fines, and who made a reſolute ſtand, and would give no more Mony, till the *Habeas Corpus* Act was paſſed, and till the new rais'd Army was disbanded; and who did their utmoſt againſt the Surrender and Regulating of Charters.

In the next Reign the ſame Men, or Men acting upon the ſame Principle, declar'd themſelves againſt taking off the Teſt and Penal Laws. They ſhew'd an open Diſlike in Parliament of Catholicks being put into Offices of Truſt. They abhorr'd the Cruel Executions in the Weſt. They oppos'd the Violent Proſecution of the Seven Biſhops. And laſtly, They were ready and active with their Councils and Aſſiſtance to bring over the Redeemer of *England*.

A Man is but young at Nineteen, but a Party may be thought old that is of ſo long a ſtanding. The Perſons juſt now deſcrib'd were the *Old Whigs*, whoſe Principles will be reverenc'd in future Ages by all ſuch as love their Country. 'Tis true, ſome Perſons did joyn with theſe, and call themſelves *Whigs*, who had all along other Views than the Nations Service, whom Diſappointments had ſowr'd, who oppos'd to be taken off, and who did not like a Court, becauſe a Court did not like them. But they who ſwim againſt the Tide, muſt make uſe of all Helps, and in Corrupt Times, even the beſt Patriots have refus'd no ſort of Men that could any

any ways assist the Publick: The Good and Bad of these altogether were call'd the *Whig Party*.

To what had been formerly stil'd, the Court Side, the People afterwards gave the Name of *Tories*. And we shall give an Account of what sort of Persons this Party was compos'd. The Bulk of 'em consisted of such as were descended from the *Cavaliers*, whose Families had suffer'd very much by the Civil War, and who by Education wear season'd with an early Love to Kingly Government. They were Jealous that all Motions tending to preserve Liberty, savourd of the Common-wealth, with whose Weight their Fathers had been Crush'd. A most unwise Generation of Men, to have any Fears that a Common-wealth could be restor'd in a Country so corrupted! Many of them were much of that Principle of which *Tacitus* describes *Marcellus Eprius* to have been, who said in the Senate, *Se meminisse Temporum quibus natus sit, quam Civitati formam Patres Aviq; instituerint: ulteriora mirari, præsentia sequi, bonos Imperatores voto expetere, qualescunq; tolerare.* Many of 'em were debauch'd by Pomp and Splendour, and in the Heat of their Youth, they lik'd the Pleasures of a Court, but the Riots of it compell'd many of 'em, at last, to depend upon its Favours. Others embrac'd the Regal Power more warmly, because they saw many of the Opposite Side bitter against the Church, not so desirous to Correct any of its Errors, as willing to lay the Ax to its very Root. Others link'd themselves with this Band out of a cautious Temper, and through a Fear that contending with the Court might produce another War. Some came into this side out of Gratitude to King *Charles*, and many through meer Affection to his Person; for without doubt He was a most engaging Prince. Others went into it from a real Conviction of their Minds, that the King was not safe without more Power, to which

which Opinion they were chiefly led, by observing the rash Councils, unquiet Spirits, and insolent Behaviour of some of their Opponents. But with those who might Act of this Side upon a Principle, there join'd a great many who had no good Intentions to the Publick, who were for enlarging the Prince's Power, in order to Augment their own, who were for Robbing the People, that they might share in the Plunder, who would have set the King above all the Laws, that they might be never accountable to a Parliament for their Proceedings; and, who pretending a great Zeal for the Church, were all the while making way for Popery; thus upon different Motives, considerable Numbers were listed on this Side, and the good and the Bad mingled together, compos'd what was call'd the *Tory Party*.

But Humane Affairs are subject to such odd Turns, that in the next Reign many of both these Parties travers'd their Ground, and mutually pass'd into that Camp which some of their Enemies had deserted. Not a few of the Whigs enter'd into the worst of King *James*'s Measures and Councils; and the Eyes of those who had been reckon'd Tories, were in a manner universally open'd, and they began to see the Errors they had been committing so many Years, insomuch that they were as eager as any Others to promote the Revolution: So that the soundest part of these clashing Factions shook Hands together, and join'd in that Rescue of our Liberties which could never have been brought about, but by the concurrent Endeavour of both Parties.

Both sides had their Faults, and of both sides bad Men were listed, and of each side there were many who all along acted upon the Principles of Honesty and Virtue, and who aim'd at the common Good, tho as to the Way to it, in their turns, each side might be now and then mistaken: It must indeed be granted, that the Whigs saw the Diseases that were

were growing upon the Body-Politick, before the Tories; but when the Diſtemper began to rage, the Tories were not behind-hand in ſeeking out the proper Remedy.

But tho ſuch as the common People then call'd Tories, join'd in the Revolution, and had without doubt the greateſt Hand in it, having on their ſide Men of Fortunes, Power, and Figure, and the main Body of the Church, which will always be found the ſtrongeſt Intereſt in *England*, yet it muſt be confeſs'd that the Change was made upon the old Whig Principles, of making Parliaments awful to the Miniſters, and of keeping the Regal Authority within the Limits of the Law; for what this Nation then did, was directly oppoſite to the Church or Tory Maxims; but when Princes quit the old Rules of right Government, their Subjects will be apt to forget the old Rules preſcrib'd for their Obedience.

'Tis hop'd theſe Names of Diſtinction are now quite aboliſh'd and forgotten; But the Faction of *Guelfs* and *Ghibelins*, after having ſlept for ſome time, reviv'd again, and continu'd upwards of two hundred years, even when the Derivation of the Words was no more remember'd; And the Parties laſted ſo long, becauſe the ſame Principles upon which they had firſt differ'd, remain'd ſtill deeply imprinted in their Minds, and afforded continual Matter for new Diſſention.

In the ſame Manner perhaps ſome time hence the Names of Whig and Tory may be again renew'd here, to diſturb this Nations peace; and if this ſhould happen, we muſt implore the Whigs not to forget their old Principles and antient Maxims.

The Tories, by taking Arms to defend their Civil Rights, and by joining to Depoſe that Prince by whom thoſe Rights were violated, have in the moſt Public Manner in the World renounced their

Doctrine

Doctrine of *Jus Divinum*, Paſſive Obedience, and Non-Reſiſtance.

But if the Whigs ſhould hereafter take their Stations if they ſhould go upon that Ground which the Tories have quitted, if they ſhould enter upon juſt ſuch Meaſures, if they ſhould purſue the ſame Councils, if they ſhould ſuffer themſelves to be imbib'd with Tory Notions, our Conſtitution muſt be intirely loſt.

For they may undermine it without Suſpition: Who will be Jealous of thoſe who have been Preaching up Liberty and accuſing Arbittary Minſters for thirty Years? who will ſuſpect ſuch profeſt Patriots? They may change the Form of our Government, and have the People of their ſide, who can have no Jealouſy of them, for the Whigs are the Favourites of the People, as having ſo often preſerv'd *England*. No Perſon could be Popular enough in *Rome* to think of Subverting its Conſtitution, in the Purity of the Commonwealth, but *Manlius* who had ſav'd the Capitol.

It will hardly be ſurmis'd, that they can mean to inſlave us, who (by their Speeches, Actions and Writings) for many Years ſeemed rather inclin'd to a Republick, than to Deſpotick Government. But if they ſhould come to change their Minds, if They ſhould throw off their former Principles, we ſhall be undone by the very Men whom we thought our ſureſt Friends.

If old Whigs ſhould hunt after Places as much as ever the Tories did, and if like them, upon Preferment, they ſhould become quite new Men, in Voting, Thinking, and Speaking, in a Moment making a ſudden Turn from the whole Courſe of their former Lives; If old Whigs as the Tories did, ſhould ever take Bribes and Penſions to betray their Truſt; If they ſhould do any thing to break into the *Habeas Corpus* Act, which is the Chief Guar-

Guardian of our Liberties; If they ſhould oppoſe any good Act for the frequent ſitting of Parliaments, which want in the Conſtitution produc'd all our former Miſeries; If they ſhould openly oppoſe any reaſonable Proviſion for Tryals in Treaſon, the want of which has loſt many a Noble Life, and for which heretofore they had ſo loudly called; If, as the Tories did, they ſhould ſend their Emiſſaries about to influence or corrupt Elections; If old Whigs to whom *Meum* and *Tuum* was once ſo ſacred, ſhould come to ruin a Society of Trading Men, and at one blow deſtroy many hundred Families, but God forbid *Engliſh*-men ſhould ever have ſuch a Thought; If old Whigs ſhall perſwade any Future Prince to Cloſet Members, as was done in the preceeding Reigns; If by their Power they ſhould get Men turn'd out of Employment, for purſuing the Dictates of their Conſcience, and Underſtanding; If like the Miniſters heretofore complain'd of, They ſhould have a Band of Penſioners ready to give up any Right, to grant any Summ, and to excuſe, nay, even to vote thair Pay-maſter Thanks for any Male Adminiſtration.

If the Old Whigs ſhould reſtore to Men the ſame diſhoneſt Intereſt they had heretofore; If they ſhould conſume us in their Miniſterial, and ſell us in their Legiſlative Capacity; If they ſhould deſire to have things governed rather by Tricks and little Arts, than according to the Direction of the Laws, or the Bent of the People; If they, who upon the Virtuous Principle of keeping *England* a free Country, in former times, oppos'd all Exciſes, ſhould be brought to create ſo many new Offices and Officers, as may influence Elections round the Kingdom; If they, who heretofore thought the beſt way to preſerve their Civil Rights, was to keep the Purſe, and to have always

ways something to give, should be for settling such an immense Revenue on the Crown, as may make Parliaments unnecessary; If they who were so careful in King *Charles*'s Reign, not to burthen the Nation with Taxes, should give away the Peoples Wealth, as if *England* were a Mine of Treasure never to be exhausted; If they who have ever asserted, that all Rents and Payments to the Crown were the Kingdoms Revenues, and not Alienable, but by Authority of Parliament, should in a short space of Time come to Alienate all the Crown Land, and to leave the King hardly a Turf of Ground either in *England* or *Ireland*; If they who formerly thought it sufficient Matter of Impeachment for a Lord Treasurer, or any Other intrusted by the King, to pass large Grants from the Crown to Themselves, should give to their Creatures, and share among one another, in a few Years, of Crown Lands, near to the Value of two Millions.

If the very Men who have * *Asserted and Claim'd it to be their true, antient and indubitable Right, and that it ought to be esteem'd, allow'd, adjudg'd and deemed That the Raising or keeping a Standing Army within the Kingdom in time of Peace, unless it be with the Consent of Parliament, is against Law*; If they who once believ'd this Eagle in the Air frighted all Motions towards Liberty; If they who heretofore thought Armies in time of Peace and our Freedoms inconsistent; If the same Men should throw off a Whig Principle so fudamental; If they should become the open Advocates for standing Forces, and even submit to Troops compos'd of Foreigners.

* Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, *pa.* 197. *p.* 192.

If in this manner the Old Whigs, wose Foresight and Courage has hitherto preserv'd *England*, should quite change their Minds, and go thus retrograde from all their former Speches, Actions, and Councils;

If

If they ſhould thus come to cloath themſelves with the Foul, Ridiculous and Deteſted Garments of the Tories, and give into the worſt of their Meaſures; And if all that has been here diſcours'd ſhould happen, then would the Conſtitution of this Country be utterly ſubverted.

For Men finding themſelves thus forſaken by the Antient Friends to Liberty, would believe they were bought and ſold; They would imagine that there was no ſuch thing as Virtue and Honeſty remaining in the Kingdom; They would think all Pretenſions to the Publick Good, to be nothing but Deſigns of Ambitious Perſons, to lift themſelves up to high Honours, upon the Shoulders of the People; And when Nations have before their Eyes an Arm'd Power to Fear, and none in whom they can put any Truſt, they ſeldom fail of ſubmitting to the Yoak.

Free States yield to Slavery when the Men beſt eſteem'd, and moſt in Vogue, are generally thought to be corrupted. This was the Condition of *Rome* under *Auguſtus*, as *Tacitus* finely deſcribes it, *Ubi Militem donis, Populum Annona, Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; inſurgere paulatim, Munia Senatus Magiſtratuum, legum in ſe trahere, nullo adverſante: cum ferociſſimi per acies aut proſcriptione cecidiſſent. Cæteri Nobilium, quanto quis ſervitio promptior, opibus ac Honoribus extollerentur: ac novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & præſentia, quam vetera ac periculoſa mallent, neque Provinciæ illum Statum rerum abnuebant, ſuſpecto Senatus populique imperio, ob certamina potentium, & avaritiam Magiſtratuum: invalido legum auxilio quæ vi, ambitu, poſtremo Pecunia turbabantur.* When the beſt and nobleſt Spirits were all extinct, and when 'twas ſeen that the Remainder were contented with Wealth, Titles and Preferments, the Price of their Submiſſion, the *Romans* thought it their ſafeſt Courſe

Lib. 1. Ann.

Courſe to commit all to the Care and Wiſdom of a Single Perſon.

In the ſame manner, If in times to come it ſhould happen that our Nobility and Gentry ſhould be more ſollicitous to get a ſmall Employment, than to keep a great Eſtate; If the Perſons of Note and Figure ſhou'd be ſway'd by their private Intereſt with out any Regard to the Public Good; If it ſhould be viſible to the Counties and Burroughs, that Men covet to be choſen, not for their Country's Service, but in order to ſerve themſelves; If it ſhould grow apparent, that neither Side is at bottom better principled than the Other; that Court and Country Party, Whigs and Church-men, are nothing but the Factions of Thoſe who Have, and Thoſe who deſire Preferment; If in this manner the whole Maſs of Blood in the Body Politick ſhould be corrupted, the Nation will throw off that Reverence to Parliaments, which has hitherto preſerv'd our Liberties, and like the Neighbouring Countries either terrify'd or allur'd, they will by degrees ſubmit to unlimited Monarchy; And ſo we ſhall loſe one of the beſt Conſtitutions that was ever ſet afoot for the well Governing a People.

Handling as we do the Methods whereby a Nation may Increaſe in Wealth and Power, we thought it neceſſary to deſcribe thoſe Parties and Factions which probably hereafter may come to influence in its Councils; And this has been done in order to incite Good Men to watch over their Growth and Progreſs, and ſuch Good Men chiefly as deſign to engage on neither Side, but to bend all their Care that no Side may be able to hurt the Commonwealth.

And if it ſhould be ask'd, Why the Care of Liberty and preſerving our Civil Rights ſhould be ſo much recommended in a Paper relating to Trade? We anſwer, that herein we follow * *Machia-*

* *Machiavel's Diſcourſes on Livy, lib. 2. c. 2.*

chiavel, who says, *That when a Free State degenerates into a Tyranny, the least Mischief that it can expect, is to make no farther Advancement in its Empire; and no farther Increase either in Riches or Power, but for the most part it goes backward and declines.*

Lib. 1. *c.* 10. This deep Statesman has a saying in another Place, well worthy of Eternal Remembrance, *That the Prince who aims at Glory and Reputation in the World, should desire a Government, where the Manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like* Cæsar, *but to rectifie and restore it like* Romulus, *than which the Heavens cannot confer, nor Man propose to himself a greater Honour.*

It may be objected, that in *France*, where all thoughts of Liberty are extinguish'd, Trade and Riches have of late Years very much increas'd. But this admits of an easy Answer. An absolute Prince, with great Abilities and Virtues, by Care and Wisdom may make his Country flourish for a time. However, if his Successors are weak or wicked, all shall be soon unravell'd and go backward, and Poverty shall soon invade the same People which before began to thrive; for to make a Nation very Rich and Powerful, there must be a long Succession of good Princes (which seldom happens) or a long Succession of good Laws and good Government, which may be always had in Countreys that preserve their Freedom: And without doubt 'tis on this Accompt that *Machiavel* has asserted, *That no Cities have augmented their Revenues or enlarged their Territories, but whilst they were free and at Liberty.*

Lib. 2. *c.* 2.

Tacit. lib. 2. *Ann.* And if in future times the Nobility and Gentry of *England* (which God forbid) should traffick the Peoples Rights for Titles, Bribes or Places, *vilia Servitii pretia*, and if they should be induc'd fearfully, or which is worse, corruptly to give up this Constitution, Poverty will creep insensibly upon

upon us. We shall, as *Machiavel* says, *go backwards and decline*; Land will yield a great deal less than now, Rents will be ill paid, And we shall not have a Foreign Traffick, large and extended enough to produce such a Naval strength as may make us Safe at home and Terrible abroad.

'Tis therefore upon the Authority of this great Man that we have laid down, *That a Country cannot Increase in Wealth and Power but by Private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a Steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration.*

However, if Things should hereafter proceed amiss, 'Tis hop'd the strong Constitution of this Government will in time throw off those Diseases which may affect it for a Season, and that the united Wisdom of the Nation can recover us from that Decay of Health to which we may be reduc'd by a few Empiricks of State: Their Giddy Management for a while may be supported and born out, by the great Riches, which peradventure may have been collected here by the Industry and Prudence of former Ages; but if what has been gathering seven Centuries, they should squander away in a few Years, the Cries of that People whom they so impoverish, will at last awaken the Parliament to enquire into, and animadvert upon their Wild Proceedings.

If the Wealth and Power of a Country depend upon the Good Government and Stability of its Affairs, it must certainly import all the different Ranks of Men to contribute their utmost that Things may be well administred: And in mix'd Constitutions almost every Man is able in some Degree to help towards this; for if the People are honest and careful in the Choice of their Representatives, and if those Representatives perform their Duty, Arbitrary Power can never

be ſettled here, and no Male Adminiſtration that may hereafter happen can long continue.

That we are in no Danger at preſent, and that Matters proceed well, now is allow'd; but for the ſecurity of future times it may not be amiſs frequently to repeat this Caution, that our Whole depends upon keeping one Poſt well defended.

The Publick Virtue which muſt preſerve a State is *A Conſtant and perpetual Will to do our Country Good*; And where this Principle governs, tho in the Minds of but a Few, yet if they perſevere with undaunted Courage, the ſmall Number may prevail at laſt to defeat the Malice of the Corrupt Part, eſpecially when the Endeavours of the Few are aſſiſted by a Prince diſpos'd by Intereſt and Inclination to promote the Common Welfare.

If Good Men were but as Active and Vigilant as their Oppoſites, 'twould not be ſo eaſie a Matter to change the Conſtitution of a Country: When thoſe who are concern'd in Honour and Intereſt to have things well adminiſtred, do reſolutely and firmly joyn together to oppoſe ſuch as find their Profit by a Corrupt and looſe Adminiſtration, a Stand may at leaſt be made, and ſome Stop put to the further Progreſs of the Evil.

But tho *Pompey*, *Cæſar* and *Craſſus* compos'd a fatal Triumvirate, and united in a ſtrict League to Subvert the Liberties of *Rome*, we do not read that there was the ſame Union and good Underſtanding between *Lucullus*, *Cato*, *Cicero*, and the reſt, who endeavour'd to ſave the Commonwealth; for the Luxury and Lazyneſs of ſome, the froward Temper, or Secret Ambition of Others, made 'em either neglect or obſtruct the Buſineſs of the Publick, which might be the Reaſon that *Cæſar* at laſt prevail'd.

In the ſame manner, if hereafter a Cabal of Men, in order to their own Greatneſs, ſhould deſign

sign To change this Constitution, To introduce a Government by the Sword, and To give away all the Nations Wealth; And if to these Ends they should form Assemblies, and there propose what they intend to consent to in another Place, They will succeed, and their Attempts can never be withstood, unless such as mean *England* well, joyn in as firm a League for its Preservation, as They shall enter into for its Destruction.

If therefore in future times, it shall be visible that some Men, to build their own Fortunes, are Pushing at their Countries Ruin, good Patriots must then exert all their Virtue, they must re-assume the Courage of their Ancestors, they must lay aside their Pleasures, but chiefly, they must Sacrifice to the Publick all their antient Animosities; They must mutually forgive one another, It must be no more remembred of what Party the Man was, it being sufficient to enquire, whether or no he always acted upon the Principles of Honesty and Honour. At such a time the best Men of both Sides, if the Name of Parties shall still remain, must shake hands together, with a Resolution to withstand the unanimous, subtle, and diligent Enemies of the King and Kingdom.

In such a Juncture both sides must contend, not which shall flatter highest, but which shall best contribute to the defence of their Princes Person, and to the maintenance of the established Government.

If bad shall Men have Meetings to consult how they may destroy our Civil Rights, Good Patriots ought to meet calmly to Communicate Councils which way those Rights are to be preserv'd; for *Machiavel* says, *There is not a better or more secure Way to Suppress the Insolence, or Cross-bite the Designs of an Ambitious Citizen, than to take the same way to prevent, which he takes to advance them.* Discourses on *Livy* C. 52.

In ſuch a Juncture not, only the beſt of all Parties muſt be taken in, but we muſt be angry with no ſort of Men that are willing to unite againſt the Enemies of *England*; for in a Nation which for a long time was, as all allow, upon a diſhoneſt Intereſt, 'twill be difficult to find Perſons whoſe Characters ſhall be intirely without a Blemiſh; Nor indeed was there ever any Man perfect: At ſuch a Seaſon therefore, Men muſt place their Hopes in ſuch as have moſt Abilities, and feweſt Faults, eſpecially when they live in the Dregs of *Romulus*, and not in the Republick of *Plato*'s Inſtitution.

If the Nobility and Gentry retain their wonted Courage, and preſerve their former Wiſdom, They will always reſcue us out of weak and polluted Hands, and will never endure that ſo Noble a Prince as we have now upon the Throne, eſteem'd by the whole World, and Head of the Proteſtant Intereſt, ſhould at any time be diſtreſs'd at home, or interrupted abroad, in the Meaſures His high Valour purpoſes for the Good of *Europe*, by the ill Conduct of any Miniſter.

Particular Men do often miſcarry in the World; notwithſtanding that in their whole Tranſactions they give continu'd Proofs of a moſt perfect Conduct: They ſhall not be the Richer for their Thrift, nor better eſteem'd for their Integrity: Their Induſtry ſhall avail 'em nothing: Their Courage ſhall never bring 'em Victory, and their wiſeſt Councils ſhall have no Succeſs. Others in the mean time every Way deficient, of no Deſert, and meerly by the help of Fortune, ſhall ſucceed in all they undertake. But tho ſhe may be ſaid to govern thus in ſingle Events, and here and there to influence in the Actions of private perſons, great Monarchies and Commonwealths do not depend upon Her. Politick Inſtitutions, prudently order'd in the beginning, and keeping on in a Steady

dy Course of Wisdom and Virtue, are out of her Power and Rule, and can never fail to prosper; And when Disasters happen to a State, 'tis seldom the work of Chance, but rather the effect of some Misgovernment.

For in former Reigns we have seen, that when the Kings Revenue was not well Managed it proceeded from this, that the Employments relating to it were not the Rewards of Skill, but the Recompence of another Merit, and that want of knowledge in the Managers was wink'd at while they were giving Money in another place. Heretofore if Men betrayed their Trust and sold the people, it was because they were largely invited to it. In former times, when the Nations Trade impair'd and went backward, the secret Cause was that the Ministers were servilely to Promote the Interest of some other Country. And in the preceeding Reigns, if the Kings Treasure was wildly dissipated, and if exorbitant Grants were made, it came from this, that the Ministers could refuse no Body, having a great deal to ask for Themselves, and that they were not to put Rubs in the Way of others, that they might more smoothly carry on their own Pretensions. These Instances are only given, not but that by many others we could support this Position, That when the publick Treasure is wasted, when a Nation runs into immense Debts, when the Land of the Crown is granted all away, when its Revenues are ill managed, and when the people are corrupted, we are not altogether to blame Fortune, the Times or Accidents of the War, but rather to attribute a great Share of these Evils to some Error in the Subordinate parts of the Administration.

Tiberius in a Letter to the Senate has this Expression, *Nescio an fuasurus fuerim omittere potius pra-* Tacit l. 3. Ann.

valida & adulta vitia, quam hoc adsequi, ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares essemus. The Scope of his Epistle is to show how difficult it was for him to correct Vices, with which the Principal Men of *Rome* were tainted, and that by the Attempt he might draw envy upon Himself. But tho a Cautious Prince might have reason to entertain such a Fear, the whole Legislative Power of a Country need never lye under Apprehensions of the like nature. This Strength can deal with the Ambition, Avarice, Corruption and Rapine of the Great ones: The Legislative Authority can correct Men of Arbitrary Principles, and pull down the topping Pride of Insolent and undertaking Ministers, who are by no means equal to their Business, and whose Heads are Giddy, and turn round in the Eminence, on which Fortune, Flattery, and their other Vices, not their Merit, has plac'd them.

And if our Affairs here should ever happen to light into such Hands, we must put our chief Hopes in the King at the Head of a Parliament.

While that Place contains Men of Courage and publick Spirit, Matters cannot long proceed amiss. Whoever therefore undertakes that Trust, should continually have before their Eyes how much the Common Welfare depends upon their Virtues. But above all things, they should have disinterested and self-denying Minds.

It can hardly be conceiv'd, but by those who have seen it, what Reverence is paid, even by his Enemies, to a Man of steady Principles, the Tenor of whose Words and Actions are always the same; who is neither to be bought nor frighted: He is admir'd and follow'd, all he says has its due weight, his honest Hoary Head is dear to all Mankind. Whereas the Whifling Prolers after places, and little busie Intreaguers, are contemptible to the very Men, of whom they are the wretched In-

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ſtruments. And let the Ambitious think what they pleaſe, that Man has moſt real Power in this Country, who is believ'd to be of the moſt unſhaken Integrity towards the publick, and He who has ſuch a Character enjoys more true Greatneſs than all the vain Pomp and Honors a Court can give.

The Employments of *England* are yet but few, and their profits but inconſiderable to what they are in ſeveral Nations; however ſmall as they ſeem to be, 'tis to be fear'd that ſome time or other they will be made Engins wherewith bad Men will endeavour to ſubert this Conſtitution.

'Tis true, at preſent we are out of ſuch a Danger, but if in future times we ſhould chance to ſee all Employments reſerv'd for Men in one certain Station, if the Road to Preferment ſhould lye but through one Place and Paſſage; when this happens we ſhall have Cauſe to be alarm'd, and to look about us.

They who feel within themſelves Abilities to ſerve the Publick, are by no means blameable in deſiring to be upon the Stage of Buſineſs. On the contrary, that ſowr Philoſophy which makes ſome Perſons at all Seaſons retire and abandon the State, is by no means to be commended. They do indeed but *Nomine Magnifico, Segne otium velare*: If the Poſture of Affairs will poſſibly admit it, Good Men ſhould rather ſtrive to be in Power, that the Commonwealth may not be ingroſs'd by Corrupt and Unskilful Hands. A Wiſe Man can eaſily diſcern whether the Miniſters are ſuch, that he may with Honour and Safety mix in Councils with them. If the Adminiſtration be ſound and right, or it if has but a Face looking that way, 'tis a proper Seaſon for Men of Probity, Skill, and Virtue, to produce their Talents, and to puſh themſelves forward, in order more fully to mend Things.

Tacit. L. 4. Hiſt.

Things. And at such a time They should be ready to assist the State with their true Sense and right Understanding; nor should they lazily suffer the Perfections of their Minds to be useless and unactive. And if among those there be any very Eminent, Strong in Friends, vers'd in Affairs of State, of a deep Reach and Foresight, Who have Eloquence to sway Assemblies, and Courage to resist and overcome Popular Fury, Such ought not to despair of the Publick, but assist with their Wisdom to redeem a People from their weak Hands, who shall get into Power by meer Chance, when the Nation perhaps has been in a high Ferment, as in Boyling Liquors the Scum will get uppermost. And there is such Reverence paid to those who have a very great Genius, that when they offer themselves to serve the Commonwealth, the Weight of the People will bear down all the Upstart Pretenders, and force 'em to give way, and make Room for Merit so Superiour.

But if it should ever happen that the Administration should be intirely bad and wrong, then ought Good Men to have no Share nor Hand in it; They should withdraw from any Participation in the Negligence or Guilt; They should quit what they cannot Honourably hold; They should concern themselves no more in Business, leaving such Ministers to Govern by themselves, who will not Govern well, and be contented to serve their Country by defending Liberty in *one Post* against any Incroachment; They should not make so ill a Use of that Affection the People may bear 'em, and of the Interest they may have in the Nation, as to be a shelter for the Crimes or Folly of Others; Nor should they as it were lend their Countenance, and be the Skreen behind which bad Men may safely attempt to undermine the Constitution.

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If the Times are good, Silent Merit will be ſought after; but if they are bad ill Men will be lifted up to the Offices and Dignities of the State by the Applauſe of their Adherents, and the Faction of their Friends; but at ſuch a Seaſon 'tis no ſhame not to be employ'd, *Tacitus* ſpeaking of *Ælius Lamia*, ſays, *Et non permiſſa Provincia Dignationem addiderat.* Tacit. lib. 6. *Ann.*

Great Men are often liable to one unfortunate Vanity: They believe their Parts, Dexterity and Wiſdom, to be ſuch, that they can mend Things, give 'em a new Complexion, Correct all Errors, and at leaſt that they ſhall preſerve themſelves ſound, tho' every one elſe be tainted; And upon theſe Preſumptions, ſome of the Men in beſt Eſteem have heretofore engag'd with a foul and deprav'd Miniſtry; But we could never ſee that they were able to make any Converts: On the contrary, in ſtead of changing the Court the Court did alter them.

Courts are but ſlowly mended, and that not by the Authority or Example of any Single Perſon, except it be of the Prince Himſelf, ſtrongly bent to ſet Matters upon a right Foot. And yet we have more Inſtances of Courts which have ſpoilt their Prince, than of Princes that have reform'd their Courts.

And if it be ask'd, when is the moſt proper time for Perſons of Probity and Virtue to undertake the Management of Affairs, It may be Anſwered, It is then ſeaſonable when Things call loudly to be mended, when unskilful Pilots have run the Ship aground, ſo that ſhe ſticks faſt, ready to ſplit at the next coming of the Waves; when Ignorant Men are quite bewilder'd in their Errors; when the whole People See and Feel the Effect of ill Government; when the Prince grows aſham'd of thoſe whom His Subjects hate and fear; when the Commonwealth cannot emerge out of its Debts and

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Difficulties, without Help from Abler Hands, then is the true time for the beſt Men to offer themſelves to the Service of their Country. At ſuch a Seaſon Honeſty will not ſtand alone, weak, defenceleſs, and out of Countenance at the ſight of Proſperous Vice. Nor can Courts be ever Safe for Honeſt Men, till the Circumſtance and Neceſſity of the Times bring thither a Party ſtrong enough to maintain it ſelf againſt thoſe who are grown great by wicked Arts.

If *Engliſh* Men will be continent in this ſingle Point, all muſt of Courſe go well; If they who have Noble Commands in the Country will ſcorn meanly to depend in Town; If they who have brave Seats of their own, will deſpiſe the crowded Antichambers of the Great Ones here; If they who have plentiful Eſtates, will ſlight a troubleſome and precarious Employment, They are more happy than a Court can make them: If our Nobility and Gentry would conſider how miſerable the the Noble-Men of *France* are with all their Mighty Places, they would at no time hereafter deſire to wear the Livery of Bondage. And if they are truly ſeaſon'd with theſe Notions, that their Liberties are above all Price, and (as Sir *Benjamin Rudiard* was wont to ſay) *That there is nothing worth being a Knave*, the Head muſt be very Skilful, and the Heart very Bold, that will under take to invade our Fundamental Rights.

'Tis true, what has been here advanc'd, and what ſhall be ſaid anon, may ſeem needleſs at preſent, when all things are preſum'd to go well, but theſe Notions may be of Uſe to After-Ages.

The Duty which Private Perſons owe to the Publick, lies in a very narrow Compaſs, and when that is thouroughly perform'd, a Country ſeldom fails to ſee *a ſteady Courſe of Wiſdom and Honeſty in ſuch as are truſted with the Adminiſtration.* This Duty

Duty may chiefly conſiſt in the following Particulars.

I. That ſuch as Repreſent the People, be Uncorrupt, Unbiaſs'd, and Diſintereſted.

II. That they diligently attend the Nation's Service.

III. That they carefully watch any Innovation or Incroachments upon the Conſtitution.

IV. That they make Proviſion againſt future Evils.

V. That they look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and examin which way immenſe Debts have been contracted, and how that Mony has been diſpoſed of which the Nation has already Granted.

VI. That they hold a ſtrong Hand over the Men of Buſineſs, calling thoſe to an Account, who, either through Folly, or upon ſome wicked Deſign, purſue deſtructive Meaſures.

1. *That ſuch as Repreſent the People be Uncorrupt, Unbyaſsd, and Diſintereſted.* This Point we have handled ſufficiently in the Series of this Diſcourſe. And to what has been already ſaid upon that Subject, we ſhall now only add, That *Rome* was once free; That *France* heretofore had the three Eſtates, which were the Guardians of its Liberty; That *Spain* had formerly many Rights and Priviledges, of which nothing now but the ſhadow remains; That *Denmark* and *Sweden* had once Conſtitutions ſomething like that of *England*: And that all theſe Countries have been inſlav'd by their own Corruptions.

2. *That they diligently attend the Nation's Service.* For otherwiſe they do not diſcharge their Truſt to which they are choſen. It has been formerly a Matter of great Wonder, that Gentlemen ſhould even

even waſte their Fortunes to be Elected, and yet afterwards never mind that Station which they ſeem'd before ſo vehemently to covet. *Cato* had many Virtues too big for Practice, but he may be eaſily imitated in one good Quality he had, of never failing to be preſent in the Senate. Such ſhould give way to others, and make room for Men of more Leiſure, who cannot afford to employ all their Time in the Service of their Country. But above all others, they are to blame who can be drawn from their Duty by Luxury, Lazineſs and Pleaſures. Liberty can be hardly Wounded in a full Houſe; the Attempts made upon it in former Reigns were made when ſuch as had no Dependance upon the Court were abſent about their Country Buſineſs. The ill Miniſters of thoſe days took that Opportunity to promote Taxes, which would never paſs in a full Aſſembly; To paſs dangerous Laws; To ſet afoot new invented Corporations which may be fatal in their Conſequences; And to form Projects either deſtructive to the Nation in General, or Ruinous to particular Men. All the ill things ever done have been compaſs'd when the Negligence of ſome had made one ſide Strong and the other Weak.

And if in After-Ages any of the Men of Buſineſs ſhould be ſo wicked as to proceed by the ſame Councils, and to go by the like Meaſures, they will promote their dark Deſigns in ſome ſuch Juncture, when the beſt Patriots ſhall be gone away quite tir'd out by Seſſions artificially prolong'd.

But it is the Duty of all who Love *England*, to defeat by unweary'd patience ſuch a Conſpiracy againſt the People; And to obviate ſuch a Miſchief: If the ordinary Rules cannot do it, extraordinary Laws may be thought on to oblige the Members to that Attendance which they owe their Country.

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He who does not attend, injures the Borough for which he serves; for it may so happen, that in his Absence a thing may pass to their Ruin who have sent him, and which his Presence might have prevented; His Electors therefore seem to have such a Right to his Service as in Reason no others ought to dispense with, without their consent.

Deserting in this manner the Publick, is a growing Evil, upon which account it ought to have a timely Remedy. Perhaps it might not be amiss if a Bill were brought in to make it highly Penal for any Member to be absent from the House above fourteen days, without express leave first had under the Seal of the Borough for which he serves.

A great many Mischiefs both Publick and Private would be prevented, if such as Represent their Country would be strict in this Duty of attending.

3. *That they carefully watch any Innovation or Incroachments upon the Constitution.* There is nothing lulls a People more asleep than the Reign of a good Prince, reverenc'd for his Wisdom, fear'd for his high Courage, belov'd for his Lenity, and admir'd for a Number of other Virtues; whereas under a bad Reign the Subjects are Jealous and vigilant, tho often to little Purpose. However, 'tis agreed on by all Writers, that the Mild Rule of *Augustus*, contributed more to confirm the Slavery of *Rome*, than all the Severity and Cunning of *Tiberius*.

The best Times likewise produce the worst Presidents; for in good times the People let many Things slip, being then at their Ease, not suspicious, and consequently not watchful over the Government; but where this Supine Temper prevails, mixt Governments decline immediately into Absolute Power. The frequent Contests that were of old between the Senate and People of

Rome

Rome without doubt preſerv'd their Freedom; for where all are of one Mind, ill Uſe may be made of that Unanimity, by ſome Eloquent, Subtle, and Ambitious Man, who may turn and rule it as he pleaſes. Therefore to preſerve Conſtitutions that have a mixture in 'em of Popular Government, 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be always ſome ſmall Diviſion, juſt enough to keep the Minds of Men awake, that they may obſerve what Advantages one part of the State gets over the other.

Bad Kings provoke enow to look into their Actions; but when the People have a good Prince, they give a favourable Interpretation to all he does.

And the beſt Man that ever Reign'd may be ill ſerv'd. It is a Maxim of our Law, *That the King can do no wrong, but if any ill be committed in Matters of State, the Council; if in Matters of Juſtice, the Judges muſt anſwer for it.* But though the Laws exempt our Kings from Blame, They are not freed from the bad Effects of ill Conduct in their Miniſters.

Declaration and Remonſtrance of Lords and Commons, May. 19. 1642.

He therefore who Repreſents his Country, cannot do the Nation nor his Prince better Service, than to ſee that thoſe who ſit at the Helm, do not run the Ship upon dangerous Rocks. Abſolute Dominion is a Bait with which the Greateſt Minds may be tempted; for they whoſe Goodneſs is unlimited, may deſire that their Power ſhonld be ſo too. But no one Man ought to think of being Omnipotent, unleſs he could be Omniſcient and Omnipreſent. Beſides though Princes may deſire great Power, that they may be able to do great Good, ſuch as ſerve 'em rarely proceed upon this Principle. They often deſire their Maſters ſhould be Arbitrary, in order to their own Impunity, and to build a large fortune for themſelves, for which reaſon they ſhould be watch'd in all their Windings, and follow'd in all their dark and ſubtil Mazes. It

It ſeldom happens that the Liberties of a Country are Invaded all at once. The Steps of Power are leiſurely and ſlow. Miniſters who have it in their Thoughts to change the Nature of a Government, go to work by Degrees. At firſt they make uſe of the moſt Popular Hands they can poſſibly procure, ordering it ſo, that the People may not perceive who 'tis that puts their Fetters on, but theſe Popular Men they ſhove out at the firſt convenient Seaſon, that all may be of a Piece. Their next Buſineſs is to corrupt ſuch Perſons as have the cleareſt Fame, whom they diſcard when ſufficiently tainted, and this they do that the People may think all Mankind alike, which naturally drives 'em to follow thoſe only who are in Power, and who can do 'em good. Afterwards they get from the Nation all the Mony they can, the Collecting of which erects new Employments, and creates them a number of Dependants, who, in one certain place, are their chief Strength and beſt Support: By the diſtribution of theſe Sums, they likewiſe make more Friends. But being never out of fear of Accounting for all at laſt, their Principal Aim is to procure their Maſter ſuch a ſtanding Revenue, as may make him ſubſiſt without the People's Help. If they find this impoſſible, or difficult, then by Accuſations, by Exorbitant Proceedings without any Preſident, and by harraſſing private Perſons, either in their Fame or Fortune, they endeavour to make all the different Ranks of the People out of Love with their ancient Conſtitution.

But when they have done all this, they will not yet think themſelves quite out of danger. *Senatus & Populus nunquam obſcura Nomina, etſi aliquando obumbrentur.* They will ſtill lie under Apprehenſions of being reach'd at laſt by the Guardians of Liberty. Therefore to damp all Thoughts of Freedom, to influence the better Sort, and to awe

Tacit. *lib.* 2. *Hiſt.*

the Vulgar, their laſt work is to procure a Standing Army.

By Manifeſt Original Contract, an Arm'd Force cannot be rais'd nor kept within this Kingdom, without conſent of Parliament, ſo that if hereafter we ſhould be ever inſlav'd that way it is our own proper Fault.

Where Armies are Powerful, there grows a Neceſſity upon Princes, rather to pleaſe them than the People. And yet no Mercenaries are ſufficient to help a Prince againſt a Powerful Foreign Force, if the Subjects are diſoblig'd at home. *Machiavel* ſays, *Prince* ch. 12. *That a Prince who founds the Duration of his Government upon Mercenary Troops ſhall never be firm nor ſecure.* ch. 13. But he counts Foreign Forces yet more dangerous, becauſe *they are always unanimous, and at the Command of other People.*

If hereafter any Miniſters ſhould be ſo wicked, to attempt the Subverſion of our Fundamental Rights, we have here ſhewn ſome of the Steps, which they will probably make, to compaſs their Deſigns. It therefore imports all good Men, to watch their firſt Invaſions and Incroachments and betimes to intercept 'em in their Courſe.

4. *That they make Proviſion againſt future Evils.* The Virtues requiſite for ſuch as will handle matters of Government, have their Foundation in Wiſdom and Courage. He, whoſe Endowments of the Mind, are not ſufficient to foreſee a long while before what may be the Event of a Council, cannot conſult ſafely for his Prince; and he who at every turn is afraid of Popular Anger, ſhall never give any ſound Advice.

Virtue and Wiſdom, in ſome Senſe, are Terms Synonimous, and different Words, ſignifying the ſame thing; for no Man can be Virtuous with any Effect conducive to the Publick Good, without a rich Talent of the Mind, and ſtrong Wiſdom; nor

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can a Man be truly Wise, without such Publick Virtue, as warmly embraces the Liberty, Honour and Interest of his Country. And when a Genius of this Kind appears in any Nation, he has a Natural Right to the Offices and Dignities of the State: But if ever Courts shall happen to be deprav'd, they will like quite another sort of Men: Wanting true Wisdom, they must set up something in the Room of it; that is to say, Momentary Shifts, and short Remedies; raw and unskilful Medlers in Business, are their Darlings, that will venture at all, and yet know nothing; upon which Principle they make open War with Desert of any kind, and reckon it a great Conquest, when they can get rid of a wary and knowing Statesman.

They count it supream Wisdom to answer any single Necessity, never regarding whether the manner of doing it be Safe, Just, or Honourable. They not only trust Providence, (as all men should do) but are content to rest wholly upon it; believing Foresight, and Thoughts of the Future, to bring more Anxiety than Profit. They are Wise, as some Men subsist from Hand to Mouth; they think it sufficient to Live to Day, and to make Provision for the present Moment. All this perhaps may be good Philosophy in Private Cases; but for the whole Body of a State to go by such Rules, must needs be very dangerous.

Machiavel says, *The* Romans *could never relish the Saying, that is so frequent in the Mouths of our Politicians; To enjoy the present benefits of Time.* They either provided against, or Fronted a Danger; and seldom let themselves be overtaken by it: He says likewise, *That things which are discover'd at a distance, (which is done only by Prudent Men) produce little Mischief, but what is easily averted: But when, through Ignorance or Inadvertency, they come to that Height,* *Prince* c. 3.

that every one discerns them, there is no Room for any Remedy, and the Disease is incurable.

Testament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu. p. 2. c. 4.

Cardinal *Richlieu* says, *It is the Duty of Ministers of State, to Represent to their Masters, that it is more necessary to consider the Future, than the Present; and that Distempers are like the Enemies of a State, against whom Prudence obliges to march, rather than tarry till they are come, to drive 'em out again; that those who do not follow this Method, will fall into great Confusions, which it will be very difficult to remedy afterwards.* But he lays down, *That it is a common thing among weak Men, to drive off time, and to chuse the preserving their Ease for a Month, rather than to deprive themselves of it for a while to avoid the Trouble of many Years; which they do not consider, because they see only what is present, and do not anticipate Time by a Wise Providence.* He farther adds, *That Ministers, who never consider to Morrow, live happily for themselves; but others live unhappily under them.*

We have here cited the Authorities of two very able Men, both in the Theory and Practice of State Affairs; to shew how dangerous their Measures are, who consult nothing but their present Ease, who love Palliating Remedies, and who are for removing from 'em the Evil Day at as great a distance as they can.

If we should ever fall into such Hands, they will not care with what Debts and Payments they load Future Times, so they may come at a little ready Mony. They will give large *Premiums* and Interest, never considering who must pay the Reckoning at last. They will set afoot high Duties, never weighing how the Peoples Trade and Manufactures are thereby affected. They will not mind how profusely they waste the Nation's Treasure; Negligence and Prodigality, being pleasant and easie for the present time, tho' afterwards the Parents of Infinite Care and Trouble.

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Constancy in denying unreasonable Suits; Thrift for the Publick; Promoting Foreign Traffick; Improving the Revenues granted; Keeping the Ships of War in good Repair; Laying up Stores; Making Schemes for better Government; Retrenching all needless Expences; Providing against Wars to come; Making good Leagues Abroad; Allaying Heats and Animosities at Home; And putting Impediments in the way of any Power that grows too fast; Are so many Seeds which Great and Able States-Men, are always Sowing, without a Prospect to Reap in many Years, but the Harvest comes at last; and under the Conduct of such Ministers Nations Thrive and Flourish: Whereas, such as proceed upon that narrow Notion of *Enjoying the present benefits of Time*; tho' they may thereby do their own Work, and make their own Fortunes, yet without doubt, they will Ruin whatever Government they undertake to Guide.

If in After-Ages, they who are trusted with the Administration here, should be thus careless and unforeseeing, it will be the Duty of such as Represent the People, by frequent and serious Inquiries into the State of the Nation, and by plain Speeches, to rowse up the Men of Business from a Lethargy, that may prove so Fatal; for undoubtedly, any part of the Legislative Authority may call upon the Executive Power, to make Provision against Future Evils.

5. *That they look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and examine which way Immense Debts have been contracted, and how that Mony has been dispos'd of, which the Nation has already Granted.*

The last Duke of *Buckingham* had many Designs to put the Affairs of his Estate in Order; and to this end he consulted several sorts of Men: His wife and true Friends laid before him, That no ways would be so effectual, as to look into his Accompts,

to employ honest Stewards, and to live within Compass. But there was another Sett of People, in whom he more delighted, who made him believe they would put his Business into such a Posture, that no Negligence, nor Profusion should do him any hurt. In short, they told him directly, that they would procure for him the Philosophers Stone. He hearken'd to 'em, minded none of his Affairs, he let his Servants do what they pleas'd, and would put no Limits to his Expences. But the consequence and conclusion of all was, that His Grace's evil Counsellors became Rich, and he grew Poor.

In the same manner, if in some Future Reign we should fall into the Hands of bad Ministers, they will tell the Prince, that they can get for Him the *Magisterium* (and indeed it would prove a kind of Philosophers Stone, if they can so concert Matters, as to obtain all the Supplies they shall insist on) they will perswade Him they can maintain His Crown and Dignity out of a Mine of new Projects, never to be exhausted, and upon this View they will advise Him, first, to give them very large Sums to Buy Limbecks, Crucibles, and Charcoal; for Utensils must be had, and Workmen must be paid; they will promote the making Exorbitant Grants, and giving away the Crown Lands upon this Notion, that 'tis Sowing a little to Reap much. They will conceal pernicious Pensions under the dark Veil of *Secret Service*. An Article that hides all. *But the Estimates of the Charge of the War* will be the best shelter they can possibly have for their Profusions of any kind, where they may insert *Items* never to be disprov'd, and never to be understood. Finding how much it turns to their own Account to have an Ample Revenue to range in, they will perswade their Prince to ask all things, and to spare nothing: And if such bad Men as have been here describ'd, should ever come to be trusted, they will make the

Body Politick faint and look pale with continual opening of its Veins; they will leave the Crown bare, the Exchequer, empty and all the Revenues Anticipated; they will distress the Gentry, and begger the Common People; and having thus inrich'd themselves, and impoverish'd all other Degrees of Men, they will reduce the Nation to be naked and defenceless, hardly able to support it self at home, much less in a Condition to undergo another Foreign War.

If at any time hereafter, such Men as have been here painted out, should be suffer'd to entangle our Matters, to dissipate our Treasures, and to waste the Commonwealth, where will be the Mony, the Fleet, and Arms, that may be necessary, in case the *French* should ever break the Peace, and attempt to possess themselves of *Spain*, and the *West-Indies*?

If by the Giddy, or rather Frantick Conduct of Beardless Politicians, lifted perhaps up from the meanest Obscurity, and set in a manner to hold the Reigns, our Affairs should hereafter be brought so low, (which God forbid) as that we must sit still, while those Dominions fall into a Power already but too Dreadful, how can Universal Monarchy be avoided? And if *Spain* should happen to be thus lost, we are not only hurt in a point of Empire, the most Important of all, but the whole Trade of *England* will be cut up by the very Roots.

It may be laid down for a certain Truth, that no Man of a great Fortune, was ever undone in a few Years, but he was Cheated of much more, than he was able to Spend: And this is yet more true, if the Man had Parts, and a good Understanding. Private Men are Ruin'd, when those about 'em are Unfaithful, and are to Profit by their Destruction; and if they have no trusty Servant, that will put them in Mind of their Condition.

The same holds in the Affairs of a whole Nation. When a Publick, that was once clear and easy, is overwhelm'd with Debts; when this happens among a People that have been always willing to give, and in a Ministry that has never been backward to ask, when all Occasions have been supply'd to their full demand, when the Prince is Wise, and without any Expensive Pleasures; when such a Country does labour under Difficulties almost insuperable, and when in some Future Reign all this shall be our Case, Mankind will entertain an Opinion that the Administration is not right; the World will be inclin'd to think, that such as shall then govern in the Revenue, want either Fidelity or Skill; it will be thought that they have not at any time laid before their Master a true State of his Affairs; it will be believ'd that they have never contriv'd his Expences with Care and Wisdom, and that they have not endeavour'd by grave and wholsome Councils to moderate his Bounties.

The Liberality of a Prince, the most extended we can imagin, will yet oblige but a very few; and to give it a constant Supply, vast Numbers must be harrass'd. Besides, among the Vulgar, Frugality in a Court does in some Measure commute for high Taxes. Liberality is Noble in rich and quiet Times, but it will hardly be thought just, when what is given is to be in a manner the last drop of Blood in the Subjects Veins. Not to Value their Treasure has been always the Fault of Great and Heroick Minds, of which many had been ruin'd every Moment, but that they had Grave and honest Ministers ready to keep 'em within Bounds by wholsome Advices, rugged Truths, and severe Virtue. And so the Duke of *Sully* proceeded with his Master *Henry* the IV. When a Prince is in his Nature too Bountiful, it is a Duty incumbent upon such as Serve him, with all Humility to beg, That

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in his high Wiſdom he would conſider how hardly that is gather'd, which they ſhall ſee ſo lightly given: They ought rather to quit their Poſts, than to ſign or fix the Seal to immoderate Gifts. But thoſe Hands muſt be very clean themſelves, which are held up to Kings with humble Prayers, that they would have Compaſſion on their People.

'Tis true, War is a devouring Monſter, and to feed it will very much diſorder the Revenues of a Country: And yet we ſee *France* has been able for Nine Years to engage all the Strongeſt part of *Europe*, to have all the while Land Armies, conſiſting of above three hundred Thouſand Men, and to maintain a Fleet as numerons, and more expenſive than that of *England*: And after all this, they have been in a Condition to make larger Expences of all kinds (as is ſaid) than in any two Years during the War; and wee ſee 'em now in a Poſture to meditate higher Deſigns than ever. That they did bear up ſo long againſt the Confederate Strength, that they have been able Annually to expend ſuch an Immenſe Treaſure for upward now of ten Years, and that they are not at preſent quite exhauſted and impoveriſh'd, muſt without doubt proceed from the good Conduct of thoſe to whom the Management of their Affairs has been intruſted. No Man is indur'd under that Monarchy to perform the Functions and Offices of the State in an ignorant and careleſs manner. The Miniſters there are more frugal for their Maſter than in their own Concerns; they do not make too much haſt to be Rich; they are contented that a Great Fortune ſhould be the Recompence of many Services, and of long Merit. They have not let the Crown Lands of *France* be as it were a Derelict, *Et primi Occupantis*: We do not obſerve it has been ſo order'd in that Kingdom, that both the Body of the People and the Pub-

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lick too are Poor at one and the ſame Inſtant their; Miniſters have not ſuffer'd the Commonwealth to be conſum'd by Uſurious Contracts with the Common Lenders; and by their Care and Wiſdom they have obtain'd ſuch Credit, even under a Deſpotick Power, that they have not been forc'd all along to pay above 7 *per Cent.* Intereſt for Mony lent the Kings; where as 40. *per Cent.* Has been has paid for mighty Sums in one Free Government: ſo that upon the whole Matter, 'tis evident enough, that *this Devouring Monſter War is to be fed* where the Men of Buſineſs are Honeſt, Foreſeeing and Frugal for the State.

Mix'd Governments, among many other Excellencies, have this Advantage, that a good Adminiſtration may be obtain'd by any one part of the Conſtitution, that will ſet it ſelf ſtrongly to ſo good a Work; Kings can all times ſet things right, if the Buſineſs of their Wars do not compel 'em to be often Abſent. Either of the Houſes, when they have ſet themſelves to inquire into, and correct Diſcorders, have been terrible to the moſt Bold, Subtile, and moſt Powerful Stateſmen, that ever went about to undo a People, or to miſlead a Prince.

If in any future Reign, the Treaſure of this Kingdom ſhould be miſ-manag'd, and profuſely waſted; and if Debts, hardly to be waded through, ſhould be contracted; the Repreſentatives of the People may, by looking ſtrictly into all theſe Matters, perhaps immediately leſſen the publick Engagements, at leaſt they may put ſome Stop to the farther progreſs of the miſchief.

In ſuch Juncture, good Men will think it their Duty, to ſee whether this Debt is not to be leſſen'd, by reviewing former Accompts; they will examine, whether the Sums already granted were not ſufficient to pay off all the Forces we have had at Land and Sea: They will inquire from whence ſuch a high

high Article of Arrears proceeds: They will see how so many Fonds come to be Deficient, and whether such Deficiencies have not been occasion'd by some ill Conduct in those, who have manag'd the respective Branches: They will inform themselves, which way the many Millions are gone, which the People have paid: They will desire to know, what Necessities could compel Men of Business to give such large *Premiums*, and high Interest; and whether the promoters of a Council so pernicious, did not lend their own Mony; and whether they have not been parties deeply concern'd themselves in all usurious Contracts: They will inquire upon what Consideration, and for what Services, immoderate Grants of Lands and Mony have been made, and they will do it the more strictly; if, when such Grants were pass'd, it should happen that the Nation was indebted, and paid heavy Taxes.

The Representatives of the People can look into all these things; and, no Doubt, it is Duty which they owe their Country, that has trusted 'em with so unlimited a disposal of their Fortunes.

To prevent Mismanagement in the Revenue of this Kingdom, it seems necessary that a Law should be made, to put the Lords of the Treasury under such an Oath, as the Lord High Treasurer of *England* takes; for it appears an Absurdity in our Government, that the meanest Officer concern'd in the King's Revenue, should be sworn to a true, and faithful Discharge of his Trust; and that the Treasury, who are trusted with the whole, whose Authority is so boundless, and who have it so much in their Power, to hurt the Nation, should be under no Oath at all. Some Objections there are against this; but he who considers 'em well, will find 'em of no weight, and that those Necessities which have broken into, and over-rul'd the Ancient

cient Courſe of the Exchequer, might have been avoided by Care and Conduct.

If in future Times *England* ſhould have any Grounds to doubt, that the Treaſure of the Publick has been Imbezzel'd; If prodigious Fortunes, rais'd in ten Years by obſcure Men, who have had no Dealings but with the Court, ſhould Miniſter Occaſion of Suſpition; If Reſumptions ſhould be thought fit, we mean in Caſes where Perſons of no Merit have been inrich'd with the Kingdom's Spoils; If it ſhould be thought reaſonable to ſee whether any thing is to be ſav'd in an immenſe Debt, out of the unwarrantable Gains which the Lenders have made; If it ſhould be judg'd expedient to inquire into any Male-Adminiſtration in thoſe through whoſe Hands the Revenue paſſes; If it ſhould be deem'd neceſſary Thrift to look into all Penſions; If it ſhould be thought reaſonable fairly and Impartially to ſtate the Accompt of ſo many Millions given and expended, ſo great and difficult a Work as a Strict Inquiry into all theſe Matters will prove, cannot be enter'd upon, and brought to a good Concluſion, but by the united Wiſdom of the Nation.

No other Power can face that ſtrong League, which will be made between Fellow Criminals to ſave one another. Ordinary Remedies prevail but little againſt ſtubborn and inveterare Diſeaſes: If therefore our Affairs ſhould be ever in diſorder, the Legiſlative Authority can bring the moſt effectual Helps to ſet us right.

And in ſuch a Caſe, peradventure, it may be thought adviſable to promote a Bill, That ſuch ſort of Abuſes as have been here deſcribed, and all other Male-Adminiſtration of the like kind, may be inquired into by Committees of both Houſes, to ſit in the Interval of Parliament, with all requiſite Powers, without Salaries, and to be choſen by Ballot.

Ballot. And supposing past Errors to be too big for Correction, yet so Awfull an Authority, and the fear that will from time to time be renew'd, may, for the future, be some Check to the growing Corruptions of the Age.

All the Premises consider'd, we submit it to better Judgments, whether it is not the Duty of such as represent their Country, *To look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and to examin which way immense Debts have been contracted, and how that Mony has been dispos'd of, which the Nation has already granted.*

Sixthly, That They should hold a Strong Hand over the Men of Business, calling those to an Account, who either through Folly, or upon some wicked Design, pursue destructive Measures. Helvidius Priscus, after the Example of his Father-in-law *Petus Thrasea* in the Philosophy he made use of to fit himself for the Service of his Common-wealth, follow'd the Opinion of the Stoicks, who plac'd all Good and Evil in Honesty or Dishonesty, accounting the Gift of Fortune, such as high Birth Power and Wealth, to be but things indifferent towards the constituting of Happiness, which they define to be internal, only in the Mind.

But tho *Aristides, Socrates, Phocion, Publicola, Cincinnatus, Attilius, Regulus*, and many others, have been great Men under a constant and willing Poverty; yet, without doubt, Nobility and Riches help good Spirits on of their way, and set 'em forward: He that is high Born, his Perfections may be sooner taken notice of, as standing upon an Eminence; and he that has Wealth need not be troubled with Private and Domestick Cares, and may devote all his Time and Thoughts to the Service his Country.

Machiavel says, that a Prince, who intends to invade the Constitution of a Free People, takes this

Discourses on Livy, *lib.* 1. *C.* 26.

this Courſe: *To ſubvert all, to turn every thing Topſie Turvie, and make all things new. To alter Magiſtracy, create new Titles, Elect new Perſons, confer new Authorities, advance the Poor, and impoveriſh the Rich. That what is ſaid of* David, *may be ſaid of him: He filled the Hungry with good Things, and the Rich he has ſent empty away. Beſides, it is his Intereſt to build new Cities, to ſhift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a Word, ſo to Toſs and Tranſpoſe every thing, that there be no Honour, Wealth, nor Preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him.*

Some of theſe Courſes were taken by *Henry* the 3*d.* in *France*; but his chief aim was to introduce new Perſons into ſuch Offices and Dignities of the State, as were fill'd before with the Nobility and Princes of the Blood. He rais'd out of the Duſt obſcure Perſons, who might owe to him only their Wealth and Honour, and who might look upon him as their ſecond Creator: Theſe paid him a blind Obedience; They never conſider'd what was for the Publick Good, what was Reaſonable, Safe, Expedient, Juſt, or Honeſt, but in all things did as they were commanded; with ſuch a Sett of Men this dark Prince gave the firſt Mortal Wound to the Liberties of *France*; He plac'd them ſo high as to overlook the old Gentry, who being weaken'd and depreſs'd, had neither the Intereſt nor the Courage to preſerve their Ancient Form of Government.

He has been follow'd in theſe Steps by all the *French* Kings his Succeſſors; ſo that under that Monarchy, in every Reign ſince, we have hardly ſeen any but the Creatures meerly of the Prince's Favour, and quite new Men upon the Stage of Buſineſs, and ſuch have in a manner ingroſs'd all the Employments of Profit, Truſt and Honour.

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We grant that in a well constituted Government, which is upon a right Foot indeed, neither Wealth nor Titles, and nothing but Virtue and Abilities, should prefer a Man to the Honours and Employments of his Country. But when the Times are too corrupt to admit of such Measures, the Question will be, Who with most safety are to be rely'd on, they whose Fortunes are made, or they who are to make their Fortunes? They who have a Satiety of Titles, or they whose Ambition may prompt 'em to attempt any thing to advance Themselves?

In all likelihood Countrys (whose deprav'd Manners will not allow 'em to lift up Virtue in Distress, and which in truth cannot find such Men to serve 'em, as were *Aristides*, *Socrates*, and those other Heroes, whom we newly mention'd;) should desire to see themselves rul'd in the subordinate Parts of Government, by the best Hands that can be possibly got: If 'tis to be come at, they should endeavour to have Places of great Honour and high Trust, fill'd with Persons, whose Birth, Estates, and other Circumstances, seem, in Humane Probability, to set 'em at least above the common Temptations of the World.

He who has a good Stake, will by afraid to engage in desperate Councils; he who has a large Estate will not consent to have the Laws subverted, which are his firmest Security; for where the Sword governs, Lands at best are held but under a precarious Title. They who are well Born will desire to preserve that Constitution, of which they and their Ancestors have always been a part: Instead of Governing and making a Figure in their Country, in all appearance they will be loth to become the contemptible Clients and Dependants of some Favourite or Minister, whom Chance or Partiality shall set above his Betters.

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But they who come into a Government, with a deſign to build a Family, and make a Fortune; who are to get all, and can loſe nothing, who are chiefly recommended by their Boldneſs to Undertake, and readineſs to Comply, whom no Councils fright, and whom no Meaſures ſhock; ſuch Men are indeed the proper Inſtruments for introducing Arbitrary Power, but can hardly be thought fit Miniſters in any Nation, that is deſirous to preſerve its Freedom.

Whoever looks over our Hiſtories, will find, that all the Attempts which were heretofore made upon the Liberties of *England*, have been form'd by ſuch Perſons, as have been here deſcrib'd.

Moſt of our former Princes having had Deſigns of Abſolute Dominion, and finding that the Men of Fortune and Figure would rather obſtruct, than promote their Intentions, thought it more conducing to their Ends to be ſerv'd by another ſort of People, and did therefore bring into the Management of their Affairs all along a Sett of Miniſters, Weak, Ambitious, Light, Deſigning, Raſh, Unskilfull in the Arts of wiſe Adminiſtration, and vers'd in nothing but Craft and Tricks; But at the Head of theſe they had always ſome one that was to be the Forlorn Hope, and who would venture to go greater Lengths than any of his Companions: And for this Poſt they generally choſe a Puſhing Man of a Bold Spirit, a ready Wit, a Fluent Tongue, obſcure and low in the World, and ſuch a One whom Fortune could hardly leave in a worſe Condition than ſhe found him. Nor was it difficult to find Perſons of this Character, who would hazzard their Heads, to compaſs Power, Wealth, and Greatneſs. And tho' they could not arrive at Unlimitted Monarchy, the Philophers Stone, our former Stateſmen have ſo much hunted after, yet in the Search of it they found ſeveral

veral other good Things; we mean, good for themselves, that is to say, Titles and Great Estates. 'Tis true, many of 'em have been interrupted in their Course and the weight of the People has born 'em down at last. But a Man of a wretched Beginning, never heard of before, when he sees himself lifted up high, seldom thinks of the Laws, Impeachments, and the Ax. He hopes to elude Justice; that the Power which set him on, will bring him off; and that he may be defended by his Numbers, and a Corrupted Majority devoted to him; Or as his Predecessors have done, that he may at last retire full of Wealth and Crimes, and that his Guilt will be cover'd in the fresher Offences of those who are to Succeed him: Or Men of this Stamp, when they have got all they can, may think to be forgiven by changing Sides; and that it will be time enough to become good Patriots, when they are no longer suffer'd to hurt the Common-wealth; for the Arms of the Publick have been but too open to embrace such a sort of Penitents.

Upon these, or the like Hopes, the *Cethegi* and *Catalines* of former Times have presum'd to attack the Liberties of *England*. It must therefore be a Duty incumbent upon such as represent their Country, *To hold a Strong hand over the Men of Business*.

'Twould be endless to enumerate all the Dangers that may befall a Free Government, if it should have at the Head of its Affairs a Minister of a bold and Enterprizing Spirit, who, from a low Degree, aspires to the highest Greatness, and whose Ambition is not restrain'd by any Private or Publick Considerations.

If in some future Reigns it should be our Case to have such a Man in a Station, and with the Power of doing much Hurt, all such as desire to pre-

ſerve their Civil Rights, ſhould with undaunted Courage ſet themſelves to ſtop him in his Career, and to intercept him in his Growth.

Prince, c. 22. *Machiavel* ſays, *There is one Rule infallible to Princes in the Election of ſuch as are to ſerve 'em. When you obſerve your Officer more careful of himſelf than of you, and all his Actions and Deſigns pointing at his own Intereſt and Advantage, that Man will never be a good Miniſter.*

We ſhall beg the Reader's Pardon for one ſhort Digreſſion in this Place, and it is to take notice of another fine Remark of the ſame Author, who ſays, *Ibid.* c. 22. *The Actions of a new Prince are liable to a ſtricter Obſervation, than if he were Hereditary; and when they are known to be Virtuous, gain more upon People, and oblige them farther than Antiquity of Blood, becauſe Men are more affected with preſent than paſs'd things.* But to return to our Matter.

Teſtament Politique du Cardinal Richlieu, p. 2. c. 3. The *Spaniards* were in a flouriſhing Condition in *Richlieu*'s time: And in the beginning of his Miniſtry the Affairs of *France* were in great Diſorder: He wholly attributes the Proſperity of *Spain* to this Principle (running through all their Councils at that time, and prevailing with all their Miniſters) of preferring the Publick Good to Private Intereſt; And the contrary obtaining in *France*, he ſays, was the Cauſe of all their Diſorders: So that we may juſtly think the preſent Greatneſs of the *French* has taken its Riſe from this Noble Principle, having gotten, there, deeper Footing now than it had heretofore.

Miniſters, whoſe Chief Aim, in all they do, is their own Greatneſs, can neither be good for Prince nor People. And when they conſult their Private Intereſt more than the Publick Good, 'tis, in many Inſtances, apparent to all the World; as for Example.

Firſt,

Firſt, When they take no Care of their Maſter's Revenue. For in all Countries, and in all Ages, bad Stateſmen have thriven beſt under Princes plung'd in Debts and Difficulties.

Secondly, When they have made a falſe Step, and do not own it, and recede, but rather call in the Prince's Authority, and all his more immediate Dependants, to help 'em out, and to countenance their Errors, 'tis a Sign they have more regard to themſelves, than to his Honour.

Thirdly, When they enter upon new and deſperate Councils, which if they ſucceed well, will redound to their proper Glory; and if they ſhould have a bad Event, may hazzard his Ruin; 'tis a plain Mark that they are ready to ſacrifice his Safety to their own Vanity or Ambition.

Fouthly, When they conceal from him Truths which he ought to know; when they do not acquaint him with the State of his Affairs, nor with the true Condition of the Nation; when they do not endeavour to moderate his Expences; and when they do not quit, when ſound Councils cannot prevail, 'tis an evident Proof, That they prefer keeping up their Intereſt, as they call it, and holding their Poſt and Employments, to all other Conſiderations whatſoever.

Fifthly, When they are ready to do any thing, let it be never ſo hurtful to their Maſter, provided it ſquare with the Intereſt and Meaſures of the Party, of which they are at the Head, and by whom they are buoy'd up; 'tis a Mark that they aim at, being independent even of the Prince himſelf, and that they think to ſubſiſt more by the Strength of their own Faction, than by his Favour.

Sixthly, When Man to Man, and *ſingly*, they are willing to own any Errors, but ſay at the ſame time, that they were againſt this, and that, accuſing their Brethren of the State for every Miſcar-

riage, 'tis a Sign that provided they themſelves are well thought on, they do not care what Opinion the People entertain of the whole Government.

Seventhly, When they are for propoſing diſhonorable and unjuſt Shifts to raiſe Mony, rather than to take the Pains of forming before-hand better Schemes for Ways and Means, 'tis a Sign that they prefer the Momentary Arts of recommending themſelves to all Thoughts whatſoever; And that they conſult more their own eaſe than the Publick Good. 'Tis likewiſe an Evidence that they are not of *Richlieu*'s mind, who ſays, *That publick Adminiſtration takes up the Thoughts of Judicious Miniſters, inſomuch that the perpetual Meditations they are oblig'd to make, to foreſee and prevent the Evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of Reſt and Contentment, excepting that which they recieve in ſeeing many Sleep quietly, relying on their Watchings, and live happy by their Miſery.*

Teſtament Politique, p. 2. c. 4.

Eighthly, When contrary to the Conſtitution of the Land, they promote Councils which tend to the keeping up an Arm'd Force, 'tis a ſign, that not daring to truſt the Laws, they would have their Proceedings maintain'd another way; that they deſire ſuch an Impunity as the Sword has ſeldom fail'd to give bad Miniſters in other Countries. 'Tis a Mark that their own Safety is their principal Object, and that they had rather the Nation ſhould be burthen'd with Taxes, and have the Form of Government alter'd, and that the Prince ſhould loſe his Subjects Hearts, than venture themſelves before a Free and angry People.

We have given ſome of the Marks, which ſelfiſh and deſigning Stateſmen may be known by hereafter. And if in future times it ſhould be our Caſe, to ſee Perſons of this Character upon the Stage of Buſineſs, we muſt rowſe up the Vigour of our Ancient Conſtitution, we muſt awaken all the

the Laws, and direct 'em boldly to the Heads of such a dangerous sort of Men,

Machiavel says, *That they who govern'd the State of* Florence, *from Anno* 1434, *to* 1494, *were wont to say, That it was necessary every five Years to riview the State, for otherwise it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd reviewing the State, reducing the People to the same Terror and Awe as they had upon 'em of old, when every Man was punish'd according to his Crime, let his Quality be what it would.* *Discourses on Livy. lib. 2. C. 1.*

He lays down likewise, *That Kingdoms as well as Commonwealths, have often occasion to be reduc'd to their first Principles:* Which, he says, *was done in* France *by the Parliaments, who reviv'd the Ancient Government as often as they oppos'd the King in his Arrests, and as often as they call'd great Delinquents to account, whose Crimes, if they are suffer'd to grow, cannot be reform'd but with Disorder, if not the Dissolution of the whole Government.*

For want of pursuing some such like Courses, the *French* have lost their old Constitution, and are now under the absolute Sway of a single Person; and that we in *England* continue still to be a free People, is without doubt chiefly owing to that Power, which our Ancestors have from time to time exerted, of impeaching such of the great Ones, as they saw entring upon Measures, which plainly tended to introduce unlimited Dominion.

We have been hitherto preserv'd by pulling down such Men, as were setting themselves and their Master above the Laws; And we shall transmit to Posterity our Civil Rights untouch'd and untainted, if we do not lose our wonted Courage.

If therefore, in any future Reign, it should be seen, that the Ministers waste the Kingdom's Treasure; that they misgovern or misapply it; that they break into appropriated Fonds; that they give Advices which invade Property, and which, in their Conse-

Conſequences, tend to diſaffect the People. And laſtly, that to ſecure themſelves they promote one Council, which muſt end in the ſubverſion of all the Laws; If theſe things ſhould come to appear, they who repreſent their Country will not be afraid to attack theſe bold and high Crimes with Complaints, Addreſſes and Impeachments; for if this be omitted, the Impunity ſuch Men have found, will engage ſo many new Offenders, that at laſt, by their Number, they grow ſafe, and above Correction; and when this happens (as it has appear'd in the inſtance of *France*) the Liberties of a Country are intirely loſt.

When Matters are become unquiet, by ill Conduct, diſcerning Princes, like Wiſe Men who have a Law-ſuit, deſire to piece things up as ſoon as poſſible, and to remove the Bone of Diſſention as ſeeing full well, That Troubles make the common People Inquiſitive; that Inquiry gives 'em Knowledge; and that when they have Knowledge, they are very hard to Govern.

But ill Miniſters often think that the beſt Courſe to ſave themſelves, is yet farther to embroil their Maſters buſineſs, not conſidering, that the more things grow diſturb'd, the greater Neceſſity there will be of ſacrificing them to appeaſe the People's Anger.

Stateſmen ſhould take great Care how they contract Publick Hatred: For both Good and Bad Kings deſert 'em at laſt, and with juſt Reaſon; for he who has not Judgment, Conduct and Wiſdom enough to avoid being odious, deſerves not to be protected by his Prince, to his own Hurt and Danger.

Is there any Inſtance of a Wiſe, Juſt, and Good King (Reigning ſo long as to have Virtues known) who had not the Hearts and Affection of his Subjects? When Plots are form'd againſt ſuch Princes, are they not preſently defeated? And does not all Man-

Mankind deteſt the Conſpirators? And let ſome Flatteres ſay what they will, the Vulgar are not impatient of any Rule, that is tolerably fair and eaſie; at bottom they love the Splendor of a Court, and are fond of Regal Power; ſo that Kings, who will but ſtoop the leaſt to be Popular, are doated upon, and Idoliz'd in every Country.

The ſame thing holds in relation to Miniſters, if they are honeſt, if they have a Superior Genius, if they do not make too much haſt to be rich, if they are notoriouſly ſeen to perfer the Common Welfare before their own Private Intereſt, if they are Affable and Induſtrious in doing good Offices, if by their Actions 'tis known that they do not deſire to hold their Stations upon any ignoble Terms, if they are not Haughty, Arrogant, and Inſolent, they may Rule the State without Clamors, they may grow Grey in their Dignities and Offices; the beſt Part of Mankind will be conſtantly of their Side. And if they are at any time attack'd by Private Malice upon ſome Diſobligations or Diſappointment, their Enemies will not be able to do 'em any hurt: Clouded they may be for a while, but they will ſoon ſhine out with freſher Luſtre: If by Inadvertency, and through the Frailty of humane Nature, they have made falſe Steps, and committed ſmall Faults, the General Voice will be ready to excuſe'em, and their Perfections ſhall be put in the Ballance, and outweigh their Errors.

But here it may be objected, that *Richlieu*, who was undoubtedly one of the Greateſt Men that ever undertook the Guidance of a State, and who had very near all the good Qualities neceſſary for one to whom the Reins of Empire are committed, did, notwithſtanding, lie under continual Accuſations, Popular Anger, and Conſpiracies againſt his Perſon. To which we anſwer, That this Cardinal was a good Miniſter for the *French* King, but not for *France*. He had all along Deſigns to make his Maſter

Maſter Abſolute. 'Tis true, he endeavour'd, by his Sagacity, Care, and Deep Foreſight, to make th- *French* as great and happy as a Country can poſſibly be under an unlimited Dominion: However, his Foundation was not ſound at bottom, nor honeſt to Humane kind: He was therefore, from time to time, harras'd, interrupted and perplex'd by the few good Patriots that remain'd, who had ſtill an Eye towards their ancient Conſtitution: Some indeed joyn'd with theſe to oppoſe him, who did not act upon ſo right a Principle.

But when the Miniſters in the Meaſures they take to promote their Maſter's Greatneſs, conſider their Countries Freedom, when at one and the ſame time they are Truſty and Impartial Servants to Prince and Country both, when they duly Contemplate how unwiſe and wrong it is ever to let them have a divided Intereſt; Such States-Men as do all this, ſtand like Roks, againſt whom the waves, ſtir'd and mov'd forward by vulgar Breath, beat in Vain. They are ſafe, Rever'd by the beſt ſort, and the Darlings of the People; Such need not fear the ſcanning of their Actions, Popular Anger, nor the ſecret Machinations of diſcontented Perſons; Their Innocence is their ſure Guard, Arm'd with which, they are not apprehenſive of *Impeachements.*

From what has been here ſaid peradventure it will appear, that mix'd Governments are not to be long preſerved under their old Form, unleſs ſuch as repreſent their Country *Do hold a ſtrong hand over the Men of Buſineſs, calling thoſe to an Accompt, who either through Folly or upon ſome wicked Deſign, perſue Deſtructive Meaſures.*

But this high Cordial is not to be us'd upon every ſlight Occaſion; 'twas never intended by our Anceſtors to encounter Diſtempers better Cur'd another way, and to be then only Adminiſtred when the Body Politick was ſick at Heart. Nothing can be Admir'd and Awful that at every turn is expoſed to com-

common View; *Impeachments* are the Laws of the Supreme Sword which should be Drawn only to cut off great Offences; It should hang high, with the Scabard on, over the Heads and in the View of such as meddle in Matters of State; and when 'tis unsheath'd, be in a Way and Manner so very Terrible, as to make all Offenders Tremble.

If in Times to come, our Affairs should happen to be under an ill Administration, the Calamities that must thereby fall upon all Degrees of Men (those excepted who shall have enrich'd themselves by the Publick Spoils) will stir up the Legislative Authority to Interpose in looking after our future Safety.

And at such a season perhaps it will be thought the Sublimest Wisdom of all, not to be angry with Persons, but to mend Things; and that it will not Import much tho' the Criminal scape unpunish'd, so the Fault can be Corrected. The remorse and shame of having, it may be, in a few Years ruin'd a Rich and Flourishing People (for so the Case may happen) will be Punishment enough to those who have left in 'em any Seeds of Honour.

Such therefore as mean their Country well in an unhappy Juncture of this Nature, when they go to give Affairs a better Complexion, should in all likelihood begin their Work by Determining and Pronouncing **What Councils have been directly against the Law, what Advices have Tended to Impoverish the Crown and Kingdom, and what Practices have wasted the Nations Treasure.** And when in this Solemn Manner they have Condemn'd the Offences, if they think fit, the Offenders may be reach'd with Ease.

If we should ever have a Set of States-Men whose Offences will compel the Nation to Accuse them, they will endeavour to cover their own Faults by recriminating upon the Proceedings of former Times. If they are Charg'd with wasting the Pub-

lick Treaſure, and giving away the Crown Lands, with aiming at Arbitrary Power, and to Govern by the Sword, they will be ſo Audacious to think they ſtand juſtify'd by anſwering, *The ſame things were heretofore done.* But they ought to make this Reflection, that King *Charles* was in danger to loſe his Crown; and that King *James* actually loſt it, becauſe his Miniſters purſu'd Meaſures deſtructive to the Kingdom.

And now in a few Words to Re-capitulate the whole Matter of this long Section; If ſuch as Repreſent the People are Uncorrupt, Unbyaſs'd and Diſintereſted; If they diligently attend the Nation's Service; If they carefully watch Encroachments upon the Conſtitution; If they make Proviſion againſt Future Evils; If they look narrowly into the Debts and Expences of the Nation; If they hold a ſtrong Hand over the Men of Buſineſs; And if in this Manner *Private Perſons perform their Duty to the Publick*, we ſhall not fail in all ſucceeding Times, to ſee *a ſteddy Courſe of Honeſty and Wiſdom in ſuch as are truſted with the Adminiſtration of Affairs.* For it may be laid down for a certain Maxim, that States-Men, will hardly be Negligent, Corrupt or Arbitrary, when they are over-look'd with careful Eyes by ſo conſiderable a Part of the Conſtitution.

And where Things are well Adminiſtr'd, *That Country will always increaſe in Wealth and Power.* Have we not before our Eyes the Example of *Spain*, labouring under Publick and Private Wants, occaſion'd by nothing but a long Series of Miſgovernment? What has preſerv'd the *Venetians* for thirteen Centuries againſt ſuch Potent Leagues as have been frequently form'd againſt 'em, but that the goodneſs of their Conſtitution has enabl'd them to do great things with a very little? Would People under a Tyranny, or indeed under a better Form of Government ill manag'd, have defended themſelves with

with ſuch Courage as *Venice* and *Holland* have done? Did ever Countries fight ſo bravely for their Oppreſſors, as Nations that have contended in the Defence of their own Liberties? Where Matters are in a tottering Condition, do not the People grow ſullen and loath to venture their Stocks out of their ſight? Is it not ſeen that at ſuch a time Men hoard their Mony up which ſhould Circulate in Trade? When the Subjects are under Apprehenſions that ill Conduct at home will at laſt produce Wars, Dangers and Invaſions from abroad, have they not in all Ages at ſuch a ſeaſon intermitted their Foreign Traffick, Manufactures and other Buſineſs? What begets general Induſtry, but hopes to have Property preſerv'd? Is it not evident that tho here and there a private Man accumulates great Riches under an Abſolute Monarchy, yet that the whole Body of the People is always poor and miſerable in Countries ſo Govern'd? What encourages Men, with infinite Care, Labour, and Hazzard, to gather private Wealth, which enriches the Publick at laſt, but the hopes that ſtability of Affairs, prudent Conduct, and juſt Adminiſtration, may produce Peace, Security, and laſting Empire? Where Men have a Proſpect of all this, Strangers reſort thither with their Wealth and Stocks, whereas Merchants and other cautious Perſons abandon Countries, whoſe Follies and Corruptions ſubject 'em to continual Changes and frequent Revolutions, ſo that peradventure upon ſolid Reaſons and very juſt Grounds, we may lay down, that nothing more contributes to make a Nation Gainers in the general Ballance of Trade, than good Laws well obſerv'd, and a conſtant Courſe of honeſt and ſteddy Government.

As Trade and Riches have their Principal Foundation in the Liberty and Laws of a Country, ſo when thoſe great Springs go right, they ſet in Motion the Engine of a Common-Wealth, tho' ſome other Wheels may happen to be out of Order.

To

To have the Course of Law and Courts of Judicature proceed uncorruptly, is such a Remainder of Srength and Health, as may in time help to recover the other sickly Parts of a Constitution.

So that a Nation is not deprav'd beyond all hope of cure, which has in the chief Seats of Judgment, Men of deep Learning, Probity, Moderation and Integrity.

We shall Conclude this last Section with some Advices which *Richlieu* directs to *Lewis* the XIII. *Testament Politique* Part. 2. Chap. 10.

" Unless Princes use their utmost Endeavours to " regulate the divers Orders of their State; If " they are negligent in the choice of a good Council; " If they despise their wholesome Advice, unless " they take a particular Care to become such that " their Example may prove a speaking Voice; If " they are negligent in Establishing the Reign of " God, that of Reason, and that of Justice toge- " ther; If they fail to protect Innocence, to re- " compence Signal Services to the Publick, and to " punish Disobedience, and the Crimes which trou- " ble the Order, the Discipline, and Safety of " States; Unless they apply themselves to foresee " and prevent the Evils that may happen, and to " divert by careful Negotiations the Storms which " Clouds drive before them from a greater Distance " than is thought; If Favour hinders them from " making a good choice of those they Honour with " great Employments, and with the Principal Offi- " ces of the Kingdom; If on all Occasions they do " not prefer publick Interest to private Advanta- " ges; tho' otherwise never so good Livers, they " will be found more guilty than those who actu- " ally transgress the Commands and Laws of God; " it being certain that to omit what we are oblig'd " to do, and to commit what we ought not to do, " is the same thing.

FINIS.